Security for Internet of Things with Low Energy and Low Power Consumption (GreenSec)

数字嵌入式系统正在融入我们的日常生活。许多这样的系统与安全和隐私概念相联系，例如，电子支付、智能家居、电子收费和智能手机。它们中的大多数是我们日常携带的便携式设备，可以分为两组：i）电池供电的设备，以及ii）非接触式无源设备。电池寿命显然是第一组的主要问题之一，与第二组的接近程度相同。因此，低能量设计对于电池供电应用是必不可少的，并且低功率设计对于非接触式现场应用是必不可少的。有趣的是，加密社区提供了一个大型的高级算法工具箱，以实现强大的安全性。基于密码分析原理设计了密码原语。然而，非常有限的注意力已经支付了关于其实现的能量和功耗，导致大多数当前的加密解决方案并不真正适合于低功耗和低能耗应用的事实。此外，这种由合法用户控制的安全启用设备可以在敌对环境中操作。因此，实现攻击作为普适应用程序的严重威胁，可以将理论上健壮的系统变成完全破坏的设置。正如众多的侧信道分析（SCA）攻击所证明的那样，保护无处不在的系统是一项必须完成的任务。虽然已经开发并引入了几种SCA对策，但几乎没有一种针对电力和能源开销。事实上，侧信道社区几乎没有考虑过用低功耗和/或低能耗特性来抵抗SCA攻击。简而言之，大多数配备了合理SCA对策的加密设备无法满足成为低功耗（或低能量）系统一部分的要求。事实上，我们在这一领域的初步研究结果支持这一说法，我们研究了低延迟密码的SCA保护实现的延迟和功耗。尽管如此，开发加密原语以及考虑低能量和低功率特性的保护解决方案将是一个巨大的好处。在这个项目中，我们将研究ASIC平台的加密原语和SCA对策的功耗和能源消耗。在此基础上，密码算法以及SCA对策将（重新）设计，以满足某些要求，从而在有限的功率和能量消耗的密码鲁棒性和SCA抵抗计划。我们将根据实际分析的结果开发专用的可证明安全的SCA对策（针对ASIC平台）。因此，需要基于对称密码学和密码工程的跨学科努力来科普这些挑战。

Digital embedded systems are becoming integrated into our daily life. Many of such systems are tied with security and privacy concepts, e.g., electronic payments, smart homes, electronic toll collection and smart phones. A majority of them as portable devices, which are carried by us in a daily base, can be categorized into two groups: i) battery-operated ones, and ii) contactless passive ones. Battery life is obviously amongst the major issues of the first group, the same as proximity of the second group. Hence, low-energy designs are essential for the battery-operated applications, and low-power designs for the contactless in-field applications. Interestingly, the crypto community offers a large toolbox of advanced algorithms to achieve a strong level of security. The cryptographic primitives have been designed based on the principle cryptanalyses. However, very limited attention has been paid with respect to the energy and power consumption of their implementations leading to the fact that most of the current cryptographic solutions are not truly suitable for low-power and low-energy applications. Further, such security-enabled devices, that are in hand and control of the legitimate users, can be operated in hostile environments. Hence, the implementation attacks, as serious threats for pervasive applications, can turn a theoretically-robust system into a completely-broken setup. As demonstrated by numerous side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks, securing ubiquitous systems is a must as well as a non-trivial task. Although several SCA countermeasures have already been developed and introduced, almost none of them focuses on the power and energy overheads. In fact, resistance against SCA attacks with low-power and/or low-energy feature has barely been considered by the side-channel community. In short, most of the cryptographic devices, equipped with sound SCA countermeasures, fail to fulfill the requirements to be a part of a low-power (or low-energy) system. Indeed, the result of our preliminary study in this area supports this statement, where we examined the latency and power consumption of SCA-protected implementation of low-latency ciphers. Nevertheless, it would be a great benefit to develop cryptographic primitives as well as protection solutions considering low-energy and low-power features. In this project we will investigate power and energy consumption of cryptographic primitives and SCA countermeasures for ASIC platforms. Based on this, cryptographic algorithms as well as SCA countermeasures will be (re-)designed to match the certain requirements resulting in cryptographically-robust and SCA-resistant schemes with limited power and energy consumption. We will develop dedicated and provably-Secure SCA countermeasures (for ASIC platforms) based on the result of our practical analyses. Hence, an interdisciplinary effort based on symmetric cryptography and cryptographic engineering is required to cope with these challenges.