How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view

How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view
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如何理性回应同行分歧:先发制人的观点

DOI:
10.1111/phis.12144
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发表时间:
2019
影响因子:
0.7
通讯作者:
Thomas Grundmann
Thomas Grundmann
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Thomas Grundmann

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在本文中,我认为关于如何理性地应对同行分歧的两种最常见的观点——总证据观(TEV)和等权重观(EWV)——由于实质性的原因都是不充分的。TEV并没有对一些假设的同伴分歧案例做出正确的直觉判断。EWV也是如此。此外,EWV并没有在足够普遍的认知原则的基础上对agent的理性要求给出任何解释。然后,我将论证两种观点都有一个真正的替代方案——抢占观点(PV),它在两方面都表现得更好。我将在论文中对PV进行概述和详细的辩护。
In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement—the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)—are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently general epistemic principles. I will then argue that there is a genuine alternative to both views—the Preemption View (PV)—that fares substantially better in both respects. I will give an outline and a detailed defense of PV in the paper.
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