CAREER: Coalition Formation Among Self-Interested Computationally Limited Agents
职业:在自利的、计算受限的智能体之间形成联盟
基本信息
- 批准号:0234693
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 17.75万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:美国
- 项目类别:Continuing Grant
- 财政年份:2001
- 资助国家:美国
- 起止时间:2001-06-01 至 2003-05-31
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
The award supports research into the development of efficient automated coalition formation methods that are targeted to operate in inherently distributed situations with combinatorial characteristics---e.g. task and resource allocation and multi- agent planning and scheduling. Of specific interest are situations in which agents have different goals and each agent is trying to maximize its own good without concern for the global good. The first part of the research extends prior work on coalition formation under bounded rationality to new models of computation and communication limitations. More general settings will also be studied in which a coalition's value is affected by nonmembers actions. For this, powerful new strategic solution concepts will be used. A paradox of bounded rationality in multi- agent systems also will be further studied and resolved. A second part of the work will explore coalition formation, using protocols that incorporate constructive multi-agent search, iterative refinement via renegotiation, backtracking via decommitting, and avoiding local optima via specific more powerful agreement types. A broad set of protocols will be explored. Collusion will also be analyzed among agents that have probabilistic, conditional performance profiles for their local deliberation algorithms, as well as agents that can gain by explicitly coordinating their computations with others. Algorithms will be designed and tested, and applied to two real- world problems: distributed vehicle routing and multi-enterprise manufacturing.
该奖项支持研究开发高效的自动化联盟形成方法,这些方法的目标是在具有组合特征的固有分布式情况下运行-例如任务和资源分配以及多代理 规划和调度。 具体关注的 是这样一种情况,在这种情况下,代理人有不同的目标,每个代理人都试图最大限度地提高自己的利益,而不关心全球利益。 研究的第一部分扩展了有限理性下联盟形成的先前工作,以计算和通信限制的新模型。 更一般的设置也将被研究,其中一个联盟的价值受到非成员的行动。 为此,将使用强大的新战略解决方案概念。多智能体系统中的有限理性悖论也将得到进一步的研究和解决. 第二部分的工作将探讨联盟的形成,使用协议,将建设性的多代理 迭代搜索 通过细化 重新谈判, 回溯 通过分解,并通过特定的方法避免局部最优 更强大的协议类型。将探讨一套广泛的议定书。共谋也将分析代理人之间的概率,有条件的性能配置文件,为他们的本地审议算法,以及代理人,可以获得明确的 协调 他们的 计算 与 他人 算法将被设计和测试,并应用于两个真实的世界的问题:分布式车辆路径和多企业制造。
项目成果
期刊论文数量(0)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
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Tuomas Sandholm其他文献
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities
- DOI:
10.1016/j.jcss.2011.02.009 - 发表时间:
2012-01-01 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:
- 作者:
Vincent Conitzer;Tuomas Sandholm - 通讯作者:
Tuomas Sandholm
Optimal Flow Aggregation
最优流量聚合
- DOI:
10.1007/3-540-44985-x_39 - 发表时间:
2000 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
S. Suri;Tuomas Sandholm;P. Warkhede - 通讯作者:
P. Warkhede
Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets
- DOI:
10.1016/j.geb.2005.06.001 - 发表时间:
2006-05-01 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:
- 作者:
Tuomas Sandholm;Subhash Suri - 通讯作者:
Subhash Suri
Automated negotiation
- DOI:
10.1145/295685.295866 - 发表时间:
1999-03 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Tuomas Sandholm - 通讯作者:
Tuomas Sandholm
Multiagent Systems A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial Intelligence
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
1999 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
Tuomas Sandholm - 通讯作者:
Tuomas Sandholm
Tuomas Sandholm的其他文献
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{{ truncateString('Tuomas Sandholm', 18)}}的其他基金
RI: Medium: Techniques for Massive-Scale Strategic Reasoning: Imperfect-Information Subgame Solving and Offering Guarantees in Simulation-Based Games
RI:中:大规模战略推理技术:不完美信息子博弈解决并在模拟游戏中提供保证
- 批准号:
2312342 - 财政年份:2023
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
RI: Small: New Computational Techniques and Market Designs for Kidney Exchanges and Other Barter Markets
RI:小型:肾脏交换和其他易货市场的新计算技术和市场设计
- 批准号:
1718457 - 财政年份:2017
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
RI: Small: Computational Techniques for Large Multi-Step Incomplete-Information Games
RI:小型:大型多步不完全信息博弈的计算技术
- 批准号:
1617590 - 财政年份:2016
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
EAGER: Exploiting a myopic opponent in imperfect-information games: Toward medical applications
EAGER:在不完美信息游戏中利用短视的对手:迈向医疗应用
- 批准号:
1546752 - 财政年份:2015
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
RI: Small: Expressiveness and Automated Bundling in Mechanism Design: Principles and Computational Methodologies
RI:小:机制设计中的表现力和自动捆绑:原理和计算方法
- 批准号:
1320620 - 财政年份:2013
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
AIR: Sophisticated Electronic Markets for TV Advertising, Powered by Novel Optimization
AIR:由新颖优化提供支持的复杂的电视广告电子市场
- 批准号:
1127832 - 财政年份:2011
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
ICES: Small: New and Better Markets via Automated Market Making
ICES:小型:通过自动化做市创造新的、更好的市场
- 批准号:
1101668 - 财政年份:2011
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
RI: Mediuim: Abstraction, Equilibrium Finding, Safe Opponent Exploitation, and Robust Strategies for Imperfect-Information Games
RI:Mediuim:不完美信息博弈的抽象、均衡发现、安全对手利用和稳健策略
- 批准号:
0964579 - 财政年份:2010
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
RI: Medium: Algorithms for Robust Barter Exchanges, with Application to Kidneys
RI:媒介:稳健的易货交换算法,适用于肾脏
- 批准号:
0905390 - 财政年份:2009
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Standard Grant
ITR - (ECS+ASE) - (dmc+soc): Automated Mechanism Design
ITR - (ECS ASE) - (dmc soc):自动化机构设计
- 批准号:
0427858 - 财政年份:2004
- 资助金额:
$ 17.75万 - 项目类别:
Continuing Grant
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