Collaborative Research: Robust Predictions In Games With Private Information

合作研究：使用私人信息对游戏进行稳健预测

• 批准号: 0851200
• 负责人: Dirk Bergemann
• 金额: $ 23.46万
• 依托单位: Yale University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-04-15 至 2013-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0851200&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Robust; Predictions; Games

In many economic environments the participants do not have the same information about the relevant aspects of their situation. For example, in a financial market each investor may have different pieces of information about the underlying value of an asset or a company. In product markets, each competiting firm may have private information about its cost structure. In auctions, such as the wireless spectrum auctions organized by the Federal Communications Commission or the offshore oil tracts auctioned off by the U.S. Department of the Interior, the bidders have private information about their valuations and also some, possibly noisy, information about the valuations of their competitors.The private information of an agent, whether it is about his/her own valuations or the valuations of the competing agents will determine the behavior and the strategy of the agent. But in practice, the theoretical and/or empirical analysts do not have a clear understanding of what the economic agents know and, in particular, what they do or do not know about each other. The missing and incomplete information si also highly relevant from a policy perspective as the supervising or regulatory authority in many markets face similar informational constraints.The PIs develop methods that allow predictions about the behavior of economic agents and the reulting market allocations in such settings. These predictions are robust to a large class of private information structures by the agents. They identify conditions on the nature of the interaction and the market under which it is possible to make unique predictions about economic behavior. When these conditions are not met, the PIs establish robust bounds on the distribution of possible economic outcomes, especially the mean and the variance of the outcomes. They use these bounds to predict the welfare impact of information sharing in markets. They also use the bounds to design robust mechanisms, such as auction and voting methods, that perform well in many information environments.This project provides an economic theory that can lead to practical solutions to market and mechanism design problems. It also provides a theoretical foundation for future work in econometrics aimed at testing models in situations where the researcher does not know the market's information structure.This research will have broader impacts for the many different areas of social science that use game theory as a fundamental tool. In addition, the project has direct implications for antitrust policy, since whether or not to allow sellers to share information is a question for price-fixing policy.

在许多经济环境中，参与者对于其处境的相关方面并没有相同的信息。 例如，在金融市场中，每个投资者可能拥有有关资产或公司的潜在价值的不同信息。 在产品市场中，每个竞争公司都可能拥有有关其成本结构的私人信息。 在拍卖中，例如联邦通信委员会组织的无线频谱拍卖或美国内政部拍卖的近海石油区，投标人拥有有关其估值的私人信息，也有一些有关其竞争对手估值的可能是噪音的信息。代理人的私人信息，无论是有关他/她自己的估值还是有关竞争代理人的估值，将决定代理人的行为和策略。 但在实践中，理论和/或实证分析师并不清楚经济主体知道什么，特别是他们彼此了解或不了解什么。 从政策角度来看，缺失和不完整的信息也高度相关，因为许多市场的监督或监管机构面临着类似的信息限制。PI 开发了一些方法，可以预测经济主体的行为以及在这种情况下产生的市场分配。 这些预测对于代理的一大类私人信息结构来说是稳健的。 他们确定了相互作用和市场的性质条件，在这些条件下可以对经济行为做出独特的预测。 当这些条件不满足时，PI 会对可能的经济结果的分布（尤其是结果的均值和方差）建立稳健的界限。 他们利用这些界限来预测市场信息共享对福利的影响。 他们还利用界限来设计稳健的机制，例如拍卖和投票方法，这些机制在许多信息环境中表现良好。该项目提供了一种经济理论，可以为市场和机制设计问题提供实际的解决方案。 它还为计量经济学的未来工作提供了理论基础，旨在在研究人员不了解市场信息结构的情况下测试模型。这项研究将对使用博弈论作为基本工具的社会科学的许多不同领域产生更广泛的影响。 此外，该项目对反垄断政策也有直接影响，因为是否允许卖家共享信息是价格垄断政策的一个问题。