Experimental Studies of Time Inconsistent Preferences for Risk, Fairness, and Charitable Giving

未来的承诺，不遵守通过，被称为时间不一致的选择（TIC），被认为是诱惑的结果，沉迷于立即满意的活动。 这些活动会导致低效率的决策，例如低储蓄，克服TIC的方法是设计合同，迫使人们“承诺”他们的计划。 这项提案着眼于一种新的TIC，人们往往不想承诺避免。 与通常的TIC不同，这项研究将研究社会而不是私人的诱惑。行为公平或慷慨的很大一部分原因是社会压力的结果，给予或显得慷慨。 这些社会压力是在决定给予的时候感受到的，而给予的喜悦是在实际的礼物交易之前感受不到的。 人们可能会受到诱惑，因为社会压力要显得慷慨大方，但可能不会在给予的时候坚持到底。这个TIC不需要通过承诺计划来治愈，而是通过给人们打破计划的灵活性来治愈。 这项研究将研究如何判断TIC的原因，以及如何最好地改善人们的结果。 了解这一新品种的TIC将导致更好的决策，如增加储蓄，教育投资和政策制定，从而提高美国公民的生活水平和美国经济的竞争力。有关TIC的文献假设，未来的计划不受当前偏见的影响，而当前偏见只能通过承诺计划来克服。 这项研究背后的想法是，同样的行为？制定和破坏计划可以来自两个同样自然和直观的模型，但一个是最好的治愈承诺，而另一个需要灵活性。 除了常见的“现在偏见”导致的TIC之外，有些人因为社会压力而对未来做出了他们不打算坚持的承诺。处理这种时间不一致选择的有效策略是允许灵活地选择退出承诺。本研究将开发模型并进行实验，以区分TIC的两种来源。 所提出的想法将应用于若干领域，如慈善捐赠和公平正义的概念，在这些领域，社会压力很重要。 该研究将使用实验室和现场实验相结合，以及经济理论来开发假设和测试。 这项研究的结果将有助于我们更好地理解时间不一致的选择问题，并有助于提供更好的合同设计，以改善社会成果。 这些结果也适用于经济学和其他社会科学的一些领域。

AbstractFuture commitments that are not followed through, referred to as time-inconsistent choices (TICs), are considered the result of temptation to indulge in immediately satisfying activities. These activities lead to inefficient decisions, such as low savings, and the way to overcome TICs is to design contracts that force people to "commit" to their plans. This proposal looks at a new breed of TICs that people often do not want to commit to avoiding. Unlike usual TICs, this research will study temptations that are social rather than private. A large component of acting fairly or generously is the result of social pressures to give or to appear generous. These social pressures are felt at the time of the decision to give, while the joy of giving is not felt until the actual gift is transacted. People may be tempted to promise to give because of the social pressure to appear generous but may not follow through when the time comes to give. This TIC need not be cured by commitment plans, but by giving people the flexibility to break with their plans. This research will study how one can tell which cause of TIC is at work, and how best to improve people's outcomes. Understanding this new breed of TICs will lead to better decisions, such as increased savings, investment in education, and policy formulation, thus improving the living standards of U.S. citizens and the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.The literature on TICs assumes that plans for the future are made free from present bias which can only be overcome by commitment plans. The idea behind this research is that the same behavior?stating and breaking a plan?can come from two equally natural and intuitive models, but one is best cured by commitment while the other requires flexibility. Besides the usual TICs resulting from "present bias", some people make commitment for the future they do not intend to follow through because of social pressure. Efficient policy to deal with this type of time inconsistent choice is to allow for flexibility to opt out of the commitment. This research will develop models and conduct experiments to distinguish between the two sources of TICs. The ideas developed will be applied to several areas, such as charitable giving and notions of fairness and justice, where social pressures are important. The research will use a combination of laboratory and field experiments, and economic theory to develop hypotheses and tests. The results of this research will help us better understand the issues of time-inconsistent choices and help provide better contract design to improve social outcomes. The results are also applicable to several areas of economics and other social sciences.