SHF: Small: Understanding and Mitigation of Electromagnetic Data Leakage from Modern Computer Processors and Systems

许多计算机系统的安全性依赖于这样的基本假设，即通过对计算机系统进行未经授权的物理篡改很难并且很容易检测到数据盗窃。不幸的是，正在向知识经济过渡的过程导致攻击者的动机增加，并导致越来越复杂的攻击。潜在的电磁侧通道攻击使用的是计算机硬件在运行时无意中产生的无线电和微波信号，尤其令人担忧，因为它们可以在不与计算机实际接触的情况下执行，而且系统的用户几乎无法检测到它们。不幸的是，对于现代计算机系统可能泄漏了多少信息，从多远可以接收这些信息，以及如何以系统地最大限度地减少这种数据泄漏的方式设计处理器和系统，人们了解的非常有限。这项研究建议对EM侧通道数据泄漏进行初步调查和表征，并获得有用的见解，为最大限度地减少这种泄漏的方法铺平道路。为此，PI将创建一个基本的实验测试床来接收和分析来自现代系统的电磁发射，然后使用该测试床来识别泄漏数据的电磁发射，并估计EM数据泄漏量如何随系统距离的变化而变化。

Security of many computer systems relies on the basic assumption that data theft through unauthorized physical tampering with a computer system is hard and easily detected. Unfortunately, the ongoing transition to a knowledge economy results in increasing motivation for attackers and results in increasingly sophisticated attacks. Potential EM side-channel attacks, which use radio and microwave signals that are unintentionally produced by computer hardware as it operates, are especially worrisome because they can be carried out without actual contact with the computer, and because they are virtually undetectable by the user of the system. Unfortunately, there is very limited understanding of how much information is possibly being leaked from modern computer systems, from which distance can this information be received, and how to design processors and systems in a way that systematically minimizes this data leakage.This research proposes to carry out preliminary investigation and characterization of the EM side channel data leakage, and gain useful insights that will pave the way toward approaches that minimize this leakage. To this end, the PIs will create a basic experimental testbed to receive and analyze EM emanations from modern systems, and then use this testbed to identify EM emanations that leak data and estimate how the amount of EM data leakage changes with the distance from the system.