Collaborative Research: Simulating the Dynamics of Insurgency

历史证据表明，一旦叛乱变得根深蒂固，解决它们可能需要几年时间，往往是相当血腥的，而且可能不是决定性的(许多叛乱再次发生)。在许多情况下，对各国政府来说，进行一场旷日持久的反叛乱运动的费用是非常昂贵的，而产生的成果却微乎其微。另一方面，虽然我们经常关注长期和血腥的叛乱，但历史也表明，大多数新生的叛乱实际上很快就会失败。该项目开发了一系列基于代理的计算机模拟模型，以帮助理解与击败叛乱相关的一些复杂性，并确定哪些可能会拖延，哪些将很快被击败。特别是，这些模型将帮助我们解决三个问题。首先，是什么导致一些叛乱组织变得根深蒂固并抵抗崩溃，而另一些叛乱组织则迅速失败？其次，尽管政府进行镇压，叛乱分子什么时候才能达到有可能生存下去的地步？最后，各国政府如何有效地调整其反叛乱战略，以遏制叛乱的增长？该模拟模拟了叛乱的早期阶段，其中平民、叛乱分子和士兵(政府军)之间的互动至关重要。在叛乱的早期阶段，平民是叛乱分子和士兵互动的受众，他们可以加入叛乱，也可以被阻止加入。叛乱分子可以攻击政府目标，进而被攻击、俘虏或杀害，他们的行动为平民改变忠诚度奠定了基础。初步模拟显示，由于政府对叛乱分子采取的军事行动有时会适得其反，因此对于试图抓获叛乱分子的政府/士兵来说，准确是至关重要的。对最初的模拟模型进行了一系列扩展，重点关注叛乱分子和政府的招募、学习以及多个叛乱团体之间的相互作用。模拟模型的发展与统计分析相结合，以确定模拟中观察到的模式是否也存在于国际政治中。该项目检查了叛乱的总体，并看看模型所建议的因素是否真的会预测叛乱的模式。特别是，对叛乱的持续时间、叛乱的发展速度以及叛乱对当地人口的渗透范围进行了审查。伴随着模型的各种替代措施的构建？在概念上，该项目纳入了关于叛乱和反叛乱努力的新数据的收集，以便能够更好地检验从模拟中出现的假设。该提案的更广泛影响包括，通过模拟和经验分析揭示了叛乱持续时间和终止的重要模式，并证实了这些模式的存在以及国际体系中各种变量之间的关系。特别是，了解不同类型的政府行动在什么情况下可能是有益的或适得其反的，可能会提供具体的政策建议，并有经验支持。了解这些模式和关系可能有助于设计适当的战略，以应对现有的叛乱，并从一开始就避免其出现。

Historical evidence suggests that once insurgencies become well-established, resolving them can take several years, is often quite bloody, and may not be definitive (many insurgencies recur). In many cases, the cost of conducting a prolonged counter-insurgency campaign is very costly for governments while producing only marginal success. On the other hand, while we often focus on long and bloody insurgencies, history also demonstrates that most nascent insurgencies actually fail quickly. This project develops a series of agent-based computer simulation models to aid in understand some of the complexities associated with defeating insurgencies and determining which are likely to drag on, and which will be defeated quickly. In particular, these models will help us address three questions. First, what leads some insurgencies to become well established and resistant to collapse, while others fail quickly? Second, when do insurgencies reach the point where they are likely to survive, despite government repression? Finally, how can governments effectively adapt their counter-insurgency strategies to stem the growth of insurgency? The simulation models the early stages of insurgency where the interactions of civilians, insurgents, and soldiers (government forces) are critical. At early stages of insurgency, civilians constitute an audience for insurgent-soldier interactions, and can join the insurgency or be deterred from joining it. Actions by insurgents who can attack government targets, and in turn be attacked and captured or killed, set the stage for civilians to change loyalties. Initial simulations have revealed the critical importance of accuracy on the part of governments/soldiers who seek to capture insurgents, since government military actions against insurgents sometimes backfire. A series of extensions to the initial simulation model are developed, focusing on insurgent and government recruitment, learning, and the interactions of multiple insurgent groups. The development of the simulation models is coupled with statistical analysis to determine whether the patterns observed in the simulations are also present in international politics. The project examines a population of insurgencies and sees whether factors that the model suggests will predict patterns of insurgencies in fact do so. In particular, insurgency duration, the speed at which insurgency grows, and the scope of penetration of the insurgency into the local population are examined. Along with construction of various proxy measures of the models? concepts, the project incorporates the collection of new data about insurgencies and counter-insurgency efforts to be able to better test the hypotheses that emerge from the simulations. The broader impacts of the proposal include the revelation of important patterns of duration and termination of insurgency, both from the simulation and empirical analysis, and confirming the presence of these patterns and relationships between variables in the international system. In particular, understanding the circumstances under which different types of government actions may be useful or counterproductive may offer specific policy advice, with empirical backing. Understanding these patterns and relationships may help in the design of appropriate strategies for confronting existing insurgencies and avoiding their emergence in the first place.