CNS Core: Large: Collaborative Research: Towards an Evolvable Public Key Infrastructure

CNS 核心：大型：协作研究：迈向可进化的公钥基础设施

• 批准号: 1900879
• 负责人: Alan Mislove
• 金额: $ 60万
• 依托单位: Northeastern University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-06-01 至 2023-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1900879&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: CNS; Core; Large; Collaborative; Research

The importance of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) public key infrastructure (PKI) to the success of the Internet cannot be overstated. From social networking to banking, from mobile devices to cloud computing, the PKI allows communicating parties to be sure of whom they are communicating with, that their communication is confidential, and that their communication has not been tampered with. Despite its incredible importance, the PKI has been notoriously difficult to evolve to meet new security concerns and Internet demands. This project introduces new, deployable alternatives to key parts of the PKI to make it more evolvable, manageable, and secure.The project has three primary thrusts. The first introduces a key enabling technology behind the subsequent thrusts, called assertion-carrying certificates (ACCs). ACCs expand today's certificates with the capability of including a small amount of code (in the form of assertions) to be evaluated as part of the certificate validation process. The second thrust applies ACCs to enable certificate authorities to more readily evolve to new demands for certificate delegation and automated issuance. The third thrust applies ACCs and trusted execution environments to enable web-hosting services like content delivery networks to securely manage their customers' cryptographic keys.Correct operation of the PKI is paramount to ensuring a secure, authenticated Internet. Recent efforts have proven that progress towards a more secure PKI is possible, but a more fundamental focus is needed to address the underlying challenges. This project will do just that by developing a new, extensible approach to constraining when identities on the Internet should be trusted. This project will make it straightforward and safe to extend the basic abstractions offered by the PKI, thereby enabling it to evolve to meet changing trends.The project's code and data will be made publicly available and maintained at https://securepki.orgThis award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

传输层安全（Transport Layer Security， TLS）公钥基础设施（public key infrastructure， PKI）对Internet成功的重要性怎么强调都不为过。从社交网络到银行，从移动设备到云计算，PKI允许通信各方确定他们正在与谁通信，他们的通信是保密的，并且他们的通信没有被篡改。尽管它的重要性令人难以置信，但众所周知，PKI很难发展以满足新的安全问题和互联网需求。该项目为PKI的关键部分引入了新的、可部署的替代方案，使其更具可扩展性、可管理性和安全性。该项目有三个主要目标。第一部分介绍了后续推进背后的关键启用技术，称为承载断言的证书（ACCs）。ACCs扩展了当前的证书，它可以包含少量代码（以断言的形式），作为证书验证过程的一部分进行评估。第二个要点是应用ACCs，使证书颁发机构能够更容易地满足证书委托和自动颁发的新需求。第三个要点是应用ACCs和可信执行环境，使内容交付网络等网络托管服务能够安全地管理客户的加密密钥。正确使用公匙基建，对确保互联网的安全及经认证至关重要。最近的努力已经证明，朝着更安全的PKI发展是可能的，但需要更基本的关注来解决潜在的挑战。这个项目将通过开发一种新的、可扩展的方法来约束何时应该信任Internet上的身份，从而做到这一点。这个项目将使扩展PKI提供的基本抽象变得简单和安全，从而使其能够发展以满足不断变化的趋势。该项目的代码和数据将在https://securepki.orgThis上公开并保存，这反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Assertion-Carrying Certificates

携带断言的证书

• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: Foundations of Computer Security
• 作者: Aqeel, Waqar;Hanif, Zachary;Larisch, James;Omolola, Olamide;Chung, Taejoong;Levin, Dave;Maggs, Bruce;Mislove, Alan;Parno, Bryan;Wilson, Christo
• 通讯作者: Wilson, Christo

When Certificate Transparency Is Too Transparent: Analyzing Information Leakage in HTTPS Domain Names

当证书透明度过于透明时：HTTPS域名信息泄露分析

• DOI: 10.1145/3338498.3358655
• 发表时间: 2019
• 期刊: WPES
• 作者: Roberts, Richard;Levin, Dave
• 通讯作者: Levin, Dave

Sound Methodology for Downloading Webpages

下载网页的合理方法

• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Network Traffic Measurement and Analysis Conference (TMA
• 作者: Indela, Soumya;Levin, Dave
• 通讯作者: Levin, Dave

Roll, Roll, Roll your Root: A Comprehensive Analysis of the First Ever DNSSEC Root KSK Rollover

滚动、滚动、滚动您的根：对首次 DNSSEC 根 KSK 轮转的综合分析

• DOI: 10.1145/3355369.3355570
• 发表时间: 2019
• 期刊: IMC
• 作者: Müller, Moritz;Thomas, Matthew;Wessels, Duane;Hardaker, Wes;Chung, Taejoong;Toorop, Willem;van Rijswijk-Deij, Roland
• 通讯作者: van Rijswijk-Deij, Roland

A comparative analysis of certificate pinning in Android & iOS

• DOI: 10.1145/3517745.3561439
• 发表时间: 2022-10
• 期刊: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Internet Measurement Conference
• 作者: Amogh Pradeep;Muhammad Talha Paracha;Protick Bhowmick;Ali Davanian;Abbas Razaghpanah;Taejoong Chung;Martina Lindorfer;Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez;Dave Levin;D. Choffnes