Topics in Strategic Communication

私人信息的战略沟通在经济理论和各种应用中具有根本意义，包括政治经济学，谈判，金融，法律和经济学。 本研究包含三个策略性沟通的计画，每个计画都使用博奕论的方法论，第一个计画发展新的沟通模式，跨越文献对“廉价谈话”与“可验证揭露”的标准分析。 经济学家对战略信息传递的了解，大部分都是基于这些两极设置的模型，在这些模型中，证据性私人信息要么完全可操纵，要么完全不可操纵。 然而，现实往往介于两者之间：操纵是可能的，但可能会产生成本。 本研究探讨了在这种情况下战略沟通的结构，发展了理论框架和结果。第二个项目研究了为什么有偏见的专家可能会被任命为决策者提供建议，往往是由决策者自己。 大多数现有的分析通常认为专家和决策者之间存在利益冲突，但没有说明为什么会存在这种冲突。 该项目开发了一个模型，将战略沟通与内源性信息获取相结合，表明征求意见的专家与不同的意见，可以是一个最佳的安排时，专家必须有动机，既获取信息，然后透露它。 长期以来，人们一直认为，即使选民不了解经济或政治变数，选举机构也鼓励消息灵通的候选人向公众透露他们的信息。目前的研究通过正式的选举竞争模型来检验这一概念的有效性，在正式的选举竞争模型中，私下知情的候选人提出了以赢得办公室为目标的政策。 问题是，候选人之间的竞争是否会导致选民能够提取候选人所拥有的有社会价值的信息。更广泛的影响第一个项目作出了新的贡献，了解作为通信技术的功能的战略信息传输的性质。 作为研究的结果，廉价的谈话和可验证的披露在概念上都可以被视为统一模型的极端，它们的预测也是如此。 此外，这些结果可能不仅对经济学，而且对政治学等领域的应用工作有用，在这些领域中，部分可操纵的信息被战略性地传达。 项目2为专家和决策者之间存在利益冲突和意见分歧提供了理由。 这可能是迈向组织中合理多样性理论的第一步。 第三个项目使我们了解政治家和政党在选举期间传播有社会价值的信息的动机。 这可能会对选举机构促进信息披露产生影响。

Intellectual MeritThe strategic communication of private information is of fundamental interest in economic theory and various applications, including in political economy, bargaining, finance, and law and economics. This research consists of three projects in strategic communication, each of which employs the methodology of game theory.The first project develops new models of communication that span the literature's standard analysis of "cheap talk" and "verifiable disclosure". Much of what economists know about strategic information transmission is based on models of these polar settings, where evidentiary private information is either perfectly manipulable or entirely non-manipulable, respectively. However, reality often lies in between: manipulation is possible, but may incur a cost. The research studies the structure of strategic communication in such cases, developing theoretical frameworks and results.The second project studies why biased experts may be appointed to advise a decision-maker, often by the decision-maker herself. Most extant analysis typically takes as given that there is a conflict of interest between experts and decision-makers, but does not address why such a conflict exists. The project develops a model that combines strategic communication with endogenous information acquisition, showing that soliciting advice from an expert with a difference of opinion can be an optimal arrangement when the expert must be motivated to both acquire information and then reveal it.The third project tackles information transmission in politics. There is a long-standing view that even if voters are uninformed about economic or political variables, electoral institutions encourage well-informed candidates for office to reveal their information to the public. The current research examines the validity of this notion through formal models of electoral competition, where privately informed candidates propose policy with the objective of winning office. The question is whether competition between candidates results in voters being able to extract the socially valuable information possessed by the candidates.Broader ImpactsThe first project makes a novel contribution to understanding the nature of strategic information transmission as a function of the technology of communication. As a consequence of the research, both cheap talk and verifiable disclosure can be viewed conceptually as extremes of a unified model, and likewise for their predictions. Moreover, the results may be useful for applied work in not only economics, but also fields such as political science, where partially manipulable information is strategically communicated. Project 2 provides a rationale for the existence of conflicts of interest and divergence of opinion between experts and decision-makers. It may be a first step towards a theory of rational diversity in organizations. The third project informs our understanding of the incentives for politicians and parties to disseminate socially valuable information during elections. It may have implications for which electoral institutions promote information revelation.