SHF: Small: Understanding and Mitigation of Electromagnetic Data Leakage from Modern Computer Processors and Systems

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Security of many computer systems relies on the basic assumption that data theft through unauthorized physical tampering with a computer system is hard and easily detected. Unfortunately, the ongoing transition to a knowledge economy results in increasing motivation for attackers and results in increasingly sophisticated attacks. Potential EM side-channel attacks, which use radio and microwave signals that are unintentionally produced by computer hardware as it operates, are especially worrisome because they can be carried out without actual contact with the computer, and because they are virtually undetectable by the user of the system. Unfortunately, there is very limited understanding of how much information is possibly being leaked from modern computer systems, from which distance can this information be received, and how to design processors and systems in a way that systematically minimizes this data leakage.This research proposes to carry out preliminary investigation and characterization of the EM side channel data leakage, and gain useful insights that will pave the way toward approaches that minimize this leakage. To this end, the PIs will create a basic experimental testbed to receive and analyze EM emanations from modern systems, and then use this testbed to identify EM emanations that leak data and estimate how the amount of EM data leakage changes with the distance from the system.