Supply chain coordination in case of asymmetric information

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Efficiency losses resulting from asymmetric information are a major challenge in Supply Chain Management. Such efficiency losses can be limited via non-linear incentive schemes (screening contracts or menu of contracts) that align the incentives of the supply chain parties. The derivation of the optimal incentive scheme thereby typically relies on classical assumptions such as full rationality or the ultimate goal of all supply chain parties to maximize profits. However, recent laboratory experiments show that these classical assumptions are critical and, thus, the following research questions arise.1.) How can observed behavior be considered in contract design? To answer this question, the first step is analyzing the underlying behavioral concepts that are the main drivers of observed behavior. To this end, we aim to figure to what extent social preferences and/or bounded rationality impact observed behavior. Building upon these insights, we are aiming to develop a theory that nests both bounded rational and social preferences. 2.) Can fully efficient contracts be established in the absence of full rationality and/or the goal of profit maximization? Our first approach to answer this question is to analyze if bilateral face-to-face communication supports cooperative and efficient outcomes. Our second approach is to analyze if renegotiation that only allows for Pareto improvements may result in fully efficient outcomes.