On a Survey on a Supply Chain Coordination with Information Asymmetry

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In this paper, we provided a survey of a proposed model on supply chain with information asymmetry. Based on Banerjee’s and Sulky’s model, we investigated the economic and management interpretation of a bargaining model with information asymmetry. The numerical examples illustrates that we can obtain either a separating or pooling equilibrium depending on the parameter values. Note that formulating an adequate contract structure that can result in a separating equilibrium is critical for modern supply chain management where strategic alliance is considered an important tool to raise strategic competence. Moreover, since nowadays supply chain has become a global network including foreign firms with different corporate culture and business traditions, it is not uncommon that firms are required to corporate one another under uncertainty about the other allied members. Therefore, a tool to detect hidden information of business partner helps business make proper managerial decisions.From this point, our paper can be understood as a meaningful initial work in developing a more detailed supply chain model with information asymmetry.