Conditions for nuclear reversals among U.S. allies

该项目旨在解释为什么美国盟国的外交政策决策者批准了各自国家的核逆转。目前占主导地位的解释仅部分得到经验事实的支持，因此需要进一步完善。这种主要的解释借鉴了美国提供的所谓延伸威慑（Tertrais 2011；国防科学委员会2008；国务院国际安全顾问委员会2007；Dunn 2006; Davis/Reiss 2000; Reiss 1994; Nye 1985）。根据这一理论，与美国结盟意味着为其合作伙伴提供核保护伞，从而提供或明或暗的安全保障，使独立的核防御能力过时。美国联盟在防扩散方面的效率在过去得到了惊人的证明，并导致几个美国盟友的外交政策精英放弃了已经存在的核武器活动，这一过程被称为核逆转。在更仔细的审视下，以联盟为基础的核逆转理论并不可靠。​然而，案例研究已经证明，美国联盟保护的相关性是阻止国家走向核的一个因果因素（Green/Furukawa 2008; Pollack/Reiss 2004）。因此，我们需要包括额外的变量，以增强或限制美国联盟减缓扩散的效果。这种完善基于联盟的核逆转理论的需要已被反复强调（例如Paul 2000: 8， m<s:1> ller/Schmidt 2010: 145）。本项目旨在推进以联盟为基础的核逆转理论，并对美国盟国的外交政策决策者同意其国家核逆转的条件提供差异化的、经验有效的解释。除了这一理论目标之外，该项目还旨在为制定德国和欧洲的不扩散政策作出贡献。这尤其涉及到如何防止美国在该地区盟友（即埃及、沙特阿拉伯、阿拉伯联合酋长国、土耳其）的决策者在面对伊朗核武器活动时效仿伊朗的问题（如Lindsay/Takeyh 2010； Moran/Russel 2009; WINEP 2009）。

The project aims at explaining why foreign policy decision makers of U.S. allies approved their respective nations nuclear reversals. The currently dominant explanation is only partially supported by empirical facts and therefore needs to be further refined.This dominant explanation draws on the so-called extended deterrence provided by the U.S. (Tertrais 2011; Defense Science Board 2008; Department of State International Security Advisory Board 2007; Dunn 2006; Davis/Reiss 2000; Reiss 1994; Nye 1985). According to this theory, an alliance with the U.S. implicates a nuclear umbrella for its partners and thus an explicit or implicit security guarantee that renders an independent capacity for nuclear defense obsolete. The efficiency of U.S. alliances with regards to non-proliferation has been spectacularly proven in the past and has led the foreign policy elites of several U.S. allies to renounce already existing nuclear weapons activities, a process called nuclear reversal.When put under closer scrutiny, alliance-based theories of nuclear reversal do not prove to be reliable. Numerous cases of nuclear reversals of U.S. allies that were approved by their respective foreign policy decision makers (i.e. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada and Germany) stand in stark contrast to cases of continued nuclear weapons development by U.S. allies (Great Britain, France, Israel and Pakistan). However, case studies have proven the relevance of U.S.-alliance protection as a causal factor for the prevention of states going nuclear (Green/Furukawa 2008; Pollack/Reiss 2004). Therefore, we need to include additional variables that enhance or limit the proliferation-mitigating effect of U.S. alliances. This need for refining the theory of alliance-based nuclear reversals has been stressed repeatedly (e.g. Paul 2000: 8, Müller/Schmidt 2010: 145).This project intends to advance the theory of alliance-based nuclear reversals and to provide a differentiated, empirically valid explanation of the conditions under which foreign policy decision makers of U.S.-allies consent to their countries nuclear reversal. Beyond this theoretical goal, the project aims at providing a contribution to the formulation of German and European non-proliferation policy. In particular, this concerns the question as to how, in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons activities, the decision makers of U.S. allies in the region (i.e. Egypt, Sau-di-Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey) can be prevented from following the Iranian example (e.g. Lindsay/Takeyh 2010; Moran/Russel 2009; WINEP 2009).