Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science:Not In My Backyard: Intra-Group Party Competition in Africa

一个竞争的政党制度对于巩固民主是必要的(Mainwaring 1999，Mair 1997，Sartori 1976)。然而，在撒哈拉以南非洲的民主化国家，人们经常看到政客们试图通过建立按种族划分垄断选票的政党来尽量减少他们面临的竞争(Mozaffar等人)。2003年，霍洛维茨1985年)。然而，非洲各国的立法选举显示，在种族认同直接映射到党派结盟的程度上，存在着相当大的差异。虽然某些民族的选票由单一政党垄断，但其他团体有多个政党，有效地争取他们的支持。如果我们要了解非洲多民族社会中民主的未来，这种跨越时间和空间的种族内部政党竞争水平的次国家差异，需要理论解释和实证分析。这个项目的学术价值与其对政客如何在民主经验有限的国家建立政党支持的当地基础的审查有关。这项研究考察了以下问题：为什么一些政客能够建立种族政党垄断，而另一些政客却失败了？这样的少数民族政党是如何维持的？民族内部或区域内的竞争是在什么条件下出现的？经济和社会学因素如何影响群体内政治竞争的出现？这项研究表明，集团内部的选举竞争取决于政党获得经济资源的途径。因此，这个项目将审查一个政党对经济资源分配的影响是否会影响其维持对同族选民投票的政治垄断的能力。这一论点挑战了关于非洲政治竞争的两种常见解释，即：选举规则的作用和裙带主义。虽然把重点放在选举机构上提供了关于一个特定地区的政党数量和竞争类型的理论预期，但该理论未能解释在类似选举规则的情况下选民可供选择的选举选择存在的差异。此外，依赖于裙带主义的理论无法解释为什么政客们会创建政党来与已经存在的共同民族政党竞争，因为该团体通过向总统提供一个统一的团体来改善获得国家资源的机会。这一论点使用了来自两个非洲国家的次国家数据进行了检验，这两个国家拥有相似的经济、政治和社会学特征，但不同种族的选民可用的选举选择有很大差异：肯尼亚和马拉维。为了评估这些国家中次国家一级政党竞争的性质，将收集关于地方一级政界人士作出的竞选承诺的数据：其数量、实质内容以及不同政党作出的承诺之间的关系。政党承诺是衡量政党竞争性质的有效措施，因为它们反映了政党寻求竞争的问题；也就是说，政党根据对方的提议更新其承诺。这项研究的设计还保持了许多自变量不变，以建立假设的自变量、经济多样性和观察到的因变量、选区级别政党制度变化之间的联系。除了收集有关经济多样性、政党承诺和政党竞争的数据外，该项目还包括一项调查，以及对政界人士和商界领袖的半结构化采访，以更好地展示商业与政治之间的联系。这项研究的更广泛影响与其对与民主化有关的学术和政策问题的贡献有关。这项研究应该为有关经济资源和政党制度发展之间的联系的辩论提供参考。了解政治竞争背后的动态，对于摆脱多民族社会中的种族竞争是民主失败的原因的普遍假设非常重要。事实上，这项研究将表明，族裔内部竞争促进民主做法；这样做将提出旨在促进长期民主化和发展的改革。

A competitive party system is necessary for the consolidation of democracy (Mainwaring 1999, Mair 1997, Sartori 1976). In Sub-Saharan Africa's democratizing states, however, politicians are often seen attempting to minimize the competition they face by building parties that monopolize votes along ethnic lines (Mozaffar et al. 2003, Horowitz 1985). Yet, legislative elections across African countries reveal considerable variation in the extent to which ethnic identities map directly onto partisan alignments. While the votes of certain ethnic groups are monopolized by single parties, other groups have multiple parties that effectively vie for their support. This sub-national variation in levels of intra-ethnic party competition, both across time and space, requires theoretical explanation and empirical analysis if we are to understand the future of democracy in Africa's multiethnic societies. The intellectual merit of this project is associated with its examination of how politicians build local bases of party support in countries with limited democratic experience. The research examines the following questions: Why are some politicians able to build ethnic party monopolies while others fail? How are such ethnic parties sustained? Under what conditions does intra-ethnic or intra-regional competition emerge? How do economic and sociological factors affect the emergence of political competition within groups? The research suggests that intra-group electoral competition is dependent on the access parties have to economic resources. This project will therefore examine whether a party's influence over the distribution of economic resources affects its ability to sustain its political monopoly over the votes of co-ethnics. This argument challenges two commonly offered explanations regarding political competition in Africa, namely: the role of electoral rules and clientelism. Although focusing on electoral institutions provides theoretical expectations on the number of parties and the type of competition one ought to observe in a particular district, the theory fails to explain the variation that exists in the electoral options available to voters given similar electoral rules. In addition, theories that rely on clientelism fail to explain why politicians would create parties to compete with already existent co-ethnic parties, given the group's access to state resources is improved by presenting the president with a unified group. This argument is tested using sub-national data from two African countries that share similar economic, political, and sociological characteristics, yet exhibit considerable variation in the electoral options available to voters across ethnic groups: Kenya and Malawi. To assess the nature of party competition at the sub-national level within these countries, data will be collected on the campaign pledges made by politicians at the local level: their number, substance, and the relationship between pledges made by different parties. Party pledges are a valid measure of the nature of party competition because they reflect the issues around which parties seek to compete; that is, parties update their pledges in response to what opposing parties offer. The study's design also holds many of the independent variables constant to establish the link between the hypothesized independent variable, economic diversity, and the observed variation on the dependent variable, constituency level party systems. Besides collecting data on economic diversity, party pledges and party competition, the project includes a survey and semi-structured interviews with politicians and business leaders to better demonstrate the links between business and politics. The broader impacts of the research are connected with its contributions to scholarly and policy concerns related to democratization. The research should inform debates on the link between economic resources and party system development. Understanding the dynamics behind political competition is important to move beyond common assumptions that ethnic rivalries in multi-ethnic societies are the reason for democracy's failure. In fact, the research will demonstrate that intra-ethnic competition promotes democratic practices; in so doing it will suggest reforms aimed at promoting democratization and development over the longer term.