A Game Theoretic Approach to Pediatric Vaccine Pricing

儿科疫苗定价的博弈论方法

• 批准号: 1161458
• 负责人: Sheldon Jacobson
• 金额: $ 36.8万
• 依托单位: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2012-08-01 至 2017-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1161458&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Game; Theoretic; Approach; Pediatric; Vaccine

The research objective of this award is to introduce and explore game theoretic models that capture how pediatric vaccine prices are negotiated in the United States. Non-cooperative game theory and discrete optimization methodologies will be studied to gain insights into pediatric vaccine pricing that meets the needs of all stakeholders, and hence, facilitate a reliable stream of pediatric vaccines. The advantage offered by such models is that pediatric vaccine prices can be set collectively based on the entire set of vaccines required to satisfy the childhood immunization schedule, rather than one vaccine at a time, as is the case today. The results of this research will provide novel insights gleaned from Bertrand oligopoly pricing models, including the existence and computation of Nash equilibrium for weighted set cover games, and the introduction and analysis of repeated weight set cover games. This research will also provide conditions under which tacit collusion and the grim trigger strategy may lead to unexpected equilibrium vaccine prices. If successful, this research will introduce models and methodologies for setting and evaluating pediatric vaccine prices, with the potential to lead to a more secure and reliable pediatric vaccine supply. Such results will provide value in assessing the current state of pediatric vaccine pricing and in evaluating future pricing for new vaccines as they enter the market. This in turn may lead to improved national immunization coverage rates based on a more reliable set of vaccine sources and their impact on both economic and public health performance measures. Moreover, through a variety of student involvement activities and public health outreach, this research effort will enhance the educational environment supported by NSF and fostered at the University of Illinois.

该奖项的研究目标是介绍和探索博弈论模型，捕捉如何在美国儿科疫苗的价格谈判。将研究非合作博弈论和离散优化方法，以深入了解满足所有利益相关者需求的儿科疫苗定价，从而促进可靠的儿科疫苗流。这种模式提供的优势是，儿童疫苗价格可以根据满足儿童免疫计划所需的整套疫苗集体确定，而不是像今天这样一次只确定一种疫苗。本研究的结果将提供来自Bertrand寡头垄断定价模型的新见解，包括加权集覆盖博弈的纳什均衡的存在和计算，以及重复加权集覆盖博弈的引入和分析。本研究还将提供默契串通和严酷触发策略可能导致意外均衡疫苗价格的条件。如果取得成功，这项研究将引入设定和评估儿科疫苗价格的模型和方法，有可能导致更安全和可靠的儿科疫苗供应。这些结果将为评估儿科疫苗定价的现状和评估新疫苗进入市场后的未来定价提供价值。这反过来又可能导致基于一套更可靠的疫苗来源及其对经济和公共卫生绩效指标的影响而提高国家免疫覆盖率。此外，通过各种学生参与活动和公共卫生宣传，这项研究工作将加强由美国国家科学基金会支持并在伊利诺伊大学培育的教育环境。