EAGER: Identifying Security Critical Properties of a Processor
EAGER: Identifying Security Critical Properties of a Processor
批准号:
1651276
负责人:
Cynthia Sturton
金额:
$15.0万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
2016
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
2016-09-15 至 2018-08-31
中文摘要
这个项目的重点是加强存在于计算机处理器中的安全漏洞。就像在软件中一样,硬件中的错误也存在漏洞,可以被坚定的攻击者利用。先前的工作已经开发了一种方法,通过该方法,处理器可以监控自己,并在观察到危险的异常行为时向软件发送警报。什么构成危险行为的问题是一个开放的问题,解决这个问题是这项研究的目标。在这样做的过程中,该项目有可能使自我监控处理器实用和有效,显着推进保护硬件免受恶意攻击的最新技术。自我监控处理器的工作原理是在硬件中编码处理器应该始终保持的属性,然后在其中一个属性被违反时向软件抛出异常。在这个项目中,研究人员开发了一种半自动化的方法和工具链来识别和构建以硬件设计语言编码的安全关键属性。该项目使用一组已经修补的处理器设计错误来自动创建一组初始的安全关键属性,并使用机器学习技术来推断一组与任何特定已知漏洞无关但对安全至关重要的附加属性。
英文摘要
This project focuses on shoring up the security vulnerabilities that exist in computer processors. Just like in software, bugs in hardware present vulnerabilities that can be exploited by determined attackers. Prior work has developed a method whereby the processor monitors itself and sends an alert to software whenever dangerous, anomalous behavior is observed. The question of what constitutes dangerous behavior is an open one, and tackling it is the goal of this research. In doing so the project has the potential to make self-monitoring processors practical and efficacious, significantly advancing the state of the art in protecting hardware from malicious attack.The self-monitoring processor works by encoding in hardware the properties that a processor should always maintain and then throwing an exception to software if one of the properties is ever violated. In this project, the researchers develop a semi-automated methodology and tool-chain to identify and build the security-critical properties encoded in a hardware design language. The project uses a set of already-patched bugs of a processor design to automatically create an initial set of security-critical properties, and machine learning techniques to infer an additional set of properties that are not tied to any particular known vulnerability, yet are critical to security.
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DOI:
10.1109/micro.2018.00071
发表时间:
2018-10
期刊:
2018 51st Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO)
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Rui Zhang;Calvin Deutschbein;Peng Huang;C. Sturton]
通讯作者:
Rui Zhang;Calvin Deutschbein;Peng Huang;C. Sturton
Identifying Security Critical Properties for the Dynamic Verification of a Processor
识别处理器动态验证的安全关键属性
DOI:
10.1145/3037697.3037734
发表时间:
2017
期刊:
Proceedings of the Twenty-Second International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Zhang, Rui, Stanley, Natalie, Griggs, Christopher, Chi, Andrew, Sturton, Cynthia]
通讯作者:
Sturton, Cynthia
End-to-End Automated Exploit Generation for Processor Security Validation
用于处理器安全验证的端到端自动漏洞利用生成
DOI:
10.1109/mdat.2021.3063314
发表时间:
2021
期刊:
IEEE Design & Test
影响因子:
2
作者:
[Zhang, Rui, Deutschbein, Calvin, Huang, Peng, Sturton, Cynthia]
通讯作者:
Sturton, Cynthia
A recursive strategy for symbolic execution to find exploits in hardware designs
用于寻找硬件设计漏洞的符号执行递归策略
DOI:
10.1145/3219763.3219764
发表时间:
2018
期刊:
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGPLAN International Workshop on Formal Methods and Security
影响因子:
--
作者:
[Zhang, Rui, Sturton, Cynthia]
通讯作者:
Sturton, Cynthia
Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Hardware Security Insights: Analyzing Hardware Designs to Understand and Assess Security Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities
-
批准号:2247754
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$57.1万
-
财政年份:2023
-
负责人:Cynthia Sturton
-
依托单位:
SaTC: STARSS: Small: Tackling the Corner Cases: Finding Security Vulnerabilities in CPU Designs
-
批准号:1816637
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$33.33万
-
财政年份:2018
-
负责人:Cynthia Sturton
-
依托单位:
CPS: Frontier: Collaborative Research: VeHICaL: Verified Human Interfaces, Control, and Learning for Semi-Autonomous Systems
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批准号:1544924
-
项目类别:Continuing Grant
-
资助金额:$50.0万
-
财政年份:2016
-
负责人:Cynthia Sturton
-
依托单位:
CRII: SaTC: Detecting Security Vulnerabilities in Instruction Set Architectures
-
批准号:1464209
-
项目类别:Standard Grant
-
资助金额:$17.5万
-
财政年份:2015
-
负责人:Cynthia Sturton
-
依托单位:
海外基金