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Moral Objectivity without Moral Facts

没有道德事实的道德客观性

基本信息

批准号：
290859428
负责人：
Privatdozent Dr. Manfred Harth
金额：
--
依托单位：
依托单位国家：
德国
项目类别：
Research Grants
财政年份：
2015
资助国家：
德国
起止时间：
2014-12-31 至 2018-12-31
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/290859428?language=en
关键词：
Moral Objectivity without Facts

项目摘要

Recently non-naturalist realism, i.e. the thesis that the world contains epistemically independent, irreducibly moral facts, shows a notable revival and increase in attention. To considerable extent this is due to David Enoch’s influential book “Taking Morality Seriously”. On the opposite, antirealist side of the debate, mostly non-cognitivist and relativist theories are discussed today. A position “in-between”, i.e. antirealism that is neither relativist nor non-cognitivist nor an error-theory, only gets marginal attention, although a very prominent philosopher, Crispin Wright, has introduced this position into the debate years ago and has further developed it since then in several articles. However, such objectivist antirealism is quite attractive: on the one side, it avoids the notorious problems of relativism and the problematic semantic reconstructions of non-cognitivism and error-theory; on the other side, it shares the crucial virtues of realism without catching its epistemological problems. In the current project, this objectivist shape of antirealism has been substantiated mostly in comparison to its robust realist rival. Enoch’s attempt to answer the crucial epistemological question – How are our moral beliefs correlated with the epistemically and causally independent facts? – has been shown to be utterly problematic. Since antirealism doesn’t face such kind of problem, the objectivist antirealism advocated in the current project turned out to have the edge over realism. Even though realism has a slight advantage as regards a further challenge that arises from the argument from faultless disagreement – antirealist have to adopt a non-standard conception of truth and to revise logic –, objectivist antirealism, on balance, is the much more plausible position. However, so far in the project, no positive argument has been taken into consideration that by itself speaks in favour of objectivist antirealism. This is to be made up for in the continuation of the project. The basic idea is this. The two arguments put forward in “Taking Morality Seriously” in favour of robust realism shall be made useful for objectivist antirealism. The first argument speaks “solely” in favour of objectivism, anyway, and, therefore, can be directly adopted by objectivist antirealists provided it can be defended against its critics. With respect to the second, more important argument that is intended to support robust realism it shall be argued that it doesn’t show so much as it is supposed to show, viz. the plausibility of realism, but rather that it solely shows the plausibility of objectivism. If compelling, this argument will offer good reasons that speak in favour of objectivist antirealism. Finally, for completing the overall project, the results shall be brought together and published in a book – working title “Moral Objectivity without Moral Facts”.

最近，非自然主义现实主义，即世界包含认识上独立的，不可还原的道德事实的论文，显示了显着的复苏和关注的增加。在很大程度上，这要归功于大卫·以诺的一本有影响力的书《认真对待道德》。相反，辩论的反实在论一方，今天讨论的大多是非认知主义和相对主义理论。一个“介于两者之间”的立场，即既不是相对主义者，也不是非认知主义者，也不是错误理论的反实在论，只得到边缘的关注，尽管一个非常杰出的哲学家，克里斯平赖特，已经介绍了这一立场的辩论多年前，并进一步发展了它，自那时以来，在几篇文章。然而，这种客观主义的反实在论是相当有吸引力的：一方面，它避免了相对主义的臭名昭著的问题以及非认知主义和错误理论的有问题的语义重建;另一方面，它分享了实在论的关键优点，但没有抓住它的认识论问题。在当前的项目中，这种反实在论的客观主义形式主要是在与其强大的实在论对手的比较中得到证实的。以诺试图回答一个关键的认识论问题--我们的道德信念如何与认识上和因果上独立的事实相关联？- 已经被证明是完全有问题的。由于反实在论不面临这样的问题，所以本课题所主张的客观主义反实在论就比实在论更有优势。尽管实在论在来自完美的分歧的论证所引起的进一步的挑战方面有一点优势--反实在论者不得不采用一种非标准的真理概念并修正逻辑--客观主义的反实在论，总的来说，是更合理的立场。然而，到目前为止，在这个项目中，还没有考虑到本身就支持客观主义反实在论的积极论点。这将在项目的继续进行中得到弥补。基本的想法是这样的。在《严肃对待道德》中提出的两个支持稳健实在论的论点，对于客观主义的反实在论是有用的。无论如何，第一个论点“完全”赞成客观主义，因此，只要它能被反对它的批评者辩护，它就能被客观主义的反现实主义者直接采纳。关于第二个，更重要的论点，它旨在支持强大的现实主义，它应该被认为，它没有显示那么多，因为它应该显示，即现实主义的可接受性，而是它只显示了客观主义的可接受性。如果令人信服的话，这一论证将提供支持客观主义反实在论的充分理由。最后，为了完成整个项目，结果应汇集在一起，并在一本书中出版-标题为“没有道德事实的道德客观性”。