Doctoral Dissertation Research: Legacy Institutions and Political Order in Weak States

本项目研究非国家机构在弱势国家中产生政治秩序的能力的变化。在某些地方，酋长、氏族、苏丹国或王国履行着国家的许多职能：执行法律的法规、收税、保障财产权和确保安全。一些这类机构的领导人对其追随者表现出令人印象深刻的控制力。然而在其他地方，居民们可以随意违抗他们的领导而不受惩罚。PI研究了为什么一些非国家机构的领导人能够命令他们的追随者服从，而其他人则不能。为解决这一问题，该项目采用了人种学技术，并在乍得周边地区进行了调查实验，该地区在2014年脆弱国家指数中排名第六。该项目有助于了解与贫穷国家和发展中国家的治理、秩序、合法性和合规性有关的机制。了解这些机制对于关心政府稳定和问责制的决策者特别重要。本项目将进行调查实验，以测试传统机构领导人能够在其追随者中诱导顺从的程度的差异。关键的随机操纵将是一项指令是否得到了一位传统机构领导人的支持。PI将测试两个结果。在“独裁者游戏”的一个版本中所做的贡献是第一个被衡量的结果。被调查者决定是否为该地区的非政治性发展项目做出贡献以及贡献多少。随机化治疗是一个传统机构领导人的认可。参与者是否返回与发展有关的信息会议是衡量的第二项成果。PI假设“接受过治疗”的受访者-那些听到传统机构领导人认可的人-将更有可能为项目做出贡献并参加会议。PI将乍得作为关注国家。该项目有助于了解与贫穷国家和发展中国家的治理、秩序和遵守有关的机制。

General SummaryThis project investigates variation in the ability of non-state institutions to produce political order in weak states. In some places, chieftaincies, clans, sultanates, or kingdoms perform many of the functions of a state: enforcing legal codes, collecting taxes, guaranteeing property rights, and ensuring security. The leaders of some such institutions demonstrate an impressive command over their followers. Yet in other places, residents feel free to disobey their leaders with impunity. The PI examines why leaders of some non-state institutions are able to command compliance from their followers while others are not. To address this question, the project employs both ethnographic techniques and a survey experiment in peripheral regions of Chad, which ranked sixth on the 2014 Fragile States Index. This project contributes to understanding about the mechanisms that relate to governance, order, legitimacy, and compliance in poor and developing countries. Understanding these mechanisms is particularly important to policy makers who are interested in governmental stability and accountability. Technical SummaryThe project will conduct survey experiments to test for differences in degree to which legacy institution leaders can induce compliance among their followers. The key randomized manipulation will be whether a directive has the backing of a legacy institution leader. The PI will test two outcomes. Contributions made in a version of the "dictator game" is the first outcome that is measured. The respondent decides whether and how much to contribute to an apolitical development project for the region. The randomized treatment is an endorsement from a legacy institution leader. Whether participants return to a development-related information session is the second outcome measured. The PI hypothesizes that "treated" respondents--those who hear an endorsement from a legacy institution leader--will be more likely to contribute to the project and to attend the meeting. The PI uses Chad as the country of interest. This project contributes to understanding about the mechanisms that relate to governance, order, and compliance in poor and developing countries.