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DEA-based performance measurement with a centralized view on DMUs

基于 DEA 的绩效衡量，具有 DMU 的集中视图

基本信息

批准号：
276714686
负责人：
Professor Dr. Heinz Ahn
金额：
--
依托单位：
Institut für Controlling und Unternehmensrechnung
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2021-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/276714686?language=en
关键词：
DEA based performance measurement centralized

项目摘要

Standard Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has widely been used to evaluate the efficiency of Decision Making Units (DMUs) on the assumption that each DMU operates independently. Under the scenario of a centralized management, however, an umbrella organization strives for improving the overall performance of its DMUs. Our research addresses this scenario by modifying DEA-based benchmarking systems according to a controlling-type structure by which the central management’s preferences can be taken into account. While DFG project (sign removed) (10/2015–09/2018) served to develop approaches to incorporate crucial controlling parameters into DEA with a centralized view of measurement, the purpose of project (sign removed)(10/2018–09/2020) is to design systems of incentives for DMUs partitioned into distinct groups and for organizations with different degrees of decentralization.Our respective findings have opened up one more research avenue that refers to the incorporation of environmental variables into the centralized view of measurement. A well-designed approach to account for such variables not only can enhance our conceptual frameworks being developed but also gives rise to innovative models. They are in the focus of our final research objective: Accounting for environmental variables – Design of a system of incentives with a centralized view of measurement.Taking the heterogeneity of the DMUs’ environments into account is of particular importance when frontier-based benchmarking approaches are used to run incentive systems for improving performance: While such a system obliges poor-performing units to save costs, e.g., good-performing units may receive rewards to perform better. Naturally, the units may strive to claim that they are not fully responsible for their performance that would to some degree depend on factors (i.e. environmental variables) beyond their control.Against this background, we aim at designing a new system of incentives that takes environmental variables into account. Its usefulness will be shown with regard to the electricity transmission sector in Brazil. The respective regulatory agency faces severe problems regarding the development of an appropriate incentive system by which this sector should be regulated. Based on this example, our first goal is to show how such regulatory systems can be modeled from both the perspective of principal-agent theory in general and frontier-based incentive regulation in particular. To account for environmental factors, the Brazilian regulator applies the so-called second-stage procedure: The DEA efficiency scores computed in a first stage are regressed on a set of environmental variables in a second stage. However, the regulator’s procedure suffers from a number of serious shortcomings, cause by, e.g., the small sample size. Hence, the second goal of our research is to convincingly incorporate environmental variables into the performance analysis.

标准数据包络分析（DEA）被广泛用于评估决策单元（DMU）的效率，假设每个DMU独立运行。然而，在集中管理的情况下，伞式组织努力提高其决策单元的整体绩效。我们的研究解决了这种情况下，修改DEA为基础的基准系统，根据一个中央管理层的喜好，可以考虑到的一个banking型结构。虽然DFG项目（签名删除）（10/2015-09/2018）用于制定方法，将关键控制参数纳入DEA，并集中考虑测量，项目的目的而（签名删除）（10/2018-09/2020）是设计激励制度的决策单元划分成不同的群体和组织与不同程度的权力下放。我们各自的研究结果已经开辟了一条研究途径，即把环境变量纳入测量的集中视图。一个精心设计的方法来考虑这些变量不仅可以加强我们正在开发的概念框架，而且还可以产生创新的模型。它们是我们最终研究目标的重点：环境变量的会计--设计一个具有集中测量视角的激励系统。当基于前沿的基准方法被用于运行激励系统以提高绩效时，考虑决策单元环境的异质性是特别重要的：虽然这样的系统迫使绩效差的单位节省成本，例如，表现良好的单元可以获得奖励以表现更好。当然，这些单位可能会努力声称，他们不完全负责他们的业绩，这将在某种程度上取决于他们无法控制的因素（即环境变量）。在这种背景下，我们的目标是设计一个新的激励制度，考虑到环境变量。巴西的输电部门将证明其有用性。有关管理机构在制定一个适当的激励制度以管理这一部门方面面临严重问题。基于这个例子，我们的第一个目标是展示如何从一般的委托代理理论和特别是基于前沿的激励监管的角度来建模这样的监管系统。为了考虑环境因素，巴西监管机构应用了所谓的第二阶段程序：在第一阶段计算的DEA效率得分在第二阶段对一组环境变量进行回归。然而，监管机构的程序存在一些严重缺陷，例如，小样本量。因此，我们研究的第二个目标是令人信服地将环境变量纳入绩效分析。