Teacher Effectiveness and Policy Designs on Teachers' Labor Market

教师效能与教师劳动力市场政策设计

• 批准号: 1947674
• 负责人: Chao Fu
• 金额: $ 43.8万
• 依托单位: National Bureau of Economic Research Inc
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2020-04-01 至 2025-03-31
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1947674&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Teacher; Effectiveness; Policy; Designs; Teachers

AbstractThe effectiveness of teachers has been a focal point of many educational policies, such as teacher accountability policies, teacher performance pay schemes, and measures to recruit and retain effective teachers in schools with more disadvantaged students. A major complication for successfully implementing these policies is the fact that teacher effectiveness is not easily observable. This project first examines how providing more transparent information about teacher effectiveness may affect teacher-school sorting patterns and the achievement of students from different backgrounds. Then, the project investigates how to improve the design of policies, such as teacher performance pay schemes, when teacher effectiveness becomes transparent information.By exploiting the differential implementation timing of a rigorous teacher evaluation system and a merit pay system in a large school district, as well as changes in specific components of each policy over time, this project first analyzes how teacher sorting across schools, teacher effort, and student outcomes responds to these policy changes. Reducing information friction may, on the one hand, enhance assortative teacher-school sorting and widen the achievement gap across schools with different compositions of students. On the other hand, it may induce teachers to exert more effort and encourage effective teachers to enter the market. Therefore, it is possible to improve both overall student achievement and educational equality with well-designed policy interventions. The second part of this project builds and estimates an equilibrium model of the teachers’ labor market with information friction, exploiting policy variation for identification. The estimated model is used to study counterfactual policy interventions that are supplemented with teacher evaluation programs, such as the design of a cost-effective merit pay system that rewards teachers for being effective and for teaching in disadvantaged schools.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

摘要教师的有效性一直是许多教育政策的焦点，如教师问责制政策，教师绩效工资计划，以及在弱势学生较多的学校招聘和留住有效教师的措施。成功实施这些政策的一个主要困难是教师的有效性不容易观察到。本研究首先探讨如何提供更透明的信息，教师的有效性可能会影响教师学校的排序模式和来自不同背景的学生的成绩。然后，研究在教师绩效成为透明信息的情况下，如何改善教师绩效工资制度等政策的设计。本研究首先分析了在大学区中，严格的教师评价制度和绩效工资制度的实施时机不同，以及每项政策的具体内容随着时间的推移而发生的变化，教师的努力和学生的成绩对这些政策变化作出了反应。减少信息摩擦，一方面可以加强教师与学校之间的相互排序，扩大学生组成不同的学校之间的成绩差距。另一方面，它可以诱导教师付出更多的努力，并鼓励有效的教师进入市场。因此，通过精心设计的政策干预，有可能提高学生的整体成绩和教育平等。第二部分，利用政策变量进行辨识，建立并估计了一个具有信息摩擦的教师劳动力市场均衡模型。估计模型被用来研究反事实的政策干预措施，补充教师评价计划，如设计一个具有成本效益的绩效工资制度，奖励教师是有效的，并在弱势学校教学。这个奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并已被认为是值得通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估的支持。