"Religion", the "Political" and "Judaism" in Classical German Philosophy.

我的研究将集中在康德哲学和德国唯心主义中的宗教、政治和犹太教的概念。正如我所论证的，这些哲学家作品中的犹太教概念不能被视为完全由他们对实际犹太人或犹太神学的认识所决定（他们对这方面的知识非常有限）；也不能归结为古典基督教对犹太教的立场（比如马吉安、奥古斯丁或路德的立场，这些立场在某种程度上根植于保罗的著作中）。我并不是说这些因素在这方面没有发挥任何作用（我也不是说它们发挥的作用是次要的或不重要的）。相反，我认为他们对犹太教概念的分析也受到了其他不可简化的内在系统考虑的影响，这些考虑与他们理解宗教和一般政治的独特方式有关，这些考虑需要特别注意，以便更充分地理解这些哲学家的作品中对犹太教的概念化方式。我进一步认为，尽管他们的工作存在差异，但这些哲学家有着重要的共同点，其根源在于康德哲学提出的独特挑战：试图弥合理性与其在历史上的实现之间的差距。由于内在的形而上学的限制，理性不可能在历史中立即实现，而要实现理性，就必须对它前面的事物进行绝对的否定。康德认为这种否定的对象，应该会导致Vernunftreligion作为理性和历史之间的中介，与政治的否定相一致，在这种背景下，他将其与犹太教相一致。费希特、谢林和黑格尔利用这种独特的康德张力的不同方面，提出了不同的方法来弥合上述理性与历史之间的鸿沟。他们对犹太教的理解离不开康德框架的背景，而康德框架正是他们试图克服的。最后，我打算讨论这些植根于对宗教和政治的理解的犹太教概念与后来的反犹太主义发展之间可能存在的关系。本讨论将在不确定康德和德国唯心主义与后来发展的哲学背景的情况下进行，因为在盖斯特领域假设一个明确的因果关系从根本上是误导的。另一方面，后来的发展必须与历史先例联系起来；否则，他们将被视为失常或疯狂，是历史本身的断裂。因此，探索这种关系的最好方法是，问一问这些哲学方法中有哪些东西使它们能够或使它们日后容易被应用、扭曲和适应纳粹意识形态。

My research will focus on the concepts of religion, politics, and Judaism in the philosophy of Kant and German idealism. As I argue, the concept of Judaism in the work of these philosophers cannot be seen as having been wholly determined by their acquaintance with actual Jews or with Jewish theology (their knowledge of which was very limited); nor can it be reduced to classical Christian positions towards Judaism (such as that of Marcion, Augustine or Luther, positions that are rooted, to some extent, in the writings of Paul). I do not claim that such factors did not play any role whatsoever in this regard (nor do I argue that the role they played was minor or unimportant). Rather, I suggest that their analysis of the concept of Judaism was also influenced by other irreducible, inner systematic considerations as well, related to the unique way they understood religion, and politics in general, and that these considerations require specific attention in order to more fully understand the way that Judaism is conceptualized in the work of these philosophers. I argue further that despite the differences in their work, these philosophers share significant common ground, rooted in the unique challenge arising from Kantian philosophy: The attempt to bridge the gap between reason and its realization in history. Reason cannot, due to inherent metaphysical constraints, be realized in history immediately, and its implementation necessitates an absolute negation of that which precedes it. Kant identifies the object of this negation, which ought to lead to Vernunftreligion as mediating between reason and history, with the negation of the political as such, which he identifies in this context with Judaism. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel drew on different aspects of this unique Kantian tension, suggesting different ways to bridge the abovementioned gap between reason and history. Their conception of Judaism cannot be understood without the context of the Kantian framework, which they try to overcome. Finally, I plan to address the possible relationships between such conceptions of Judaism, rooted in the understanding of religion and politics in general, and later, anti-Semitic developments. This discussion will be carried out without identifying the philosophical context of Kant and German idealism with later developments on the one hand, since assuming a clear-cut causal relation in the realm of Geist is fundamentally misleading. On the other hand, later developments must be located in relation to historical antecedents; otherwise they will be viewed as aberrations or madness, a break in history itself. The best way to explore this relationship, therefore, is to ask what in these philosophical approaches would enable them or make them prone to later be applied, twisted, and adapted to Nazi ideology.