Would More Information Reduce Disagreement? Theory and Applications

更多信息会减少分歧吗？

• 批准号: 1459877
• 负责人: Navin Kartik
• 金额: $ 28.09万
• 依托单位: Columbia University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-06-01 至 2018-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1459877&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Would; More; Information; Reduce; Disagreement

Disagreement is ubiquitous in society, often resulting in social conflict. Can disagreement on an issue be reduced by obtaining more information? The PI will investigate various questions related to this theme. The project beings by showing that while more information can sometimes reduce disagreement, it can also increase disagreement. The main focus is on when more information should be expected to reduce disagreement "on average".The second part of the project uses the results on disagreement to study problems in information economics. The PI will develop models of persuasion, signaling, and markets with adverse selection to understand how an agent's information revelation is affected by the arrival of additional information. The additional information can be either exogenous or endogenously provided by other agents. Inter alia, new results will be obtained on how competition affects information provision.

分歧在社会中无处不在，往往导致社会冲突。 是否可以通过获取更多的信息来减少在一个问题上的分歧？ PI将调查与此主题相关的各种问题。 该项目的存在表明，虽然更多的信息有时可以减少分歧，但它也可以增加分歧。 主要的焦点是当更多的信息应该预期减少分歧“平均”。该项目的第二部分使用分歧的结果来研究信息经济学中的问题。PI将开发具有逆向选择的说服，信号和市场模型，以了解代理人的信息披露如何受到额外信息的影响。额外的信息可以是外源性的，也可以是由其他代理人内源性地提供的。阿利亚其他外，将在竞争如何影响信息提供方面取得新的成果。