The Design of International Organizations.Fostering Diplomatic Deliberation?

无论是宪法、建国条约，还是国家和国际组织(IO)的议事规则，令人惊讶的是，许多关于行为者之间互动的规则为审议创造了空间，同时限制了可供讨论的时间。尽管后者可能会加快决策速度，但它可能会降低决策的质量和合法性。最初的项目回答了两个研究问题：内部监督办公室的机构设计在多大程度上寻求引导外交审议，以及内部监督办公室在这方面为什么不同？外交官在实践中参与审议的范围有多广？为什么内部监督办公室和政策周期的各个阶段的外交审议会有所不同？在第一阶段，该项目回答了这两个问题，从而为组织的体制设计和体制规则的实际使用提供了新的和重要的见解。该项目的扩展放大了设计、演员实践和IO性能之间的联系。它将阐明审慎的制度设计和审慎的外交做法对IO绩效的四个不同组成部分的影响，即IO产出绩效(在给定时间段内做出的政策决定的数量)、IO决策的速度(效率)、IO解决问题的能力和IO的合法性。因此，与最初研究内部监督办公室在审议机构设计和外交审议做法方面如何以及为什么不同的项目不同，延长一年项目的研究设计是以x为中心的。它考察了以下核心研究问题：制度设计条款和审议实践如何以及在什么条件下影响IO绩效？基于这一核心问题，该项目将回答后续问题。这些问题包括以下几个方面：哪些机构设计要素和哪些外交做法对IO绩效有很强的积极影响，以及在什么条件下它们相互促进？如何从制度上理想地配置内部监督办公室，以促进高水平的绩效？IO性能的某些组成部分之间是否存在权衡，以致审慎的设计和实践只能增加一个组成部分(例如合法性)，而牺牲其他组成部分(例如决策速度)？

Whether we look at constitutions, founding treaties, or the rules of procedure of states and International Organizations (IO), it is striking that many rules on interaction between actors create room for deliberation, whilst simultaneously limiting the time available for discussion. While the latter might speed up decision making, it could risk reducing its quality and legitimacy. The initial project answered two research questions: How strongly does the institutional design of IOs seek to induce diplomatic deliberation and why do IOs differ in this respect? How extensively do diplomats engage in deliberation in practice and why does diplomatic deliberation vary between IOs and over stages of a policy-cycle? In the first stage the project answered these two questions thereby providing novel and important insights into IO institutional design and the actual usage of institutional rules. The project extension zooms into the nexus between design, actor practices and IO performance. It will shed light on the effects of deliberative institutional design and deliberative diplomatic practices on four different components of IO performance, namely on IO output performance (number of policy decisions taken in a given period of time), on the speed of IO decision-making (efficiency), on IO problem-solving ability, and on IO legitimacy. Thus, unlike in the initial project that examined how and why IOs differ with respect to their deliberative institutional design and the diplomatic deliberative practices, the research design of the one-year project extension is x-centered. It examines the following core research question: How and under what conditions do institutional design provisions and deliberative practices impact IO performance? Based on this core question, the project will answer subsequent questions. These encompass the following ones: Which institutional design elements and which diplomatic practices have strong positive impacts on IO performance and under what conditions do they reinforce each other? How are IOs ideally institutionally configured in order to foster high levels of performance? Is there a tradeoff between some of the components of IO performance, so that deliberative design and practices can only increase one component (e.g. legitimacy) at the expense of others (e.g. speed of decision-making)?