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Self-organization of Constitutional Institutions: Transformation and Constitutional Problems of Internal Rules of Public Authorities

宪政机构的自组织：公权力内部规则的变迁与宪政问题

基本信息

批准号：
255548693
负责人：
Professor Dr. Florian Meinel
金额：
--
依托单位：
Abteilung für Staatstheorie, Politische Wissenschaften und Vergleichendes Staatsrecht
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2014
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2013-12-31 至 2020-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/255548693?language=en
关键词：
Self organization Constitutional Institutions Transformation

项目摘要

The right of parliaments and cabinets to determine their own rules of proceedings including their internal organizational structure is an established component of democratic constitutional law since the 19th century. Its significance declined over the 20th century, when constitutional recognition of minority rights, partisanship, and judicial review considerably narrowed the field of action for institutional self-governance. Yet the era of supranationalization that has put questions of self-organization back on the constitutional agenda: The internal organization of the executive determines how national cabinets influence supranational policy-making. The rise of special committees for urgent decisions, e.g. state interventions concerning the financial market, is challenging existing categories of constitutional law. At the same time, we witness an increasing variety in the law of internal organization. New legal instruments such as codes of conduct, interinstitutional agreements, nonbinding resolutions on internal structure and proceeding, or information and non-disclosure agreements enter the field that was formerly dominated by "rules of procedure" as locus classicus of the law of self-organization. These developments indicate profound changes in the architecture of multilevel constitutional governance and the separation of powers. The Europeanization of decision-making as well as emerging responsibilities of control and information beyond the lawmaking-paradigm challenge traditional concepts of internal organization of parliaments and governments. My comparative inquiry will draw at a comparison of three constitutional systems: In German constitutional law, the doctrinal recognition of autonomous self-organization of the legislative and the executive branch is in practice undermined by judicial review under substantive provisions of democratic legitimacy. In the European Union, due to the Court's judicial self-restraint in this matter, the right to self-organization has in contrast often been described as a driving force of the Union's constitutional development. Drawing on a much more elaborated theory of the separation of powers, US constitutional law and theory have dealt with questions of self-organization of both Congress and the executive branch in a way that reflects their political and legal relevance. Building on these differences, the project will first of all expose how internal law with its different forms and functions constitutes the "operational level" of the separation of powers by determining from within the critical points of potential interbranch conflicts. It will then ask in a more general way how the structural transformation of the legal forms of self-organization reflects changes in the competences and self-conception of political institutions. The comparative perspective will finally allow to address questions of the law and theory of the constitution's organizational rules in a transnational perspective.

议会和内阁有权决定自己的议事规则，包括其内部组织结构，这是自19世纪以来民主宪法的一个既定组成部分。它的重要性在世纪下降，宪法承认少数民族的权利，党派和司法审查大大缩小了机构自治的行动领域。然而，超国家化的时代将自组织问题重新提上了宪法议程：行政部门的内部组织决定了国家内阁如何影响超国家的政策制定。紧急决策特别委员会的兴起，例如国家干预金融市场，正在挑战现有的宪法类别。与此同时，我们看到内部组织法则的变化越来越大。新的法律的文书，如行为守则、机构间协定、关于内部结构和程序的不具约束力的决议，或信息和保密协定，进入了以前由“程序规则”主导的领域，成为自组织法的经典。这些事态发展表明，多层次宪政治理和分权结构发生了深刻变化。决策的欧洲化以及新出现的立法模式之外的控制和信息责任挑战了议会和政府内部组织的传统概念。我的比较研究将借鉴三种宪政制度的比较：在德国宪法中，立法和行政分支的自主自组织的理论承认在实践中被民主合法性的实质性规定下的司法审查所破坏。在欧洲联盟，由于法院在这一问题上的司法自我克制，自我组织的权利往往被描述为欧盟宪政发展的推动力。美国宪法和宪法理论借鉴了一种更为详细的分权理论，以反映国会和行政分支的政治和法律的相关性的方式处理了它们的自组织问题。在这些差异的基础上，本项目将首先揭示具有不同形式和功能的国内法如何通过从内部确定潜在部门间冲突的临界点，构成分权的“操作层面”。然后，它将以一种更一般的方式提出问题：自组织的法律的形式的结构性转变如何反映政治机构的能力和自我概念的变化。比较的视角将最终允许在跨国视角中解决宪法组织规则的法律和理论问题。