SaTC: CORE: Small: Collaborative: Techniques for Enhancing the Security and Trust of FPGAs-Based Systems

SaTC：核心：小型：协作：增强基于 FPGA 的系统的安全性和信任的技术

• 批准号: 1813945
• 负责人: James Plusquellic
• 金额: $ 20万
• 依托单位: University of New Mexico
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2018-08-15 至 2022-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1813945&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Collaborative; Techniques

Secret keys that are stored and used within physical devices can be extracted by adversaries. The attacks involve measuring the power consumption or electromagnetic radiation emanating from the chip as it carries out encryption, and then analyzing them to deduce the secret key. This project investigates techniques that self-mutate the hardware at runtime as a means of significantly reducing and ideally eliminating signal information leveraged by the adversary.The research carried out in this project investigates side-channel leakage, particularly as it relates to signal propagation paths within the encryption engine. A hardware description of the proposed self-mutating hardware will be implemented on a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) using dynamic partial reconfiguration. Multiple instances of encryption engine components, e.g., the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) substitution box (SBOX), will be created using implementation diversity techniques as a means of diversifying signal propagation paths, and a self-reconfiguration hardware engine will randomly choose instances to reprogram on-the-fly. Advanced differential power analysis (DPA)-type attacks will be carried out to determine the resilience of the proposed countermeasures.The techniques, data and hardware developed in this research will be integrated into undergraduate and graduate level courses at University of New Mexico, University of Maryland Baltimore County and University of North Carolina at Charlotte, and red-team/blue-team competitions will be created. Minority and underrepresented students will be recruited to participate in funded research activities.A project repository will be created and maintained at University of North Carolina, Charlotte at the web address http://www.ece.uncc.edu/fareena/SPREAD for 5 years. The hardware description language, software, data, analysis methods and copies of the papers will be made available for download.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

攻击者可以提取物理设备中存储和使用的密钥。这些攻击涉及在芯片进行加密时测量芯片发出的功耗或电磁辐射，然后对其进行分析以推断密钥。本项目研究了在运行时自突变硬件的技术，以显著减少和理想地消除攻击者利用的信号信息。本项目进行的研究调查了侧通道泄漏，特别是当它与加密引擎内的信号传播路径相关时。所提出的自变异硬件的硬件描述将在使用动态部分重构的现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)上实现。将使用实现分集技术作为多样化信号传播路径的手段来创建加密引擎组件的多个实例，例如高级加密标准(AES)替换盒(SBOX)，并且自重新配置硬件引擎将随机选择实例以在运行中重新编程。这项研究中开发的技术、数据和硬件将被整合到新墨西哥大学、马里兰大学巴尔的摩县分校和北卡罗来纳大学夏洛特分校的本科和研究生课程中，并将创建红队/蓝队比赛。少数族裔和代表性不足的学生将被招募参加受资助的研究活动。将在北卡罗来纳大学夏洛特分校建立和维护一个项目库，网址为http://www.ece.uncc.edu/fareena/SPREAD，为期5年。硬件描述语言、软件、数据、分析方法和论文副本将可供下载。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Side-Channel Power Resistance for Encryption Algorithms Using Implementation Diversity

• DOI: 10.3390/cryptography4020013
• 发表时间: 2020-04
• 期刊: Cryptogr.
• 作者: Ivan Bow;N. Bete;F. Saqib;Wenjie Che;C. Patel;R. Robucci;Calvin Chan;J. Plusquellic