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Disagreement in Philosophy. Semantic and Epistemological Foundations

哲学上的分歧。

基本信息

批准号：
283100111
负责人：
Professorin Dr. Elke Brendel
金额：
--
依托单位：
Lehrstuhl für Logik und Grundlagenforschung
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2018-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/283100111?language=en
关键词：
Disagreement Philosophy.Semantic Epistemological Foundations

项目摘要

Disagreement is a driving force of progress in the sciences. It indicates mistakes and facilitates their correction. If disagreement does not dissolve over time, it puts rational pressure on all sides to weaken or suspend judgment. When indissoluble disagreement is ubiquitous within a particular discipline, it threatens the epistemic integrity of that discipline. Prima facie, philosophy seems to be a paradigm case of this threat. In order to evaluate this assessment, the present project starts with addressing the semantics and epistemology of disagreement. Both foci belong to the hot topics of the current international debates in philosophy. So far they have been mostly discussed in isolation from each other. In contrast, the present project will address the interplay of the semantics and epistemology of disagreement. It will use the results of this investigation to analyze paradigm cases of philosophical disagreement. In the semantic part (part A), we will explore different kinds of disagreement and examine which of them imply that only one side can be correct. One core theme of this part of the project will be the task of identifying and modeling pseudo-disagreement such that both parties talk past each other. Given this background, we will scrutinize on the current debate about faultless disagreement. Moreover, we will explore whether and how disagreement is compatible with and can be modeled within the framework of contextualist or relativist semantics. In the epistemological part (part B), we will explore whether and if so under what general conditions a substantial disagreement requires to suspend judgment of all parties. On the one hand, the relevant conditions regard the logic of defeat. On the other hand, they concern the issue of whether the same evidence can justify conflicting judgments. In the application part (part C), we will explore how pervasive substantial disagreement is in philosophy and how we should rationally react to it. We will use general considerations and two case studies about disagreement in current epistemology to make progress on this point. Taking this route, we will try to give at least a partial answer to the main question whether the epistemic integrity of philosophy is threatened by the ubiquity of indissoluble philosophical disagreement.

分歧是科学进步的动力。它指出错误，并有助于纠正错误。如果分歧不能随着时间的推移而消除，它就会给各方施加理性的压力，使其削弱或暂停判断。当无法解决的分歧在一个特定的学科中无处不在时，它威胁到了该学科的认识完整性。从表面上看，哲学似乎是这种威胁的典型案例。为了评估这一评估，本项目开始解决语义和认识论的分歧。这两个问题都是当前国际哲学界争论的热点问题。到目前为止，它们大多是孤立地讨论的。与此相反，本项目将解决语义学和认识论的分歧的相互作用。它将使用这个调查的结果来分析哲学分歧的范例案例。在语义部分（A部分），我们将探讨不同类型的分歧，并检查其中哪些意味着只有一方是正确的。该项目这一部分的一个核心主题将是识别和建模伪分歧的任务，以便双方互相交谈。在这种背景下，我们将仔细研究目前关于完美分歧的辩论。此外，我们将探讨是否以及如何不一致是兼容的，并可以在语境主义或相对主义语义学的框架内进行建模。在认识论部分（B部分），我们将探讨是否以及如果是的话，在什么一般条件下，一个实质性的分歧需要暂停所有各方的判断。一方面，相关条件考虑到了失败的逻辑。另一方面，他们关心的问题是，同样的证据是否可以证明相互矛盾的判断。在应用部分（C部分），我们将探讨哲学中的实质性分歧是如何普遍存在的以及我们应该如何理性地应对它，我们将使用关于当前认识论中分歧的一般考虑和两个案例研究来推进这一点。沿着这条路线，我们将试图至少部分地回答一个主要问题，即哲学认识论的完整性是否受到无处不在的无法解决的哲学分歧的威胁。