SaTC: CORE: Small: Collaborative: Techniques for Enhancing the Security and Trust of FPGAs-Based Systems

SaTC：核心：小型：协作：增强基于 FPGA 的系统的安全性和信任的技术

• 批准号: 1813945
• 负责人: James Plusquellic
• 金额: $ 20万
• 依托单位: University of New Mexico
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-08-15 至 2022-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1813945&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Collaborative; Techniques

Secret keys that are stored and used within physical devices can be extracted by adversaries. The attacks involve measuring the power consumption or electromagnetic radiation emanating from the chip as it carries out encryption, and then analyzing them to deduce the secret key. This project investigates techniques that self-mutate the hardware at runtime as a means of significantly reducing and ideally eliminating signal information leveraged by the adversary.The research carried out in this project investigates side-channel leakage, particularly as it relates to signal propagation paths within the encryption engine. A hardware description of the proposed self-mutating hardware will be implemented on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) using dynamic partial reconfiguration. Multiple instances of encryption engine components, e.g., the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) substitution box (SBOX), will be created using implementation diversity techniques as a means of diversifying signal propagation paths, and a self-reconfiguration hardware engine will randomly choose instances to reprogram on-the-fly. Advanced differential power analysis (DPA)-type attacks will be carried out to determine the resilience of the proposed countermeasures.The techniques, data and hardware developed in this research will be integrated into undergraduate and graduate level courses at University of New Mexico, University of Maryland Baltimore County and University of North Carolina at Charlotte, and red-team/blue-team competitions will be created. Minority and underrepresented students will be recruited to participate in funded research activities.A project repository will be created and maintained at University of North Carolina, Charlotte at the web address http://www.ece.uncc.edu/fareena/SPREAD for 5 years. The hardware description language, software, data, analysis methods and copies of the papers will be made available for download.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

在物理设备中存储和使用的密钥可以被对手提取。这些攻击包括测量芯片在执行加密时的功耗或电磁辐射，然后分析它们以推断出密钥。本项目研究在运行时自变异硬件的技术，作为一种手段，显着减少和理想地消除信号信息利用的对手。在本项目中进行的研究调查边信道泄漏，特别是当它涉及到加密引擎内的信号传播路径。提出的自变异硬件的硬件描述将在现场可编程门阵列（FPGA）上实现，使用动态部分重新配置。加密引擎组件的多个实例，例如，高级加密标准（AES）替换盒（SBOX）将使用实现多样性技术作为使信号传播路径多样化的手段来创建，并且自重新配置硬件引擎将随机选择实例以在运行中重新编程。先进的差分功率分析（DPA）型攻击将进行，以确定所提出的countermeasurement.The技术，数据和硬件在这项研究中开发的弹性将被集成到本科和研究生水平的课程在大学的新墨西哥州，大学的马里兰州巴尔的摩县和大学的北卡罗来纳州在夏洛特，和红队/蓝队的比赛将被创建。少数民族和代表性不足的学生将被招募参加资助的研究活动。一个项目库将在北卡罗来纳州，夏洛特的大学创建和维护，网址为http://www.ece.uncc.edu/fareena/SPREAD，为期5年。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并已被认为值得通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估的支持。

项目成果

Side-Channel Power Resistance for Encryption Algorithms Using Implementation Diversity

• DOI: 10.3390/cryptography4020013
• 发表时间: 2020-04
• 期刊: Cryptogr.
• 作者: Ivan Bow;N. Bete;F. Saqib;Wenjie Che;C. Patel;R. Robucci;Calvin Chan;J. Plusquellic