SaTC: CORE: Small: Finding and Mitigating Side-channel Leakage in Embedded Architectures

智能家居、汽车、飞机、医疗和工业应用中的电子设备越来越能够使用自己的嵌入式处理器现场处理信息。虽然嵌入式处理器使生活更轻松，但它们也为窃取或破坏我们的敏感数据打开了大门。恶意攻击者可以监控设备内部和周围的功率或辐射特征，并使用侧信道攻击来发现其秘密。该研究项目将提高嵌入式程序员编写具有侧通道保护的代码的能力，并提供工具，以在设计过程的早期验证其代码的侧通道抵抗力。该项目将利用位切片代码的潜力，实现嵌入式平台上高度确定性的软件执行，同时促进自动插入对抗侧通道攻击的对策。这项工作将开发一个过程来重新排序通用代码成位切片的形式，其中一个指令字的每个位是有效地独立处理。接下来，针对电源侧信道攻击的布尔对策将自动插入到代码中。嵌入式对策的有效性将通过一种新的组合，侧通道泄漏检测方法在模拟和目标原型阶段进行验证。最后，泄漏缓解算法将迭代地升级位切片的代码。这项研究可能会导致新的处理器架构和安全的嵌入式应用程序的指令集，在一个时代，先天的安全性是一样重要的性能和效率。这些技术将支持现有的处理器架构，并且与现有的嵌入式设计方法兼容。此外，这些方法将导致侧通道感知设计在电子设计自动化工作流程中的集成，支持新的和改进的架构的开发。该项目的成果将加强密码工程和硬件安全方面的研究生课程。该项目还将利用行业合作来转移成果和设计工具。该项目的成果，包括出版物、代码和示例，将在https://sites.google.com/view/bitslice-mitigation在线托管。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

Electronic devices found in a smart home, automobile, airplane, medical, and industrial applications are becoming more capable of on-the-spot processing information with their own embedded processors. While embedded processors make life easier, they also open the door to theft or corruption of our sensitive data. Malign actors can monitor power or radiation signatures in and around a device, and discover its secrets using side-channel attacks. This research project will improve the embedded programmers' capability to write code with side-channel protection and provides tools to verify their code's side-channel resistance early in the design process.The project will exploit the potential of bit-sliced code to achieve highly deterministic software execution on embedded platforms while facilitating automated insertion of countermeasures against side-channel attacks. This work will develop a process to reorder general-purpose code into bit-sliced form, where each bit of an instruction word is effectively processed independently. Next, Boolean countermeasures against power side-channel attacks will be inserted automatically into the code. Effectiveness of embedded countermeasures will be verified through a novel combination of side-channel leakage detection methodologies during simulation and target prototyping stages. Finally, a leakage mitigation algorithm will iteratively upgrade the bit-sliced code.This research may lead to novel processor architectures and instruction sets for secure embedded applications, in an era where innate security is as important as performance and efficiency. The techniques will support existing processor architectures, and they are compatible with existing embedded design methodologies. Additionally, the methods will lead to the integration of side-channel aware design in the electronic design automation workflow, supporting the development of new and improved architectures. The results of this project will enhance graduate-level courses on cryptographic engineering and on hardware security. The project will also leverage industry collaborations to transfer results, and design tools. The results of this project, including publications, code, and examples, will be hosted online at https://sites.google.com/view/bitslice-mitigation. After the completion of the project, the website will remain online as a reference repository.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.