Topics in Strategic Communication

智力价值私人信息的战略传播在经济理论和各种应用中具有基本的兴趣，包括在政治经济学、讨价还价、金融和法律和经济学中。本研究包括三个战略沟通项目，每个项目都运用了博弈论的方法论。第一个项目开发了新的沟通模式，跨越了文献中标准的“廉价谈话”和“可核实的披露”的分析。经济学家对战略信息传播的许多了解都是基于这些两极环境的模型，在这些两极环境中，证据性私人信息要么完全可操纵，要么完全不可操纵。然而，现实往往介于两者之间：操纵是可能的，但可能会招致成本。本研究研究了在这种情况下战略沟通的结构，形成了理论框架和结果。第二个项目研究了为什么有偏见的专家可能会被任命为决策者提供建议，通常是由决策者本人。大多数现有的分析通常认为专家和决策者之间存在利益冲突，但没有解决为什么会存在这种冲突。该项目开发了一个将战略沟通和内生信息获取相结合的模型，表明当专家必须同时获取信息并披露信息时，征求意见分歧的专家的建议可能是一种最优安排。第三个项目解决了政治中的信息传递问题。长期以来，有一种观点认为，即使选民对经济或政治变数一无所知，选举机构也会鼓励知情的公职候选人向公众披露他们的信息。目前的研究通过选举竞争的正式模型来检验这一概念的有效性，在这些模型中，私人知情的候选人提出政策，以赢得职位为目标。问题是候选人之间的竞争是否会导致选民能够提取候选人拥有的有社会价值的信息。布罗德影响第一个项目对理解作为通信技术功能的战略性信息传输的性质做出了新的贡献。这项研究的结果是，从概念上讲，空谈和可核实的披露都可以被视为统一模型的极端，同样地，他们的预测也是如此。此外，这些结果可能不仅对经济学领域的应用工作有用，而且对政治学等领域的应用工作也有帮助，在这些领域，部分可操纵的信息被战略性地传达。项目2为专家和决策者之间存在利益冲突和意见分歧提供了理由。这可能是迈向组织合理多样性理论的第一步。第三个项目使我们了解了政治家和政党在选举期间传播有社会价值的信息的动机。这可能会对哪些选举机构促进信息披露产生影响。

Intellectual MeritThe strategic communication of private information is of fundamental interest in economic theory and various applications, including in political economy, bargaining, finance, and law and economics. This research consists of three projects in strategic communication, each of which employs the methodology of game theory.The first project develops new models of communication that span the literature's standard analysis of "cheap talk" and "verifiable disclosure". Much of what economists know about strategic information transmission is based on models of these polar settings, where evidentiary private information is either perfectly manipulable or entirely non-manipulable, respectively. However, reality often lies in between: manipulation is possible, but may incur a cost. The research studies the structure of strategic communication in such cases, developing theoretical frameworks and results.The second project studies why biased experts may be appointed to advise a decision-maker, often by the decision-maker herself. Most extant analysis typically takes as given that there is a conflict of interest between experts and decision-makers, but does not address why such a conflict exists. The project develops a model that combines strategic communication with endogenous information acquisition, showing that soliciting advice from an expert with a difference of opinion can be an optimal arrangement when the expert must be motivated to both acquire information and then reveal it.The third project tackles information transmission in politics. There is a long-standing view that even if voters are uninformed about economic or political variables, electoral institutions encourage well-informed candidates for office to reveal their information to the public. The current research examines the validity of this notion through formal models of electoral competition, where privately informed candidates propose policy with the objective of winning office. The question is whether competition between candidates results in voters being able to extract the socially valuable information possessed by the candidates.Broader ImpactsThe first project makes a novel contribution to understanding the nature of strategic information transmission as a function of the technology of communication. As a consequence of the research, both cheap talk and verifiable disclosure can be viewed conceptually as extremes of a unified model, and likewise for their predictions. Moreover, the results may be useful for applied work in not only economics, but also fields such as political science, where partially manipulable information is strategically communicated. Project 2 provides a rationale for the existence of conflicts of interest and divergence of opinion between experts and decision-makers. It may be a first step towards a theory of rational diversity in organizations. The third project informs our understanding of the incentives for politicians and parties to disseminate socially valuable information during elections. It may have implications for which electoral institutions promote information revelation.