Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science:Not In My Backyard: Intra-Group Party Competition in Africa

竞争性政党制度是巩固民主的必要条件（Mainwaring 1999，Mair 1997，Sartori 1976）。然而，在撒哈拉以南非洲的民主化国家，政治家们经常试图通过建立政党来最大限度地减少他们所面临的竞争，这些政党沿着种族界限垄断选票（Mozaffar et al. 2003，Horowitz 1985）。然而，非洲各国的立法选举显示，在种族身份直接映射到党派联盟的程度上存在相当大的差异。虽然某些族裔群体的选票被一个政党垄断，但其他群体有多个政党，有效地争夺他们的支持。如果我们要理解非洲多民族社会民主的未来，就需要对民族内政党竞争水平在时间和空间上的这种次国家差异进行理论解释和实证分析。这个项目的学术价值与它对政治家如何在民主经验有限的国家建立政党支持的地方基础的研究有关。该研究探讨了以下问题：为什么一些政治家能够建立民族政党垄断，而其他人失败？这样的民族政党是如何维持下去的？在什么情况下会出现种族内或区域内的竞争？经济和社会因素如何影响群体内政治竞争的出现？研究表明，集团内的选举竞争取决于各政党获得经济资源的机会。因此，本项目将审查一个政党对经济资源分配的影响力是否影响其维持对同族裔选票的政治垄断的能力。这一论点对关于非洲政治竞争的两种常见解释提出了质疑，即：选举规则的作用和裙带关系。虽然聚焦于选举制度提供了理论上的预期，即在特定地区应该观察到的政党数量和竞争类型，但该理论未能解释在类似的选举规则下选民可获得的选举选项中存在的差异。此外，依赖于裙带关系的理论无法解释为什么政治家会创建政党与已经存在的同种族政党竞争，因为该团体通过向总统提供统一的团体来改善对国家资源的获取。这一论点是使用来自两个非洲国家的次国家数据进行测试，这两个国家具有相似的经济，政治和社会学特征，但在不同种族群体的选民可选择的选举中表现出相当大的差异：肯尼亚和马拉维。为了评估这些国家国内次国家一级政党竞争的性质，将收集关于地方一级政治家竞选承诺的数据：其数量、实质内容以及不同政党所作承诺之间的关系。政党承诺是衡量政党竞争性质的有效尺度，因为它们反映了政党寻求竞争的问题;也就是说，政党根据对方的提议更新其承诺。该研究的设计还保持了许多自变量不变，以建立假设的自变量，经济多样性和因变量，选区层面的政党制度上观察到的变化之间的联系。除了收集有关经济多样性、政党承诺和政党竞争的数据外，该项目还包括一项调查和对政治家和商界领袖的半结构化访谈，以更好地展示商业与政治之间的联系。研究的更广泛影响与其对有关民主化的学术和政策问题的贡献有关。这项研究应该为关于经济资源与政党制度发展之间联系的辩论提供信息。了解政治竞争背后的动态对于超越多族裔社会中的族裔对抗是民主失败原因的常见假设非常重要。事实上，这项研究将表明，族裔内的竞争促进民主做法;这样做将建议旨在促进民主化和长期发展的改革。

A competitive party system is necessary for the consolidation of democracy (Mainwaring 1999, Mair 1997, Sartori 1976). In Sub-Saharan Africa's democratizing states, however, politicians are often seen attempting to minimize the competition they face by building parties that monopolize votes along ethnic lines (Mozaffar et al. 2003, Horowitz 1985). Yet, legislative elections across African countries reveal considerable variation in the extent to which ethnic identities map directly onto partisan alignments. While the votes of certain ethnic groups are monopolized by single parties, other groups have multiple parties that effectively vie for their support. This sub-national variation in levels of intra-ethnic party competition, both across time and space, requires theoretical explanation and empirical analysis if we are to understand the future of democracy in Africa's multiethnic societies. The intellectual merit of this project is associated with its examination of how politicians build local bases of party support in countries with limited democratic experience. The research examines the following questions: Why are some politicians able to build ethnic party monopolies while others fail? How are such ethnic parties sustained? Under what conditions does intra-ethnic or intra-regional competition emerge? How do economic and sociological factors affect the emergence of political competition within groups? The research suggests that intra-group electoral competition is dependent on the access parties have to economic resources. This project will therefore examine whether a party's influence over the distribution of economic resources affects its ability to sustain its political monopoly over the votes of co-ethnics. This argument challenges two commonly offered explanations regarding political competition in Africa, namely: the role of electoral rules and clientelism. Although focusing on electoral institutions provides theoretical expectations on the number of parties and the type of competition one ought to observe in a particular district, the theory fails to explain the variation that exists in the electoral options available to voters given similar electoral rules. In addition, theories that rely on clientelism fail to explain why politicians would create parties to compete with already existent co-ethnic parties, given the group's access to state resources is improved by presenting the president with a unified group. This argument is tested using sub-national data from two African countries that share similar economic, political, and sociological characteristics, yet exhibit considerable variation in the electoral options available to voters across ethnic groups: Kenya and Malawi. To assess the nature of party competition at the sub-national level within these countries, data will be collected on the campaign pledges made by politicians at the local level: their number, substance, and the relationship between pledges made by different parties. Party pledges are a valid measure of the nature of party competition because they reflect the issues around which parties seek to compete; that is, parties update their pledges in response to what opposing parties offer. The study's design also holds many of the independent variables constant to establish the link between the hypothesized independent variable, economic diversity, and the observed variation on the dependent variable, constituency level party systems. Besides collecting data on economic diversity, party pledges and party competition, the project includes a survey and semi-structured interviews with politicians and business leaders to better demonstrate the links between business and politics. The broader impacts of the research are connected with its contributions to scholarly and policy concerns related to democratization. The research should inform debates on the link between economic resources and party system development. Understanding the dynamics behind political competition is important to move beyond common assumptions that ethnic rivalries in multi-ethnic societies are the reason for democracy's failure. In fact, the research will demonstrate that intra-ethnic competition promotes democratic practices; in so doing it will suggest reforms aimed at promoting democratization and development over the longer term.