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CIF: Small: Strategic Information Provision for the Control of Cyber-Socio-Physical Transportation Networks

CIF：小型：控制网络-社会-物理运输网络的战略信息提供

基本信息

批准号：
2007604
负责人：
Cedric Langbort
金额：
$ 19.93万
依托单位：
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2020
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2020-07-01 至 2023-06-30
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2007604&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
CIF Small Strategic Information Provision

项目摘要

Modern transportation networks are systems whose proper operation depends on tight interactions between human, algorithmic, and physical elements and whose regulation (be it to reduce congestion or encourage the use of energy-saving modalities) must thus accordingly involve all components, including mechanisms that target human decision-making. Existing approaches typically either rely on monetary payments (e.g., tolls) or information provision (using, e.g., variable message signs or routing apps) to influence commuters' choices. A major difference between these two types of mechanisms is that the former is strategic (since monetary payments/taxes are computed and implemented with the explicit goal of inducing a particular socially beneficial behavior), while the latter is not (since the information provided is simply a report of the actual state of the road). The goal of this project is to develop tools for the principled design of information provision mechanisms which are adapted to the specific conditions and constraints of such cyber-socio-physical (CSP) systems and actively craft messages to align them with socially efficient outcomes.This research project builds on the existing frameworks of Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design from Economics and uses Control and Information Theory tools, viewpoints, and insights to extend these approaches to the challenging realm of CSP systems in general, and traffic networks in particular. Specifically, this project formulates new models of (1) non-Bayesian and bounded rational decision making occurring in this context and, (2) strategic messaging under non-classical information structure and addresses the corresponding information design problems. The project also (3) develops the necessary tools to incorporate message personalization as a means of introducing informational decoupling without causing disparate impact among commuters.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

现代交通网络的正常运行取决于人、算法和物理要素之间的紧密互动，因此其监管（无论是减少拥堵还是鼓励使用节能模式）必须相应地涉及所有组件，包括针对人类决策的机制。现有的方法通常依赖于货币支付（例如，收费）或信息提供（使用，例如，可变的信息标志或路由应用程序）来影响通勤者的选择。这两种机制之间的主要区别在于，前者是战略性的（因为货币支付/税收的计算和实施具有诱导特定社会有益行为的明确目标），而后者则不是（因为所提供的信息只是道路实际状况的报告）。本项目的目标是开发信息提供机制的原则性设计工具，这些机制适用于这种网络社会物理（CSP）系统的特定条件和约束，并积极地制作信息，使其与社会有效成果保持一致。本研究项目建立在现有的贝叶斯说服和信息设计框架的基础上，并使用控制和信息理论工具，观点，以及将这些方法扩展到具有挑战性的CSP系统领域的见解，特别是交通网络。具体而言，本项目制定了新的模型（1）非贝叶斯和有限理性的决策发生在这种情况下，（2）战略消息下的非经典信息结构，并解决相应的信息设计问题。该项目还（3）开发必要的工具，将信息个性化作为引入信息解耦的手段，而不会在通勤者中造成不同的影响。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。