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Supply chain coordination in case of asymmetric information

信息不对称情况下的供应链协调

基本信息

批准号：
244988212
负责人：
Professor Dr. Guido Voigt
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für Logistik und Transport
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2014
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2013-12-31 至 2016-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/244988212?language=en
关键词：
Supply chain coordination case asymmetric

项目摘要

Efficiency losses resulting from asymmetric information are a major challenge in Supply Chain Management. Such efficiency losses can be limited via non-linear incentive schemes (screening contracts or menu of contracts) that align the incentives of the supply chain parties. The derivation of the optimal incentive scheme thereby typically relies on classical assumptions such as full rationality or the ultimate goal of all supply chain parties to maximize profits. However, recent laboratory experiments show that these classical assumptions are critical and, thus, the following research questions arise.1.) How can observed behavior be considered in contract design? To answer this question, the first step is analyzing the underlying behavioral concepts that are the main drivers of observed behavior. To this end, we aim to figure to what extent social preferences and/or bounded rationality impact observed behavior. Building upon these insights, we are aiming to develop a theory that nests both bounded rational and social preferences. 2.) Can fully efficient contracts be established in the absence of full rationality and/or the goal of profit maximization? Our first approach to answer this question is to analyze if bilateral face-to-face communication supports cooperative and efficient outcomes. Our second approach is to analyze if renegotiation that only allows for Pareto improvements may result in fully efficient outcomes.

信息不对称导致的效率损失是供应链管理中的一个主要挑战。这种效率损失可以通过非线性激励计划（筛选合同或合同菜单）来限制，这些计划使供应链各方的激励措施保持一致。因此，最优激励方案的推导通常依赖于经典的假设，如完全理性或所有供应链各方的最终目标是利润最大化。然而，最近的实验室实验表明，这些经典假设是关键的，因此，出现了以下研究问题。如何在合同设计中考虑观察到的行为？要回答这个问题，第一步是分析基本的行为概念，这些概念是观察到的行为的主要驱动力。为此，我们的目标是弄清楚社会偏好和/或有限理性在多大程度上影响观察到的行为。基于这些见解，我们的目标是发展一个理论，嵌套有限理性和社会偏好。2.）的情况。在缺乏充分理性和/或利润最大化目标的情况下，完全有效的合同能否成立？我们回答这个问题的第一个方法是分析双边面对面的沟通是否支持合作和有效的结果。我们的第二种方法是分析只允许帕累托改进的重新谈判是否会导致完全有效的结果。