Location Factor Public Law - Integration and Competition in Federal Order

《区位因素公法--联邦秩序中的一体化和竞争》一书解决了三个后续问题：基于经济竞争模型，该论文在其第一部分（第25页及以下）中讨论，国家间的竞争是否基本可能表明，只有局部要素竞争才符合经济竞争模型。它的主要特征是，国家在竞争生产要素的同时，尽可能地发展本国的公法。因此，它们吸引生产要素所有者在其领土上定居，从而产生额外的税收。这一经济机制要求在针对竞争国家的上级法律中有一个竞争秩序，才能得到执行。它的成分将在第二部分（第91页及以后）加以阐述。出现了五条诫命：首先，在上级法中必须确立公共福利基础，禁止国家间以牺牲公共福利为代价的竞争。第二，要素所有者必须确保要素流动性和投资的未来证明，以实现跨境风险敞口并做出有吸引力的安排。在竞争国家方面，需要立法规定财政自主权、机会平等和立法空间，以激励竞争互动。第三，需要保护机制，例如国家援助法，以确保只有国家法律的质量才能决定投资。第四，上级法的可接受性;第五，为使当地要素竞争可行，必须提出某些组织要求，第三部分将这些抽象要求与欧洲共同体法和德国宪法进行比较，结果是，只有共同体法允许成员国之间的可行竞争（第161页及以后各页）。与此相反，国内法缺少流动性因素（第402页及其后）。由于《德国宪法》规定的收入均等，财政自主（第434页及其后）。如果把共同体法理解为成员国之间功能性竞争的秩序，那么就有可能对主要法作出竞争性解释（第337页及其后）。例如，它解释了为什么欧洲法院在基本自由领域的审查标准高于欧洲基本权利领域。原因是，要素流动所需的基本自由因此成为当地要素竞争的一个重要组成部分（第354页及其后）。

The habilitation thesis .Location Factor Public Law - Integration and Competition in Federal Order* addresses three succeeding problems: Based on an economic competition model the thesis discusses in its first part (p. 25 ff.), whether competition between states is basically possible It is shown, that only the local factor competition is in accordance with the economic competition model. Its main characteristic is, that states are competing for production factors, as they develop their national public law as attractive as possible. Thus they attract owners of production factors to settle in their territory, which generates additional tax revenues. This economic mechanism requires a competition order in the superior law, which addresses the competing states, in order to be executable. Its ingredients will be developed in the second part (p. 91 ff.). Five commandments are appearing: First a public weal base is necessary in the superior law, to prohibit that competition between states is conducted on the expense of the public weal. Secondly, factor mobility and future proof of investment have to be ensured on the side of the factor owners, to enable a cross-border exposure and to arrange it attractive. On the side of the competing states is it necessary to legislate financial autonomy, equality of opportunity and space for lawgiving, to motivate for competitive interaction. Thirdly, protective mechanisms e.g. in the form of state aid law are needed, in order to ensure that only the quality of the state law determines the investment. Fourthly, the enforceability of the superior law and fifthly, some organizational requirements have to be given for a workable local factor competition.In the third part these abstract demands are compared to the European Community Law and the German Constitutional Law with the result, that only the Community Law allows for a workable competition between the member states (p. 161 ff.). In contrast the national law is missing factor mobility (p. 402 ff.) and financial autonomy because of the revenue equalisation in the German Constitution (p. 434 ff.).Understanding the Community Law as an order of a functional competition between the member states, a competitive interpretation of the primary law will be possible (p. 337 ff.). It explains for example, why the standard of review of the European Court of Justice is higher in the field of fundamental freedoms than in the field of the European basic rights. The reason is, that the fundamental freedoms required for factor mobility thus become one important component of the local factor competition (p. 354 ff.).