Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Social Networks and Electoral Strategies in the Philippines

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How can politicians be encouraged to choose pro-growth or development-oriented policies in new democracies? There is a growing consensus that political factors--in particular, good governance and accountability--are key determinants of economic success and, in turn, development aid effectiveness. The problem, however, is that growth-promoting policies, including providing necessary public goods, are not always attractive to politicians seeking re-election (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith et al. 2003; Vicente and Wantchekon 2008). This dissertation develops a new theory of politics in emerging democracies in which politicians win office at the local government level through ex ante strategies of vote buying, in which politicians give gifts or money to individuals in exchange for their vote (Schaffer and Schedler 2007), and ex post strategies of clientelism, through which politicians offer targeted private goods for electoral support (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Stokes 2007). The density of social networks is an important determinant of the choice between these two strategies. Close social ties and repeated interactions facilitate monitoring and verifying political exchange between politicians and individual voters. The theory implies that villages with dense social networks will be characterized by ex post strategies while villages lacking these network structures will use ex ante strategies. Similarly, the researcher hypothesizes that individual position in the social network affects whether voters are targeted for ex ante or ex post political exchange: the less connected are more targeted for vote-buying and less targeted for clientelistic exchange than the well-connected.This dissertation will undertake a set of household and politician surveys in Isabela Province, the second largest province in the Philippines, building on data collected from a baseline survey of politics and local service delivery recently conducted by the World Bank. This proposed survey employs two methodological innovations: 1) collecting social network data to evaluate network structure and to identify the position of individuals within the network; and 2) employing new survey methods that allow respondents to shield their response from enumerators (unmatched count technique) that are expected to reduce the under-reporting of vote buying. The use of social network analysis and of new survey methods allows for an assessment of the role of social networks in determining the monitoring and verification costs associated with the different political strategies.This project is the first to study the determinants of ex ante vs. ex post mechanisms of contingent political exchange. Understanding these mechanisms can help policymakers and local NGOs to design more effective voter education initiatives in the Philippines and better address the needs of groups that are particularly vulnerable to vote buying and other illegal practices. For example, many current anti-vote buying initiatives in the Philippines are organized through churches and civic groups. However, if people with fewer social ties to the community are targeted for vote buying at higher rates than those that are more integrated, such programs will not be able to reach the most vulnerable groups. Additionally, programs implemented through existing social groups may even have the unintended consequence of further widening the gap in voter awareness between well-connected and less-connected individuals. This study will also help improve the effectiveness of development aid and economic policy reform (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000). One puzzle in the aid literature is why many countries are unable to foster political accountability, even after adopting institutions such as free elections and term limits. This study can contribute to the design of economic reform interventions by the World Bank and other aid organizations by identifying political and social structures that undermine political accountability and prevent growth-friendly economic policies from being viable electoral strategies.