NeTS: Small: Strategic Management of Advance Reservations in Cloud and Network Services

NeTS：小型：云和网络服务提前预订的战略管理

• 批准号: 1717858
• 负责人: David Starobinski
• 金额: $ 50.72万
• 依托单位: Trustees of Boston University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2017-09-01 至 2022-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1717858&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NeTS; Small; Strategic; Management; Advance

Part 1.Advance reservation (AR) services form a pillar of the economy. For instance, they are widely deployed in the industries of transportation, lodging, and health care. They are also increasingly being adopted for the management of resources in communication networks and in cloud computing. For users they offer assurance that resources will be available when needed, while for providers they offer a new stream of revenue and the ability to forecast demand. Yet, the behavior of systems supporting AR is complex, since the decision of a customer about making a reservation affects the performance of other customers. Furthermore, pricing schemes employed by service providers have a significant impact on customer behavior. The main goals of this project are to develop mathematical models for characterizing the strategic behavior of users and providers in cloud and networking systems that support AR. The project also entails the design of efficient resource allocation and pricing mechanisms to incentivize widespread adoption of AR services in a way that benefits both customers and the service provider. Part 2The main goals of this project are: i) to develop models for characterizing the strategic behavior of all participants in advance reservation schemes employed in cloud computing and network systems; ii) to analyze the equilibrium outcomes of these models using game theory; iii) to design efficient resource allocation and pricing mechanisms that incentivize the deployment of AR services to the benefit of all participants; and iv) to transition theory into practice. This project incorporates key features of advance reservation in cloud and network services along several dimensions, including the randomness of the demand, the heterogeneity of the workload, the dynamic nature of the network traffic and topology, and the ability for users to learn and adapt their strategies based on historical data. The investigations entail characterizing the equilibria outcomes and their efficiency, using both established and newer concepts, such as the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Conservatism in non-cooperative contexts, and the Core and Bargaining Schemes in cooperative contexts. The project further includes measurements on an open cloud marketplace (Massachusetts Open Cloud) to inform the analysis and guide both service providers and customers in their strategic decisions.

第1部分。提前预订（AR）服务是经济的支柱。例如，它们被广泛应用于交通、住宿和医疗等行业。它们也越来越多地被用于通信网络和云计算中的资源管理。对于用户来说，它们提供了资源在需要时可用的保证，而对于提供商来说，它们提供了新的收入来源和预测需求的能力。然而，支持AR的系统的行为是复杂的，因为客户关于预订的决定会影响其他客户的性能。此外，服务提供商采用的定价方案对客户行为有显著影响。该项目的主要目标是开发数学模型，用于描述支持AR的云和网络系统中用户和提供商的战略行为。该项目还需要设计有效的资源分配和定价机制，以激励广泛采用AR服务，从而使客户和服务提供商都受益。本项目的主要目标是：i)开发用于表征云计算和网络系统中采用的提前预订方案中所有参与者的战略行为的模型；Ii)运用博弈论分析这些模型的均衡结果；iii)设计有效的资源分配和定价机制，以激励部署增强现实服务，使所有参与者受益；四是将理论转化为实践。该项目结合了云和网络服务中提前预订的几个主要特征，包括需求的随机性、工作负载的异质性、网络流量和拓扑的动态性，以及用户根据历史数据学习和调整策略的能力。研究包括描述均衡结果及其效率，使用既有和较新的概念，如非合作环境下的无政府状态的价格和保守的价格，以及合作环境下的核心和议价方案。该项目还包括对开放云市场（马萨诸塞州开放云）的测量，以提供分析信息，并指导服务提供商和客户做出战略决策。

项目成果

Social Welfare and Price of Anarchy in Preemptive Priority Queues

• DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2020.05.015
• 发表时间: 2020-02
• 期刊: Oper. Res. Lett.
• 作者: Jonathan Chamberlain;D. Starobinski

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Shared/Buy-in Computing Systems

共享/购买计算系统的博弈论分析

• DOI: 10.1109/ojcoms.2020.2969646
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society
• 影响因子: 7.9
• 作者: Shi, Zhenpeng;Bestavros, Azer;Orda, Ariel;Starobinski, David
• 通讯作者: Starobinski, David

A case study of a shared/buy-in computing ecosystem

共享/购买计算生态系统的案例研究

• DOI: 10.1007/s10586-018-2256-2
• 发表时间: 2018
• 期刊: Cluster Computing
• 作者: Liao, Christopher;Klausner, Yonatan;Starobinski, David;Simhon, Eran;Bestavros, Azer
• 通讯作者: Bestavros, Azer

Strategic Revenue Management of Preemptive versus Non-Preemptive Queues

• DOI: 10.1016/j.orl.2020.12.011
• 发表时间: 2020-07
• 期刊: Oper. Res. Lett.
• 作者: Jonathan Chamberlain;D. Starobinski

Preemptible queues with advance reservations: Strategic behavior and revenue management

• DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2020.12.044
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Eur. J. Oper. Res.
• 作者: Jonathan Chamberlain;Eran Simhon;D. Starobinski