An embodied process account of how intentional states give rise to the active self

“此时此地的现象体验”和“对我们自己处于特定情境的感知”是主动自我的两个方面，主动自我最终是意识的一部分，是“对所发生的事情的感觉”的一部分。意识的一个先决条件是意向性，人类和其他动物拥有“关于”世界上事物的精神状态的能力。 我们认为，积极的自我需要两个方向的适应和六种心理模式的意向性。世界-心智（World-to-Mind）是意向性运动风格的契合方向，包括行动中的意向（正在进行的运动行为）、先前的意向（尚未启动的计划行动）和欲望（对激励行动的结果的取向）。心与世界（Mind-to-world）是意向性的感知特征的契合方向，包括感知（立即可用）、记忆（通过检索可用）和信念（将感知、行动和结果联系起来），身体所有权是自我的核心特征，需要感知身体部位，并通过记忆来识别它们。能动性是自我的第二个核心特征，它不仅包含产生运动的行动意图，而且包含产生一系列朝着目标的行动的先验意图。 因此，能动性也包含对特定结果的欲望。权变学习可以被解释为建立将感知和行动与结果联系起来的信念。我们的目标是提供一个过程解释，说明意向性的感觉-运动基础如何产生一个积极的自我。 在动态场论的理论框架内，意向状态被建模为与具身动态架构中的感觉和运动表面相关联的自稳定激活模式。在发展的角度来看，我们将学习视觉探索，探索行动和突发事件，以及模仿。为了解释体现好奇心、视觉识别和对婴儿自身身体的识别的注视模式，我们将基于行动意图、感知和记忆的心理模型来建模注视行为。 先前的意图、愿望和信念将在一个权变学习的过程模型中实现。第二层次的意向性，其中意向状态形成的系统自己的内部表征将被用来解释模仿。假设只有婴儿的行为剧目中的动作被模仿，心理模拟将被证明是关键的延迟模仿和自我代理，体验自我作为一个人的行动的原因的故意状态。 心理意象将被证明为自我知觉提供基础。我们将通过模拟来检查和说明过程模型。作为一种启发式设备，我们将在基于视觉的机器人上实现模型，以检查它们捕获所有必要过程的程度。 与发展实验的比较将使理论解释受到实证检验。

"Phenomenal experience in the here and now" and "perception of ourselves to be in a particular situation" are two facets of the active self that is ultimately part of consciousness, of the "feeling of what happens". A prerequisite to consciousness is intentionality, the capacity of humans and other animals to have mental states that are "about" things in the world. The active self, we argue, requires intentionality of two directions of fit and six psychological modes. World-to-mind, the direction of fit of the motoric flavor of intentionality, includes intention-in-action (ongoing movement behavior), prior intention (planned actions that are not yet initiated), and desires (orientation to outcomes that motivate action). Mind-to-world, the direction of fit of the perceptual flavor of intentionality, includes perception (immediately available), memory (available through retrieval), and beliefs (linking percepts, actions, and outcomes).Body ownership, a core signature of the self, entails perception of body parts, and memory to enable their recognition. Agency, a second core signature of the self, entails intention-in-action to generate movement, but also prior intention to generate sequences of actions toward a goal. Agency thus also entails desires of particular outcomes. Contingency learning may be construed as the establishment of beliefs that link percepts and actions to outcomes. Our goal is to provide a process account for how the sensory-motor grounding of intentionality can give rise to an active self. Within the theoretical framework of Dynamic Field Theory, intentional states are modeled as self-stabilized patterns of activation linked to the sensory and motor surfaces in embodied dynamic architectures. In a developmental perspective we will study visual exploration, exploration of actions and contingencies, and imitation. To account for patterns of looking that embody curiosity, visual recognition, and recognition of infants' own body, we will model looking behavior based on the psychological models of intention-in-action, perception, and memory. Prior intention, desire, and belief will be implemented in a process model of contingency learning. Second-level intentionality in which intentional states are formed about the systems own internal representations will be used to account for imitation. On the hypothesis that only actions within an infants' behavioral repertoire are imitated, mental simulation will be shown to be critical to deferred imitation and self-agency, the intentional state of experiencing the self as the cause of one's actions. Mental imagery will be shown to provide the substrate for self-perception. We will examine and illustrate the process models through simulation. As a heuristic device, we will implement models on a vision-based robot to examine the extent to which they capture all necessary processes. Comparison to developmental experiments will subject the theoretical accounts to empirical test.