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NSF workshop on side and covert channels in computing systems

NSF 研讨会：计算系统中的侧面通道和隐蔽通道

基本信息

批准号：
1747723
负责人：
Guru Prasadh Venkataramani
金额：
$ 10万
依托单位：
George Washington University
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2017
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2017-10-01 至 2018-09-30
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1747723&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
NSF workshop side covert channels

项目摘要

Information leakage to malicious adversaries is a fast growing concern affecting computer users. Among the various forms of information leakage, side- and covert channels have particularly gained notorious attention. Side channels are information leakage channels where an adversary silently observes the activities of a victim process to infer its secrets. Covert channels are even more dangerous because a malicious insider trojan process intentionally colludes with the attacker to exfiltrate secrets. Such information leakage channels can exploit the abundance of shared hardware resources in current multi-core hardware, and result in compromising sensitive user information. A thorough understanding of the impact of such information leakage channels on computer system security and their consequences can immensely benefit our national cyber-security. This project organizes a workshop to gather leading researchers and experts who have spent considerable effort and time in studying side and covert channels, as well as security researchers with strong experience in computer systems and their security needs. The workshop narrowly focuses on hardware side and covert channels, in order to create a unique forum for studying a cross-disciplinary challenge in a focused manner, namely the threat of side-channel and covert-channel leakage in computing, with the participation of different communities: computer architects, hardware designers, and cryptographers. The workshop participants identify potential improvements to existing computer design methodologies and strategies to minimizing and potentially neutralizing information leakage. A comprehensive workshop report then summarizes the findings and discussion on the current state of the art and projection in terms of detecting, mitigating and defending against side- and covert channels.

向恶意对手泄露信息是影响计算机用户的一个快速增长的问题。在各种形式的信息泄露中，旁路和秘密渠道尤其臭名昭著。旁路通道是一种信息泄露通道，攻击者在这里静静地观察受害者进程的活动，以推断其秘密。隐蔽渠道更加危险，因为恶意的内幕木马进程故意与攻击者串通，泄露机密。这种信息泄露通道可以利用当前多核硬件中丰富的共享硬件资源，并导致用户敏感信息的泄露。彻底了解此类信息泄露渠道对计算机系统安全的影响及其后果，将极大地有利于我国的网络安全。该项目组织了一次研讨会，聚集了在研究旁路和秘密通道方面花费了大量精力和时间的顶尖研究人员和专家，以及在计算机系统及其安全需求方面具有丰富经验的安全研究人员。讲习班狭隘地侧重于硬件方面和秘密渠道，以便创建一个独特的论坛，以集中方式研究一个跨学科的挑战，即计算中的侧面渠道和秘密渠道泄漏的威胁，不同的社区：计算机架构师、硬件设计师和密码学家参加。讲习班与会者确定了对现有计算机设计方法和战略的潜在改进，以最大限度地减少和可能消除信息泄露。然后，一份全面的研讨会报告总结了关于检测、减轻和防御旁路和隐蔽通道方面的最新技术和预测的调查结果和讨论。