Collaborative Research: Veto Bargaining: Delegation and Non-Coasian Dynamics

合作研究：否决权谈判：授权和非科亚动态

• 批准号: 2018948
• 负责人: Navin Kartik
• 金额: $ 23.78万
• 依托单位: Columbia University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2020-08-01 至 2023-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2018948&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Veto; Bargaining; Delegation

This award funds research on the topic of veto bargaining. Veto bargaining concerns situations in which one agent or group can make proposals but another must approve them. Applications can be found in many areas of the social sciences: legislatures (e.g., U.S. Congress) propose bills that executives (e.g., the President) can veto; criminal prosecutors bring charges that judges and juries decide whether to convict a defendant on; CEOs and Boards need shareholders to sign off on certain decisions; and search committees put forward candidates but the decision of whether to hire rests elsewhere in an organization. The central issue the research will take up concerns the uncertainty proposers face about the preferences of those with veto power—which proposals they are willing to accept relative to the status quo. Using game theory, the PIs will theoretically investigate how such uncertainty affects bargaining and the resulting outcomes. They will explore applications and implications in some of the contexts noted above. It is hoped that the research will contribute to both the theoretical and practical understanding of veto bargaining, and provide some methodological insights.The PIs will adopt a framework of Proposer-Vetoer bargaining over a “spatial dimension” of actions or policies; i.e., the agents have single-peaked preferences. Vetoer’s preferences are her private information. The first part of the project will take a mechanism design approach to identify Proposer-optimal outcomes when Proposer has full commitment. This approach will be useful both normatively and positively. A connection will be made to optimal delegation. Among other things, the results will show that under reasonable conditions incomplete information can dramatically corrode Proposer’s bargaining power, while still resulting in efficient outcomes. Comparative statics will be obtained concerning the Proposer’s risk aversion and the alignment of preferences between Proposer and Vetoer. The second part of the research project will study a dynamic model in which Proposer has limited commitment. That is, he/she cannot commit to not coming back to Vetoer with a proposal in the next period should the current proposal be rejected. The results from the first part of the project will be used to understand how bargaining is affected by limited commitment. A familiar intuition when players are patient is that of Coasian dynamics: regardless of the commitment solution, Proposer’s lack of commitment should erode his/her bargaining power and lead to Vetoer getting her ideal outcome, perhaps modulo some minimum “outside option” payoff to Proposer. The PIs anticipate showing that this intuition fails here, owing to single-peaked preferences. In particular, it is anticipated that under some conditions there will be non-Coasian dynamics, with Proposer obtaining her commitment payoff.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项资助关于否决权谈判主题的研究。否决权谈判涉及一个代理人或团体可以提出建议，但另一个必须批准的情况。可以在社会科学的许多领域找到应用：立法机构（例如，美国国会）提出法案，高管（例如，总统可以否决;刑事检察官提出指控，法官和陪审团决定是否对被告定罪;首席执行官和董事会需要股东签署某些决定;搜索委员会提出候选人，但是否雇用的决定取决于组织的其他部门。这项研究的中心问题是提案者面临的不确定性，即那些拥有否决权的人的偏好相对于现状，他们愿意接受哪些提案。使用博弈论，PI将从理论上研究这种不确定性如何影响讨价还价及其结果。他们将探讨在上述某些情况下的应用和影响。希望本研究能有助于对否决权讨价还价的理论和实践的理解，并提供一些方法论的见解。PI将采用一个关于行动或政策的“空间维度”的提议者-否决者讨价还价的框架;即，代理具有单峰偏好。否决者的偏好是她的私人信息。该项目的第一部分将采取机制设计方法，以确定当投标人完全承诺时，投标人的最佳结果。这一做法在规范和积极方面都是有益的。将与最佳授权建立联系。除其他事项外，结果将表明，在合理的条件下，不完整的信息可以大大削弱投标人的议价能力，同时仍然导致有效的结果。比较静态将获得有关投标人的风险规避和投标人和否决者之间的偏好对齐。第二部分将研究一个投标人承诺有限的动态模型。也就是说，如果目前的提案被否决，他/她不能承诺在下一个时期不带着提案回到否决者那里。项目第一部分的结果将用于了解有限承诺如何影响讨价还价。当参与者有耐心时，一个熟悉的直觉是科斯动力学：不管承诺解决方案如何，提议者缺乏承诺应该会削弱他/她的讨价还价能力，并导致否决者得到她的理想结果，也许是提议者的最小“外部选项”收益的模。PI预测表明，由于单峰偏好，这种直觉在这里失败了。特别是，预计在某些条件下，将有非科斯动力学，与投标人获得她的承诺payoff.This奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并已被认为是值得的支持，通过评估使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准。

项目成果

Sequential Veto Bargaining With Incomplete Information

信息不完整的顺序否决谈判

• DOI: 10.3982/ecta20658
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: Econometrica
• 影响因子: 6.1
• 作者: Ali, S. Nageeb;Kartik, Navin;Kleiner, Andreas
• 通讯作者: Kleiner, Andreas