Robust Market Design

稳健的市场设计

• 批准号: 0518929
• 负责人: Dirk Bergemann
• 金额: $ 25.85万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2005
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2005-07-01 至 2008-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0518929&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Robust; Market; Design

The mechanism design literature of the last thirty years has been very successful. A wide range of institutional design questions, ranging from simple trading rules to political constitutions, have been analyzed and elegant optimal solutions have been obtained. Market design has become more important in many economic arenas, both because of new insights from theory and developments in information technology. Yet there has been an unfortunate disconnect between the general theory and the applications/empirical work: mechanisms that work in theory or are optimal in some class of mechanisms often turn out to be too complicated to be used in practise. Practitioners have then often been led to argue in favor ad hoc restriction which lead to simpler but apparently sub-optimal mechanisms. The PIs will conduct research on mechanism design to answer this question. They model robustness considerations by relaxing common knowledge assumptions in such a way that stronger solution concepts and simpler mechanism are endogenously created as robust optimal solution. In the first part of the project they consider design problems in which the objective of the designer is to maximize expected revenues and encompasses optimal monopoly pricing and optimal auctions. They introduce robustness consideration by allowing the principal to be uncertain about agents' beliefs and higher order beliefs about other agents' types. Subsequently, they will pursue a local version of the robustness analysis by requiring that the true distribution over valuations is within a range of a model distribution. In the second part they consider full rather than partial implementation. As private information may enable the agents to coordinate behavior in many different ways, the designer is concerned that there exists equilibrium behavior by the agents which does not realize his objective. The robust design then seeks to prevent equilibria, in the form of collusive behavior among the agents, which fail to realize the objective of the designer. This research conceptualizes the notion of robustness for a wide class of mechanism design problems. It provides analytical instruments to evaluate how sensitive design rules are to strategic uncertainty. If successful, the techniques will provide solutions to specific design questions such as auctions and other allocation rules. The theory of mechanism design is used with increasing frequency to solve real-life trading problems. It is then of foremost interest to understand how robust the theoretical solutions are to small variations in the environment. The goal of this project is to deepen our understanding of the performance of mechanisms such as bilateral trading and auctions rules. If successful, the techniques and solutions suggested will lend themselves to improve the performance of mechanisms and decrease their sensitivity to the specific features of the environment.

过去三十年的机械设计文献是非常成功的。广泛的制度设计问题，从简单的贸易规则到政治宪法，都得到了分析和优雅的最优解。市场设计在许多经济领域变得越来越重要，这既是因为理论的新见解，也是因为信息技术的发展。然而，在一般理论和应用/经验工作之间存在着不幸的脱节：理论上有效的机制或在某些机制类别中最优的机制往往过于复杂，无法在实践中使用。然后，从业者经常被引导去争论赞成特设限制，这导致了更简单但显然是次优的机制。PI将进行机制设计的研究来回答这个问题。 他们模型的鲁棒性考虑放松常识假设，以这样一种方式，更强的解决方案的概念和更简单的机制是内生的强大的最佳解决方案。在项目的第一部分，他们考虑的设计问题，其中的设计者的目标是最大限度地提高预期收入，并包括最优垄断定价和最优拍卖。他们引入了鲁棒性的考虑，允许主体是不确定的代理人的信念和高阶信念的其他代理人的类型。随后，他们将通过要求估值的真实分布在模型分布的范围内来追求鲁棒性分析的本地版本。在第二部分中，他们考虑的是全面而不是部分执行。由于私人信息可以使代理人以许多不同的方式协调行为，设计者关心的是存在的代理人的平衡行为，不实现他的目标。鲁棒设计则试图防止均衡，在代理之间的合谋行为的形式，这不能实现设计者的目标。本研究概念化的鲁棒性的概念，广泛的一类机制设计问题。它提供了分析工具来评估设计规则对战略不确定性的敏感程度。如果成功，这些技术将为拍卖和其他分配规则等具体设计问题提供解决方案。机制设计理论越来越多地被用来解决现实生活中的交易问题。然后，最感兴趣的是了解理论解决方案对环境中的小变化的鲁棒性。本项目的目的是加深我们对双边贸易和拍卖规则等机制绩效的理解。如果成功，所建议的技术和解决方案将有助于提高机制的性能，降低其对环境具体特征的敏感性。