TWC: Medium: Collaborative: A Unified Statistics-Based Framework for Side-Channel Attack Analysis and Security Evaluation of Cryptosystems

TWC：媒介：协作：基于统计的统一框架，用于密码系统的侧通道攻击分析和安全评估

• 批准号: 1314655
• 负责人: Yunsi Fei
• 金额: $ 52.21万
• 依托单位: Northeastern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2013-07-01 至 2017-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1314655&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TWC; Medium; Collaborative; Unified; Statistics

Side-channel attack (SCA) has shown to be a serious implementation attack to many cryptosystems. Practical countermeasures only mitigate the vulnerability to some extent. Considerable research efforts on leakage-resilient cryptography have so far not led to practical leakage-resilient implementations. One hindering reason is the lack of commonly accepted and sound metrics, standards, and evaluation procedures to measure and evaluate the vulnerability/resilience of cryptosystems to various side-channel attacks. Accurate modeling of side channels, however, is one of the open problems in applied crypto research. This project aims to close the gap between SCA theories and practices by formalizing a general framework for side-channel attack analysis and security evaluation of cryptosystems. The proposed framework quantifies the effect of algorithmic and implementation characteristics on the success rate of the theoretically strongest maximum likelihood attack, revealing system-inherent SCA-related parameters for security improvement. The framework will extract maximum leakage from the observed measurement data in the black-box scenario, often the realistic situation for adversaries. State-of-the-art statistical methods are employed in the framework to precisely analyze and evaluate the overall side-channel leakage. This holistic framework will significantly alleviate the burden of security system architects, software developers, and hardware designers in their quest to build SCA security into systems they design, so as to ultimately yield provably secure hardware.

侧信道攻击（SCA）是一种严重的密码实现攻击。实际对策只能在一定程度上减轻脆弱性。到目前为止，对泄漏弹性密码学的大量研究工作还没有导致实际的泄漏弹性实现。一个阻碍的原因是缺乏普遍接受的和健全的指标，标准和评估程序来衡量和评估各种侧信道攻击的脆弱性/弹性的密码系统。然而，侧信道的精确建模是应用密码学研究中的公开问题之一。该项目旨在通过形式化密码系统侧通道攻击分析和安全评估的通用框架来缩小SCA理论与实践之间的差距。该框架量化了算法和实现特性对理论上最强的最大似然攻击成功率的影响，揭示了系统固有的SCA相关参数，以提高安全性。该框架将从黑箱场景中观察到的测量数据中提取最大泄漏，通常是对手的现实情况。该框架采用了最先进的统计方法来精确分析和评估整体侧通道泄漏。这个整体框架将大大减轻安全系统架构师、软件开发人员和硬件设计人员在寻求将SCA安全性构建到他们设计的系统中的负担，从而最终产生可证明安全的硬件。