EAGER: Exploiting a myopic opponent in imperfect-information games: Toward medical applications
EAGER: Exploiting a myopic opponent in imperfect-information games: Toward medical applications
批准号:
1546752
负责人:
Tuomas Sandholm
金额:
$10.0万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2015
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2015-09-01 至 2016-08-31
中文摘要
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英文摘要
Living organisms adapt to challenges through evolution and adaptation. These survival mechanisms have proven to be a key difficulty in developing therapies, since the challenged organisms develop resistance. It would be desirable to be able to harness evolution and adaptation for therapeutic and technological goals. For example, through a sequence of appropriate manipulations, could we get a heterogeneous population of cancer cells to evolve to benign ones? Or, could we steer the evolution of the population to a state where we can destroy it? Could we evolve bacteria that eat toxins from the environment? The PI proposes this to be done using computational game theory approaches. Biological opponents have a distinct weakness that can be exploited: evolution and adaptation is myopic - it does not look ahead in the game tree. The PI proposes to develop techniques for exploiting opponents that cannot look ahead in imperfect-information games. This project will set the stage for opponent-exploitation approaches to battling diseases in a broad range of context by computationally exploiting the diseases' myopic evolution/adaptation. This applies to basically an unlimited number of diseases (at the population, individual, and drug design levels), to synthetic biology (without inserting foreign genetic material), and to asking fundamental questions in our ability to steer evolution/adaptation. The work thus has the potential to pave the way for exceptionally broad impact. The proposed work has significant educational impact as well, beyond training and mentoring a PhD student working on this project. The PI will incorporate some of the most important results from the proposed research into his PhD-level courses Advanced AI and Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces. He also proposes to give talks and tutorials on these topics.Living organisms adapt to challenges through evolution and adaptation. These survival mechanisms have proven to be a key difficulty in developing therapies, since the challenged organisms develop resistance. It would be desirable to be able to harness evolution and adaptation for therapeutic and technological goals. For example, through a sequence of appropriate manipulations, could we get a heterogeneous population of cancer cells to evolve to benign ones? Or, could we steer the evolution of the population to a state where we can destroy it? Could we evolve bacteria that eat toxins from the environment? The PI proposes this to be done using computational game theory approaches. Biological opponents have a distinct weakness that can be exploited: evolution and adaptation is myopic - it does not look ahead in the game tree. The PI proposes to develop techniques for exploiting opponents that cannot look ahead in imperfect-information games. The proposed work has three intellectual foci. First, extending an IJCAI-15 paper by Kroer and Sandholm to handle the setting where the myopic opponent's node evaluation is not known exactly, but rather with uncertainty. Second, developing game abstraction techniques that leverage the opponent's myopia. Third, developing game representations that are tractable in settings where the opponent is a population (e.g., of cells) rather than an individual.
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RI: Mediuim: Abstraction, Equilibrium Finding, Safe Opponent Exploitation, and Robust Strategies for Imperfect-Information Games
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RI: Medium: Algorithms for Robust Barter Exchanges, with Application to Kidneys
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ITR - (ECS+ASE) - (dmc+soc): Automated Mechanism Design
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:2004
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依托单位:
CAREER: Coalition Formation Among Self-Interested Computationally Limited Agents
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批准号:0234693
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资助金额:$17.75万
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资助金额:$38.82万
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财政年份:2001
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依托单位:
ITR/PE+SY: Collaborative Research: Foundations of Electronic Marketplaces: Game Theory, Algorithms and Systems
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批准号:0121678
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$120.03万
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财政年份:2001
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ITR: Secure Automated Negotiation under Limited Computation: Deliberation in Equilibrium
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资助金额:$38.82万
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Advanced Contract Types for Automated Negotiation
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资助金额:$7.19万
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依托单位:
Advanced Contract Types for Automated Negotiation
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财政年份:1998
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依托单位:
Optimal Mechanisms for Negotiation Under Message Passing andBelief Revision
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资助金额:$20.11万
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财政年份:1997
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海外基金