Collaborative Research: Information and Markets

合作研究：信息与市场

• 批准号: 2049754
• 负责人: Dirk Bergemann
• 金额: $ 16.5万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-08-01 至 2024-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2049754&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Information; Markets

This project analyzes the impact of information for the structure of markets. The use of information in internet and other markets has been revolutionized in the twenty by developments in technology. Economic institutions are adapting to these changes. At the same time, there have been fundamental improvements in our theoretical understanding of the role of information in the economy, but these new insights are somewhat abstract. Our project brings recent theoretical developments in information economics to bear on key economic questions in the economy. One component of our project addresses the new multi-billion dollar market for internet advertising. Advertisers purchase the right to display advertisements to particular internet users (the display of one advertisement to a particular internet user is known as an "impression". Because internet platforms have detailed information about users, it is possible to target users precisely, i.e., show particular advertisements to internet users with particular characteristics. The market for impressions has become very sophisticated. The research team seeks to understand the gains and losses associated with targeting impressions. This work will be an input into the important policy question of how internet platforms should be regulated. The team's work on the market for impressions will analyze new questions in auction theory. In particular, in the market for impressions, the publisher can use his private information about users to control advertisers' information about the value of particular viewers. Providing more information will increase the efficiency of the allocation. But more information will also reduce competition and give more information rents to the buyer. The team plans to understand the optimal information structure for the publishers and see how the optimal policy translates into selling methods used in practice. A second component of the project will study "Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets". Price discrimination when firms exploit information about consumers to target them with different prices. Price discrimination has been most successfully studied in the context of a monopoly seller. When firms both compete with each other but also price discriminate, the analysis can become intractable. This is a good example of a setting where more insight and tractability can be gained by allowing richer information. The team plans to provide tight bounds on welfare outcomes and price distributions for a given distribution of heterogeneous values of consumers. Finally, they want to improve our understanding of the relation between information and "higher-order beliefs". Higher-order beliefs encode a population's beliefs about the world, their beliefs about others' beliefs and so on. What is the relation between representing information via higher-order beliefs and less structured representations? They will develop the connection, understanding how a many player formalization of "more information" translates into higher-order beliefs and identifying settings where higher-order beliefs can be used to approximate any information structure.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

这个项目分析了信息对市场结构的影响。随着技术的发展，互联网和其他市场中信息的使用在20世纪发生了革命性的变化。经济机构正在适应这些变化。与此同时，我们对信息在经济中的作用的理论理解有了根本性的改进，但这些新的见解有些抽象。我们的项目将信息经济学的最新理论发展与经济中的关键经济问题联系起来。我们项目的一个组成部分是针对价值数十亿美元的互联网广告新市场。广告商购买向特定互联网用户显示广告的权利(向特定互联网用户显示一则广告被称为“印象”。由于互联网平台拥有关于用户的详细信息，因此可以精准地定位用户，即向具有特定特征的互联网用户展示特定的广告。印象市场已经变得非常复杂。研究小组试图了解与目标印象相关的得失。这项工作将是对互联网平台应如何监管这一重要政策问题的投入。该团队在印象市场上的工作将分析拍卖理论中的新问题。特别是，在印象市场中，出版商可以使用他关于用户的私人信息来控制广告商关于特定观众价值的信息。提供更多信息将提高分配的效率。但更多的信息也会减少竞争，为买家提供更多的信息租金。该团队计划了解出版商的最佳信息结构，并看看最优政策如何转化为实践中使用的销售方法。该项目的第二部分将研究“竞争性市场中的价格歧视”。价格歧视是指公司利用有关消费者的信息，以不同的价格瞄准他们。在垄断卖家的背景下，价格歧视被研究得最为成功。当公司既相互竞争又存在价格歧视时，分析可能会变得困难。这是一个很好的例子，可以通过允许更丰富的信息来获得更多的洞察力和可控性。该团队计划为消费者不同价值的给定分布提供福利结果和价格分布的严格限制。最后，他们希望提高我们对信息和“高阶信念”之间关系的理解。更高阶的信念编码了一个群体对世界的信念，他们对其他人的信念，等等。通过高阶信念来表示信息和结构较差的表示之间有什么关系？他们将发展这种联系，了解多个参与者对“更多信息”的正规化如何转化为更高级别的信念，并确定可以使用更高级别的信念来近似任何信息结构的设置。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的智力优势和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Calibrated Click-Through Auctions

校准点击式拍卖

• DOI: 10.1145/3485447.3512050
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: ACM Web Conference
• 作者: Bergemann, Dirk;Dütting, Paul;Paes Leme, Renato;Zuo, Song
• 通讯作者: Zuo, Song

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

具有潜在信息的反事实

• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210496
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: American Economic Review
• 影响因子: 10.7
• 作者: Bergemann, Dirk;Brooks, Benjamin;Morris, Stephen
• 通讯作者: Morris, Stephen

Search, Information, and Prices

搜索、信息和价格

• DOI: 10.1086/714443
• 发表时间: 2021
• 期刊: Journal of Political Economy
• 影响因子: 8.2
• 作者: Bergemann, Dirk;Brooks, Benjamin;Morris, Stephen
• 通讯作者: Morris, Stephen