Self-organization of Constitutional Institutions: Transformation and Constitutional Problems of Internal Rules of Public Authorities

自19世纪以来，议会和内阁有权决定自己的议事规则，包括其内部组织结构，这是民主宪法的一个既定组成部分。它的重要性在20世纪下降了，因为宪法承认少数民族的权利、党派之争和司法审查大大缩小了机构自治的行动范围。然而，超国家时代已经把自我组织的问题重新提上了宪法议程：行政部门的内部组织决定了国家内阁如何影响超国家的政策制定。作出紧急决定的特别委员会的兴起，例如国家对金融市场的干预，正在挑战现有的宪法类别。与此同时，我们看到内部组织的规律越来越多样化。新的法律文书，如行为守则、机构间协定、关于内部结构和程序的不具约束力的决议或信息和不披露协定，进入了以前由“程序规则”作为自组织法的经典所在地所主导的领域。这些事态发展表明，多层次宪政结构和权力分立发生了深刻变化。决策的欧洲化以及超越立法范式的控制和信息责任的出现挑战了议会和政府内部组织的传统观念。我的比较研究将对三种宪法制度进行比较：在德国宪法中，立法和行政部门的自治自我组织的理论承认在实践中被民主合法性实质性条款下的司法审查所破坏。在欧洲联盟，由于法院在这个问题上的司法自我克制，自我组织的权利相反经常被描述为联盟宪法发展的推动力。借鉴更为详尽的三权分立理论，美国宪法法律和理论以一种反映其政治和法律相关性的方式处理了国会和行政部门的自我组织问题。在这些差异的基础上，该项目将首先揭示具有不同形式和功能的国内法如何通过从内部确定潜在部门间冲突的关键点来构成权力分立的“操作层面”。然后，它将以更一般的方式询问自组织的法律形式的结构转变如何反映政治机构的能力和自我概念的变化。通过比较的视角，最终可以在跨国视角下解决宪法组织规则的法律和理论问题。

The right of parliaments and cabinets to determine their own rules of proceedings including their internal organizational structure is an established component of democratic constitutional law since the 19th century. Its significance declined over the 20th century, when constitutional recognition of minority rights, partisanship, and judicial review considerably narrowed the field of action for institutional self-governance. Yet the era of supranationalization that has put questions of self-organization back on the constitutional agenda: The internal organization of the executive determines how national cabinets influence supranational policy-making. The rise of special committees for urgent decisions, e.g. state interventions concerning the financial market, is challenging existing categories of constitutional law. At the same time, we witness an increasing variety in the law of internal organization. New legal instruments such as codes of conduct, interinstitutional agreements, nonbinding resolutions on internal structure and proceeding, or information and non-disclosure agreements enter the field that was formerly dominated by "rules of procedure" as locus classicus of the law of self-organization. These developments indicate profound changes in the architecture of multilevel constitutional governance and the separation of powers. The Europeanization of decision-making as well as emerging responsibilities of control and information beyond the lawmaking-paradigm challenge traditional concepts of internal organization of parliaments and governments. My comparative inquiry will draw at a comparison of three constitutional systems: In German constitutional law, the doctrinal recognition of autonomous self-organization of the legislative and the executive branch is in practice undermined by judicial review under substantive provisions of democratic legitimacy. In the European Union, due to the Court's judicial self-restraint in this matter, the right to self-organization has in contrast often been described as a driving force of the Union's constitutional development. Drawing on a much more elaborated theory of the separation of powers, US constitutional law and theory have dealt with questions of self-organization of both Congress and the executive branch in a way that reflects their political and legal relevance. Building on these differences, the project will first of all expose how internal law with its different forms and functions constitutes the "operational level" of the separation of powers by determining from within the critical points of potential interbranch conflicts. It will then ask in a more general way how the structural transformation of the legal forms of self-organization reflects changes in the competences and self-conception of political institutions. The comparative perspective will finally allow to address questions of the law and theory of the constitution's organizational rules in a transnational perspective.