SHF: Small: Understanding and Mitigation of Electromagnetic Data Leakage from Modern Computer Processors and Systems

SHF：小：了解和减轻现代计算机处理器和系统的电磁数据泄漏

• 批准号: 1017638
• 负责人: Milos Prvulovic
• 金额: $ 10.67万
• 依托单位: Georgia Tech Research Corporation
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-09-15 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1017638&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SHF; Small; Understanding; Mitigation; Electromagnetic

Security of many computer systems relies on the basic assumption that data theft through unauthorized physical tampering with a computer system is hard and easily detected. Unfortunately, the ongoing transition to a knowledge economy results in increasing motivation for attackers and results in increasingly sophisticated attacks. Potential EM side-channel attacks, which use radio and microwave signals that are unintentionally produced by computer hardware as it operates, are especially worrisome because they can be carried out without actual contact with the computer, and because they are virtually undetectable by the user of the system. Unfortunately, there is very limited understanding of how much information is possibly being leaked from modern computer systems, from which distance can this information be received, and how to design processors and systems in a way that systematically minimizes this data leakage.This research proposes to carry out preliminary investigation and characterization of the EM side channel data leakage, and gain useful insights that will pave the way toward approaches that minimize this leakage. To this end, the PIs will create a basic experimental testbed to receive and analyze EM emanations from modern systems, and then use this testbed to identify EM emanations that leak data and estimate how the amount of EM data leakage changes with the distance from the system.

许多计算机系统的安全性依赖于这样的基本假设，即通过对计算机系统的未经授权的物理篡改而进行的数据盗窃很难且很容易被检测到。不幸的是，正在进行的向知识经济的过渡导致攻击者的动机越来越强，并导致越来越复杂的攻击。潜在的电磁侧信道攻击，即使用计算机硬件在运行时无意产生的无线电和微波信号，尤其令人担忧，因为它们可以在不与计算机实际接触的情况下进行，而且系统用户几乎无法检测到它们。不幸的是，有多少信息可能被泄露从现代计算机系统的理解非常有限，从什么距离可以接收到这些信息，以及如何设计处理器和系统的方式，系统地最大限度地减少这种数据leakage.This研究建议进行初步调查和表征的EM侧通道数据泄漏，并获得有用的见解，为最大限度地减少这种泄漏的方法铺平道路。为此，PI将创建一个基本的实验测试平台，以接收和分析来自现代系统的EM辐射，然后使用该测试平台识别泄漏数据的EM辐射，并估计EM数据泄漏量如何随与系统的距离而变化。