Experimental Studies of Time Inconsistent Preferences for Risk, Fairness, and Charitable Giving

风险、公平和慈善捐赠的时间不一致偏好的实验研究

基本信息

批准号：
1658952
负责人：
James Andreoni
金额：
$ 31.63万
依托单位：
University of California-San Diego
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Continuing Grant
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2017-07-01 至 2023-06-30
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1658952&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
Experimental Studies Time Inconsistent Preferences

项目摘要

AbstractFuture commitments that are not followed through, referred to as time-inconsistent choices (TICs), are considered the result of temptation to indulge in immediately satisfying activities. These activities lead to inefficient decisions, such as low savings, and the way to overcome TICs is to design contracts that force people to "commit" to their plans. This proposal looks at a new breed of TICs that people often do not want to commit to avoiding. Unlike usual TICs, this research will study temptations that are social rather than private. A large component of acting fairly or generously is the result of social pressures to give or to appear generous. These social pressures are felt at the time of the decision to give, while the joy of giving is not felt until the actual gift is transacted. People may be tempted to promise to give because of the social pressure to appear generous but may not follow through when the time comes to give. This TIC need not be cured by commitment plans, but by giving people the flexibility to break with their plans. This research will study how one can tell which cause of TIC is at work, and how best to improve people's outcomes. Understanding this new breed of TICs will lead to better decisions, such as increased savings, investment in education, and policy formulation, thus improving the living standards of U.S. citizens and the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.The literature on TICs assumes that plans for the future are made free from present bias which can only be overcome by commitment plans. The idea behind this research is that the same behavior?stating and breaking a plan?can come from two equally natural and intuitive models, but one is best cured by commitment while the other requires flexibility. Besides the usual TICs resulting from "present bias", some people make commitment for the future they do not intend to follow through because of social pressure. Efficient policy to deal with this type of time inconsistent choice is to allow for flexibility to opt out of the commitment. This research will develop models and conduct experiments to distinguish between the two sources of TICs. The ideas developed will be applied to several areas, such as charitable giving and notions of fairness and justice, where social pressures are important. The research will use a combination of laboratory and field experiments, and economic theory to develop hypotheses and tests. The results of this research will help us better understand the issues of time-inconsistent choices and help provide better contract design to improve social outcomes. The results are also applicable to several areas of economics and other social sciences.

未经遵循的抽象提交承诺被称为时间不一致的选择（TICS），被认为是沉迷于立即满足活动的诱惑的结果。这些活动导致效率低下的决策，例如储蓄低，克服抽动的方法是设计迫使人们“承诺”其计划的合同。该提议着眼于人们通常不想避免的一种新型抽动。与通常的抽动不同，这项研究将研究社会而不是私人的诱惑。公平或慷慨地行动的很大一部分是社会压力给予或慷慨的结果。在决定时会感到这些社会压力，而在实际礼物进行交易之前，不会感受到奉献的喜悦。由于社会压力显得慷慨，人们可能会愿意承诺给予奉献，但在付出时可能不会遵循。这种抽动不必通过承诺计划来治愈，而是通过让人们的灵活性来违反计划。这项研究将研究如何判断出TIC的哪些原因在起作用，以及如何最好地改善人们的成果。了解这种新的抽动将导致更好的决策，例如增加的储蓄，对教育和政策制定，从而提高美国公民的生活水平和美国经济的竞争力。关于泰克的文献假设未来的计划摆脱了当前的偏见，这只能通过承诺计划来克服。这项研究背后的想法是相同的行为？说并打破了计划吗？可以来自两个同样自然和直观的模型，但是一种最好通过承诺来治愈，而另一种则需要灵活性。除了“当前偏见”所产生的通常的抽动外，有些人会为未来的未来承诺，因为社会压力而不愿遵循。处理这种时间不一致的选择的有效政策是允许灵活性退出承诺。这项研究将开发模型并进行实验，以区分两种抽动来源。开发的想法将应用于几个领域，例如慈善奉献和公平和正义的概念，在社会压力很重要的情况下。该研究将结合实验室和现场实验以及经济理论来开发假设和检验。这项研究的结果将有助于我们更好地了解时间不一致的选择问题，并有助于提供更好的合同设计以改善社会成果。结果也适用于经济学和其他社会科学领域。