ERI: Multi-Layer Dynamic Strategic Decision-Making for Integrated Cyber-Physical Energy Systems Security and Resilience

ERI：综合网络物理能源系统安全性和弹性的多层动态战略决策

• 批准号: 2138956
• 负责人: Juntao Chen
• 金额: $ 19.98万
• 依托单位: Fordham University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-01-15 至 2024-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2138956&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: ERI; Multi; Layer; Dynamic; Strategic

This award is funded in whole or in part under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117-2). The pervasive adoption of advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs) in electric power systems has made the grid a complex cyber-physical energy system (CPES). Among the ICTs, the Internet of Things (IoT) plays a crucial role in filling the gap between the control and monitoring of electricity services and physical grid dynamic processes. The widespread implementation of IoT devices significantly improves the CPES's operational performance, but it also exposes the grid to vast cyber threats. It has been revealed that the adversary can disrupt the CPES operations through IoT botnet attacks by compromising a large number of IoT-operated energy devices in the power distribution system and using them as a means to launch a coordinated cyber-physical attack. Classical approaches to trustworthy CPES focus on improving cybersecurity to prevent attacks or enhancing physical resiliency to restore the system operation after attacks. However, solely relying on either approach is not a viable solution as achieving perfect security or resiliency is extremely cost-prohibitive, if not impossible. To this end, this project aims to devise cost-effective and holistic mechanisms for enhancing both the security and resiliency of CPES under large-scale IoT botnet attacks. The design paradigm will jointly mitigate the risks of the cyber components and equip the physical grid with agile recovery capability.The project will develop a unified theoretical framework to facilitate grid operators' decentralized, strategic, and integrative decision-making on security and resiliency strategies in CPES. Specifically, the project will first establish a quantitative framework for analyzing the systemic cyber-physical risks imposed by the massive IoT-controlled energy devices in the microgrid. This systemic risk model will then be integrated with the microgrid's operation framework to study the attacker's strategic behavior in destabilizing the grid. The adversarial analysis facilitates uncovering the most vulnerable locations in the microgrids, which is leveraged to guide the strategic defense. The second research thrust will establish a dynamic game to enable the integrated design of proactive cyber defense and physical resiliency planning strategies for networked microgrids. The multi-layer multi-stage game-theoretic design provides preventive security mechanisms to harden the cyber components of CPES and corrective resiliency measures to improve the preparedness of the physical grid for attacks. The project will further develop distributed learning-based mechanism for the microgrid operators to counteract the strategic adversaries adaptively. The developed techniques and results in this project will be demonstrated using public power system simulation tools. The PI will integrate the research outcomes into the engineering, data science, and cybersecurity curriculum, providing students cross-disciplinary training in cyber-physical smart grids, security and resilience, and artificial intelligence. The PI is also committed to public education through outreach activities to further broadening the participation of women and minorities as undergraduate and graduate students in the project.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项全部或部分根据2021年美国救援计划法案（公法117-2）资助。先进的信息和通信技术（ICT）在电力系统中的普遍采用，使电网成为一个复杂的网络物理能源系统（CPES）。在信通技术中，物联网在填补电力服务的控制和监测与物理电网动态过程之间的差距方面发挥着至关重要的作用。物联网设备的广泛实施显着提高了CPES的运营性能，但也使电网面临巨大的网络威胁。据透露，对手可以通过物联网僵尸网络攻击破坏CPES的运营，方法是破坏配电系统中大量物联网操作的能源设备，并将其用作发起协调的网络物理攻击的手段。可信CPES的经典方法专注于提高网络安全性以防止攻击或增强物理弹性以在攻击后恢复系统操作。然而，仅仅依靠任何一种方法都不是可行的解决方案，因为实现完美的安全性或弹性即使不是不可能的，也是极其昂贵的。为此，该项目旨在设计具有成本效益和整体性的机制，以增强CPES在大规模物联网僵尸网络攻击下的安全性和弹性。该设计范式将共同降低网络组件的风险，并为物理网格提供敏捷恢复能力。该项目将开发一个统一的理论框架，以促进网格运营商在CPES中对安全和弹性策略的分散，战略和综合决策。具体而言，该项目将首先建立一个定量框架，用于分析微电网中大规模物联网控制的能源设备所带来的系统性网络物理风险。然后，将该系统性风险模型与微电网的运营框架集成，以研究攻击者破坏电网稳定的策略行为。对抗性分析有助于发现微电网中最脆弱的位置，从而指导战略防御。第二个研究重点将建立一个动态的游戏，使网络微电网的主动网络防御和物理弹性规划策略的综合设计。多层多阶段博弈论设计提供了预防性安全机制，以加强CPES的网络组件和纠正性弹性措施，以提高物理网格对攻击的准备。该项目将进一步开发基于分布式学习的机制，使微电网运营商能够自适应地对抗战略对手。在这个项目中开发的技术和结果将使用公共电力系统仿真工具进行演示。PI将把研究成果整合到工程、数据科学和网络安全课程中，为学生提供网络物理智能电网、安全和弹性以及人工智能方面的跨学科培训。PI还致力于通过外展活动进行公共教育，以进一步扩大妇女和少数民族作为本科生和研究生参与该项目。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并通过使用基金会的知识价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

Enhancing equitable resilience of urban energy systems via strategic planning of EV charging infrastructure

通过电动汽车充电基础设施的战略规划增强城市能源系统的公平弹性

• DOI: 10.1016/j.tej.2023.107275
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: The Electricity Journal
• 作者: Ebbrecht, Gabrielle;Chen, Juntao
• 通讯作者: Chen, Juntao

Enhancing Cyber-Physical Resiliency of Power Grids under IoT-Enabled Dynamic Botnet Attacks

• DOI: 10.1109/pesgm52003.2023.10253342
• 发表时间: 2023-07
• 期刊: 2023 IEEE Power & Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM)
• 作者: Juntao Chen

A Cross-Layer Design Approach to Strategic Cyber Defense and Robust Switching Control of Cyber-Physical Wind Energy Systems

战略网络防御和网络物理风能系统鲁棒切换控制的跨层设计方法

• DOI: 10.1109/tase.2022.3164860
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering
• 影响因子: 5.6
• 作者: Chen, Juntao;Zhu, Quanyan
• 通讯作者: Zhu, Quanyan

Differentially Private ADMM-Based Distributed Discrete Optimal Transport for Resource Allocation

• DOI: 10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001511
• 发表时间: 2022-11
• 期刊: GLOBECOM 2022 - 2022 IEEE Global Communications Conference
• 作者: Jason Hughes;Juntao Chen

Adversarial Manipulation of Learning in Linear-Quadratic Zero-Sum Differential Games via Cost Poisoning

• DOI: 10.1109/cns59707.2023.10288942
• 发表时间: 2023-10
• 期刊: 2023 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS)
• 作者: Son Tung Do;Gabrielle Ebbrecht;Juntao Chen