Would More Information Reduce Disagreement? Theory and Applications
Would More Information Reduce Disagreement? Theory and Applications
批准号:
1459877
负责人:
Navin Kartik
金额:
$28.09万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2015
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2015-06-01 至 2018-05-31
中文摘要
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英文摘要
Disagreement is ubiquitous in society, often resulting in social conflict. Can disagreement on an issue be reduced by obtaining more information? The PI will investigate various questions related to this theme. The project beings by showing that while more information can sometimes reduce disagreement, it can also increase disagreement. The main focus is on when more information should be expected to reduce disagreement "on average".The second part of the project uses the results on disagreement to study problems in information economics. The PI will develop models of persuasion, signaling, and markets with adverse selection to understand how an agent's information revelation is affected by the arrival of additional information. The additional information can be either exogenous or endogenously provided by other agents. Inter alia, new results will be obtained on how competition affects information provision.
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会议论文
Collaborative Research: Veto Bargaining: Delegation and Non-Coasian Dynamics
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批准号:2018948
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$23.78万
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财政年份:2020
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负责人:Navin Kartik
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依托单位:
Information Transmission and Aggregation
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批准号:1155931
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$28.72万
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财政年份:2012
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负责人:Navin Kartik
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依托单位:
Topics in Strategic Communication
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批准号:0965577
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$7.6万
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财政年份:2009
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负责人:Navin Kartik
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依托单位:
Topics in Strategic Communication
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批准号:0720893
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项目类别:Continuing Grant
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资助金额:$0.0万
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财政年份:2007
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负责人:Navin Kartik
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依托单位:
海外基金