Conditions for nuclear reversals among U.S. allies

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The project aims at explaining why foreign policy decision makers of U.S. allies approved their respective nations nuclear reversals. The currently dominant explanation is only partially supported by empirical facts and therefore needs to be further refined.This dominant explanation draws on the so-called extended deterrence provided by the U.S. (Tertrais 2011; Defense Science Board 2008; Department of State International Security Advisory Board 2007; Dunn 2006; Davis/Reiss 2000; Reiss 1994; Nye 1985). According to this theory, an alliance with the U.S. implicates a nuclear umbrella for its partners and thus an explicit or implicit security guarantee that renders an independent capacity for nuclear defense obsolete. The efficiency of U.S. alliances with regards to non-proliferation has been spectacularly proven in the past and has led the foreign policy elites of several U.S. allies to renounce already existing nuclear weapons activities, a process called nuclear reversal.When put under closer scrutiny, alliance-based theories of nuclear reversal do not prove to be reliable. Numerous cases of nuclear reversals of U.S. allies that were approved by their respective foreign policy decision makers (i.e. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada and Germany) stand in stark contrast to cases of continued nuclear weapons development by U.S. allies (Great Britain, France, Israel and Pakistan). However, case studies have proven the relevance of U.S.-alliance protection as a causal factor for the prevention of states going nuclear (Green/Furukawa 2008; Pollack/Reiss 2004). Therefore, we need to include additional variables that enhance or limit the proliferation-mitigating effect of U.S. alliances. This need for refining the theory of alliance-based nuclear reversals has been stressed repeatedly (e.g. Paul 2000: 8, Müller/Schmidt 2010: 145).This project intends to advance the theory of alliance-based nuclear reversals and to provide a differentiated, empirically valid explanation of the conditions under which foreign policy decision makers of U.S.-allies consent to their countries nuclear reversal. Beyond this theoretical goal, the project aims at providing a contribution to the formulation of German and European non-proliferation policy. In particular, this concerns the question as to how, in the face of Iranian nuclear weapons activities, the decision makers of U.S. allies in the region (i.e. Egypt, Sau-di-Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey) can be prevented from following the Iranian example (e.g. Lindsay/Takeyh 2010; Moran/Russel 2009; WINEP 2009).