Collaborative Research: The economics of social data

合作研究：社会数据经济学

• 批准号: 1948336
• 负责人: Dirk Bergemann
• 金额: $ 22.3万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2020-08-01 至 2024-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1948336&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; economics; social; data

This award funds research in economic theory. The rise of large Internet platforms is leading to an unprecedented collection and use of data. The platforms generate massive amounts of data about individual consumers, their preferences, their locations, their friends, their political views, and almost all other facets of their lives. The availability of individual-level data allows companies to offer refined search results, personalized product recommendations, informative ratings, timely traffic data, and targeted advertisements. The resulting markets for data introduce a fundamentally new set of economic relationships. A central feature of the data collected from individuals is its social aspect. Namely, the data captured from an individual user is not only informative about that specific individual, but also about users similar to her. Thus, individual data is really social data. The social nature of the data generates an informational externality. That is, an individual providing information about herself affects the marketplace options available to others. This project will give us new insights into how data markets affect economic outcomes. The team will pursue a research agenda focused on data markets. The first step is to establish the theoretical foundations of our understanding of how information markets work. This research focuses on the social aspect of information collection, which leads to a newly understood "data externality" that can be associated with various market failures. This research seeks to understand why internet data platforms tend to become large dominant firms, and how this affects the welfare of consumers, advertisers, and publishers. The next step is to analyze whether and how large internet platforms can maintain and possibly extend their market power through various contracting and commercial practices, and how both antitrust enforcement and regulatory policy might respond. The team will investigate the likely industry equilibrium and competitive structure in such markets for data and information, and any possible regulatory interventions. More specifically they will develop new results on how the gathering of this kind social data impacts the economics of content providers (e.g., online, print, radio and television media). Finally, how do the current contracting practices in the digital advertising markets accentuate or attenuate the data externalities, and the resulting social outcomes? These questions gain importance in the presence of the externality generated by the social data.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项资助经济理论研究。大型互联网平台的兴起正在导致前所未有的数据收集和使用。这些平台产生了大量关于个人消费者的数据，他们的偏好，他们的位置，他们的朋友，他们的政治观点以及他们生活的几乎所有其他方面。个人层面数据的可用性使公司能够提供精确的搜索结果、个性化的产品推荐、信息性评级、及时的流量数据和有针对性的广告。由此产生的数据市场引入了一套全新的经济关系。从个人收集的数据的一个核心特征是其社会方面。也就是说，从个人用户捕获的数据不仅是关于该特定个人的信息，而且是关于与她相似的用户的信息。因此，个人数据是真正的社交数据。数据的社会性质产生了信息外部性。也就是说，个人提供有关自己的信息会影响其他人可用的市场选择。该项目将为我们提供有关数据市场如何影响经济结果的新见解。该团队将致力于数据市场的研究议程。第一步是建立我们理解信息市场如何运作的理论基础。这项研究的重点是社会方面的信息收集，这导致了一个新的理解“数据外部性”，可以与各种市场失灵。这项研究旨在了解为什么互联网数据平台往往成为大型主导公司，以及这如何影响消费者，广告商和出版商的福利。下一步是分析大型互联网平台是否以及如何通过各种合同和商业实践来维持并可能扩大其市场力量，以及反垄断执法和监管政策可能如何应对。该小组将调查这些市场中可能的行业均衡和竞争结构，以获取数据和信息，以及任何可能的监管干预。更具体地说，他们将开发关于收集这种社交数据如何影响内容提供商经济的新结果（例如，在线、印刷、广播和电视媒体）。最后，数字广告市场目前的合同做法如何加强或削弱数据外部性以及由此产生的社会后果？这个奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

The economics of social data

社会数据经济学

• DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12407
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: The RAND Journal of Economics
• 作者: Bergemann, Dirk;Bonatti, Alessandro;Gan, Tan
• 通讯作者: Gan, Tan

Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing

• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.008
• 发表时间: 2021-12-08
• 期刊: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• 影响因子: 1.1
• 作者: Bergemann, Dirk;Castro, Francisco;Weintraub, Gabriel
• 通讯作者: Weintraub, Gabriel

Nonlinear pricing with finite information

有限信息下的非线性定价

• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.004
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Games and Economic Behavior
• 影响因子: 1.1
• 作者: Bergemann, Dirk;Yeh, Edmund;Zhang, Jinkun
• 通讯作者: Zhang, Jinkun

The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints

具有事后参与限制的顺序筛选范围

• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105055
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: Journal of Economic Theory
• 影响因子: 1.6
• 作者: Bergemann, Dirk;Castro, Francisco;Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
• 通讯作者: Weintraub, Gabriel Y.