An embodied process account of how intentional states give rise to the active self

“此时此刻的非凡体验”和“对自己处于特定情况的感知”是主动自我的两个方面，而主动自我最终是意识的一部分，是“感觉所发生的事情”的一部分。意识的一个先决条件是意向性，即人类和其他动物具有与世界上的事物有关的精神状态的能力。我们认为，主动自我需要两个匹配方向和六种心理模式的意向性。从世界到心灵，意向性的汽车风格的契合方向，包括行动中的意图(正在进行的运动行为)、先前的意图(尚未启动的计划行动)和愿望(对激励行动的结果的取向)。意识到世界，意向性的知觉味道的契合方向，包括知觉(立即可用)、记忆(通过提取获得)和信念(将知觉、行为和结果联系起来)。身体所有权是自我的核心特征，需要对身体部位的知觉，以及使其能够被识别的记忆。代理是自我的第二个核心特征，它需要行动中的意图来产生运动，但也需要事先的意图来产生朝向目标的行动序列。因此，代理还意味着对特定结果的渴望。权变学习可以被解释为将感知和行动与结果联系起来的信念的建立。我们的目标是提供一个过程说明，意向性的感觉-运动基础是如何产生积极的自我的。在动态场理论的理论框架内，意向状态被建模为具身动态结构中与感觉和运动表面相联系的自我稳定的激活模式。从发展的角度来看，我们将学习视觉探索、行动和偶然事件的探索以及模仿。为了解释体现好奇心、视觉识别和对婴儿自身身体识别的注视模式，我们将基于意向-行动、感知和记忆的心理模型来模拟注视行为。先前的意图、愿望和信念将在权变学习的过程模型中实现。第二层意向性，其中关于系统自身的内部表征形成意向状态，将被用来解释模仿。在假设只有婴儿的行为才能被模仿的假设下，心理模拟将被证明是延迟模仿和自我代理的关键，自我代理是将自我体验为行为原因的有意状态。我们将展示心理意象为自我感知提供基础。我们将通过模拟来检验和说明过程模型。作为启发式装置，我们将在基于视觉的机器人上实现模型，以检查它们捕获所有必要过程的程度。与发展实验的比较将使理论解释受到实证检验。

"Phenomenal experience in the here and now" and "perception of ourselves to be in a particular situation" are two facets of the active self that is ultimately part of consciousness, of the "feeling of what happens". A prerequisite to consciousness is intentionality, the capacity of humans and other animals to have mental states that are "about" things in the world. The active self, we argue, requires intentionality of two directions of fit and six psychological modes. World-to-mind, the direction of fit of the motoric flavor of intentionality, includes intention-in-action (ongoing movement behavior), prior intention (planned actions that are not yet initiated), and desires (orientation to outcomes that motivate action). Mind-to-world, the direction of fit of the perceptual flavor of intentionality, includes perception (immediately available), memory (available through retrieval), and beliefs (linking percepts, actions, and outcomes).Body ownership, a core signature of the self, entails perception of body parts, and memory to enable their recognition. Agency, a second core signature of the self, entails intention-in-action to generate movement, but also prior intention to generate sequences of actions toward a goal. Agency thus also entails desires of particular outcomes. Contingency learning may be construed as the establishment of beliefs that link percepts and actions to outcomes. Our goal is to provide a process account for how the sensory-motor grounding of intentionality can give rise to an active self. Within the theoretical framework of Dynamic Field Theory, intentional states are modeled as self-stabilized patterns of activation linked to the sensory and motor surfaces in embodied dynamic architectures. In a developmental perspective we will study visual exploration, exploration of actions and contingencies, and imitation. To account for patterns of looking that embody curiosity, visual recognition, and recognition of infants' own body, we will model looking behavior based on the psychological models of intention-in-action, perception, and memory. Prior intention, desire, and belief will be implemented in a process model of contingency learning. Second-level intentionality in which intentional states are formed about the systems own internal representations will be used to account for imitation. On the hypothesis that only actions within an infants' behavioral repertoire are imitated, mental simulation will be shown to be critical to deferred imitation and self-agency, the intentional state of experiencing the self as the cause of one's actions. Mental imagery will be shown to provide the substrate for self-perception. We will examine and illustrate the process models through simulation. As a heuristic device, we will implement models on a vision-based robot to examine the extent to which they capture all necessary processes. Comparison to developmental experiments will subject the theoretical accounts to empirical test.