Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Reformed or Reconfigured? Explaining Why Militant Groups Participate in Elections
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Reformed or Reconfigured? Explaining Why Militant Groups Participate in Elections
批准号:
1022912
负责人:
James Fearon
金额:
$1.2万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2010
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2010-07-01 至 2011-06-30
中文摘要
权威人士和政策制定者最近就一项协议是否能够而且应该将塔利班作为一个政党纳入阿富汗政治进行了辩论。然而,协议的可行性仍不确定,因为该激进组织迄今几乎没有表现出参与的迹象。此外,即使这样的协议也不能保证和平。联合国等组织有时认为,在冲突后举行选举,通常包括前武装组织的参与,有助于实现持久和平。然而,武装组织在选举中是否派出候选人,在冲突期间和冲突后是否像政党一样行事,以及重要的是,他们是否愿意在参与时放弃暴力,这些方面差别很大。我们对武装组织为什么参与选举,以及这如何影响随后的和平可能性知之甚少。解决这些问题的少数案例研究集中在全面内战结束时的少数大型激进组织,因此他们倾向于假设和平源于激进组织的参与,而不是探索其在不同背景下的前景。此外,这项工作未能产生全面的因果理论,探索激进组织的参与动机,也解释了他们对其他参与者预期行为的反应。在从小型恐怖主义运动到大规模内战的冲突中,这个项目试图回答两个相关的问题:为什么一些激进组织参与选举,而另一些却没有?为什么一些人随后继续使用暴力,而另一些人却没有?该研究采用多种方法来了解激进组织的选举参与情况,以及随后的暴力战术使用情况。该研究人员根据她对哥伦比亚和北爱尔兰多个武装组织的实地调查,提出了一种武装组织选举参与的理论。该理论认为,该组织和政府都是战略参与者,他们的动机和行动共同决定了激进组织参与的结果,以及选举后的和平。具体来说,这个激进组织希望如何在选举中与政府竞争,以及如何在军事上与政府作战,这两者之间必须有大致的一致性;政府的期望也必须保持一致。在国内冲突中,意外事件可以将这些信念转变为这样一种配置。国际行动者(如另一国政府或非政府组织)的潜在存在也会影响双方的决定。研究人员在已经进行的案例研究中找到了改变人们对通过选票或子弹竞争的期望的因素,但所调查的州可能因各种原因而有所不同。因此,这个项目将更广泛地检验这一理论。研究人员正在建立一个所有武装组织的全球数据集,其特点是衡量每个组织是否参与选举。在美国国家科学基金会的支持下,研究人员将聘请本科生助理完成这项测量的编码,然后收集一系列其他变量,允许对构成该项目的理论的假设进行实证检验。通过在许多情况下检查这些指标,研究人员可以评估理论在不同背景下的有效性。这个项目在理论、实践和方法上都有贡献。首先,社会科学研究尚未对国内冲突期间做出的许多政治决定,特别是激进组织的选举参与做出可靠的解释。本研究分析了这种参与作为参与这个被忽视的研究领域的第一步。其次,了解这些情况下行为者的动机及其对结果的影响——就选举参与与和平而言——为冲突国家以及其他国家和国际组织提供政策建议。最后,该项目提供了一个前所未有的、有来源的、透明编码的所有武装组织数据集,其中包括组织和政府行动的信息,以及民众和国际支持的衡量标准。这项对各种规模的武装组织使用任何类型的暴力战术的研究,还通过提供一个论坛来测试战斗中的战术决策理论及其对冲突结束的影响,促进了通常独立的内战和恐怖主义研究团体之间的合作。
英文摘要
Pundits and policymakers have recently debated whether a deal could and should bring the Taliban into Afghan politics as a party. The feasibility of a deal remains uncertain, however, as the militant group has so far shown few signs of engagement. Furthermore, even such a deal would not guarantee peace. Organizations such as the United Nations sometimes assume that holding elections after conflict, usually including the participation of former militant groups, facilitates a durable peace. Yet militant groups vary greatly in whether they run candidates in elections and otherwise behave like political parties during and after conflict, and, importantly, in whether they are willing to relinquish violence while participating.We know very little about why militant groups participate in elections, and how this affects the subsequent likelihood of peace. The few case studies addressing these questions focus on a small number of large militant groups at the end of full-scale civil wars, and so they tend to assume that peace results from militant group participation rather than exploring its prospects in different contexts. Moreover, this work fails to generate comprehensive, causal theories exploring militant group motivations for participation that also account for their reactions to the expected behavior by other actors. In conflicts ranging from small terrorist campaigns to large civil wars, this project seeks to answer two related questions: why do some militant groups participate in elections while others do not? And, why do some subsequently continue to use violence while others do not?The study employs a multi-method approach to understand militant group electoral participation, as well as the subsequent tactical use of violence. The researcher specifies a theory of militant group electoral participation based on her fieldwork on multiple militant groups in Colombia and Northern Ireland. The theory identifies both the group and the government as strategic actors whose incentives and actions jointly determine the outcome in terms of the militant group's participation, as well as in terms of post-election peace. Specifically, there must be a rough alignment between how the militant group expects to do competing in elections against the government versus fighting it militarily; the government's expectations must similarly align. Amid civil conflict, surprising events can shift these beliefs into such a configuration. The potential presence of an international actor, such as another government or a non-governmental organization, also influences both sides' decisions. The researcher located factors that change these expectations about competing through ballots or bullets in the case studies already conducted, but the states examined may differ for a variety of reasons. Thus, this project will test the theory more broadly. The researcher is building a global dataset of all militant groups, which features a measure of whether each participates in elections. With NSF support, the researcher will hire undergraduate assistants to finish coding this measure, and then collect a series of other variables permitting empirical tests of the hypotheses making up the project's theory. By examining these indicators across many cases, the researcher can assess the theory's validity in different contexts.This project makes theoretical, pragmatic, and methodological contributions. First, social science research has not yet generated solid explanations for many of the political decisions made during civil conflicts, especially militant group electoral participation. This study analyzes such participation as an initial step toward engaging this neglected research area. Second, understanding the incentives of the actors in these situations and their impact on the outcome--in terms of electoral participation and peace--informs policy recommendations for the conflicted state, as well as other states and international organizations. Finally, this project provides an unprecedented, sourced, and transparently coded dataset of all militant groups that includes information on group and government actions, as well as measures of popular and international support. This research on all sizes of militant groups using any type of violent tactics also facilitates collaboration between the often separate civil war and terrorism research communities by providing a forum for testing theories of tactical decisions during fighting, and their impact on conflict termination.
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会议论文
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Government Concessions to Irregular Politics, Violence, and Insurgency
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批准号:0817568
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$1.2万
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财政年份:2008
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负责人:James Fearon
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依托单位:
Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Conflict, Violence and Civil War
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批准号:0720440
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$1.2万
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财政年份:2007
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负责人:James Fearon
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依托单位:
Collaborative Project: 'Minorities at Risk' Database and Explaining Ethnic Violence
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批准号:9876477
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项目类别:Standard Grant
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资助金额:$4.59万
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财政年份:1999
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负责人:James Fearon
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依托单位:
海外基金