Information Acquisition under Fundamental Uncertainty - Precaution, Research, and the Environment

现代监管决策的一个重要部分涉及对经验知识几乎不能提供指导的技术的监管。在这种根本不确定（模棱两可）的情况下，监管机构，例如环境保护局（Environmental Protection Agency），需要做出两个决定。一个是在监管之前更多地了解技术的积极努力程度。另一个是考虑到监管机构在学习后面临的剩余不确定性，对其使用进行监管。目前，文献要么对监管只涉及风险而不涉及不确定性时监管机构的主动学习提供指导，要么对模糊性下没有主动学习的监管决策提供指导。然而，文献没有提供关于激励政策问题的指导，这涉及到基本不确定性设置中的主动学习。这项研究的目的是发展一个合适框架的理论基础，从而缩小这一知识差距。这个项目正按计划进行。来自文献的构建模块第一次被组合成一个易处理的模糊主动学习框架。这已经被用来对监管的文献做出贡献。寻求6个月延期的目标是完成研究项目，但会根据新的发展进行调整。额外的时间将有机会将前24个月的研究结果应用于监管文献，并通过这一点，完成原始提案中设想的研究步骤循环。鉴于到目前为止的结果证明了我们最初的信心，即我们对不同机构设置的分析将是相关的和技术上可行的，这一结论特别令人信服。短期延长将确保研究结果能够在实际监管实践中取得成果。重点是外部机构的决定，该机构为我们研究的监管机构制定了授权。这个外部机构有一个制度选择，即在多大程度上将信息获取和监管这两项任务联系起来或分开。这些任务可以合并到一个机构，或交给不同的机构，或者可以为每项任务制定单独的规定。在实践中，我们观察到不同的国家在这一选择中采用了非常不同的方法。制度选择是本研究的重点，也是其对制度监管安排文献贡献的核心。具体而言，拟议研究的目标是(1)将符合相关标准、基本不确定性和监管机构进行研究的选择的现有监管例子映射到我们的框架中；(2)修改现有框架，了解不同制度安排对信息获取行为的影响，以期提出可检验的假设。

A significant part of modern regulatory decisions concern the regulation of technologies about which experiential knowledge offers little guidance. In such settings of fundamental uncertainty (ambiguity), the regulator, for example the Environmental Protection Agency, needs to make two decisions. One is about the level of active effort to learn more about the technology before regulation. The other is the regulation of its use given the remaining uncertainty that the regulator faces after learning. At present, the literature offers guidance either on active learning by a regulator when the regulation only involves risk rather than uncertainty or on regulatory decisions under ambiguity without active learning. However, the literature offers no guidance on the motivating policy problem which involves active learning in settings of fundamental uncertainty. The objective of this research is to develop the theoretical underpinnings of a suitable framework and thereby close this knowledge gap. The project is on schedule. Building blocks from the literature have for the first time been combined into a tractable framework of active learning under ambiguity. This has been used to make a contribution to the literature on regulation. The objective of the 6 month extension sought is to complete the research project, but adjusted for new developments. The additional time would give the opportunity to apply the findings of the first 24 months to the regulation literature and, through that, close the circle of research steps envisioned in the original proposal. This closure is particularly compelling in light of the fact that the results so far justify our initial confidence that our analysis of different institutional set-ups will be relevant and technically feasible. The short extension will ensure that the findings can be made fruitful for actual regulatory practice. The focus is on the decision of the outside body that draws up the mandate for the regulatory body that we study. This outside body has an institutional choice, namely on how strongly to connect or separate the two tasks of information acquisition and regulation. The tasks could be combined into one institution or given to distinct institutions, or separate mandates for each task could be codified. In practice, we observe different countries using very different approaches in this choice. The institutional choice is the focus of the research proposed and the core of its contribution to the literature on institutional regulatory arrangements. In particular, the objectives of the research proposed are (1) to map existing regulatory examples that meet the relevant criteria, fundamental uncertainty and the option of the regulator to undertake research, to our framework; and (2) to modify the existing framework to understand the implications different institutional arrangements would have on information acquisition behavior with a view to developing testable hypotheses.