Firm Wage Differentials in Imperfect Labour Markets: The Role of Market Power and Industrial Relations in Rent Splitting between Workers and Firms

不完善劳动力市场中的企业工资差异：市场力量和劳资关系在工人和企业之间分摊租金中的作用

• 批准号: 402977338
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Boris Hirsch
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (IVWL)
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2017-12-31 至 2020-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/402977338?language=en
• 关键词: Firm; Wage; Differentials; Imperfect; Labour

Studies are legion that find that equally productive workers are paid different wages by different employers. Obviously, such persistent firm wage differentials are at odds with a competitive labour market where firms take the market wage as given and act as wage takers. Instead, they point at an imperfect labour market where significant employment rents accrue to both employers and workers and both parties possess some market power in the wage formation process. Against this backdrop, the main purpose of this proposal is to grasp a firmer understanding of how employment rents are split between workers and employers in imperfect labour markets and how labour market institutions, such as unions and works councils, influence the distribution of rents. In that it not only promises new insights into the wage formation process and the likely consequences of important labour market trends like falling unionisation and worker codetermination, but also promises to inform important public policy debates, such as which rights should be granted to organised labour.Specifically, the project will make four contributions. First, existing studies that investigate rent sharing, i.e. the impact of firm performance on workers’ wages, lack credible exogenous variation in firm performance to identify the causal rent-sharing effect. We will use the Official Firm Data for Germany (“Amtliche Firmendaten für Deutschland”; AFiD) that contain information on firms’ energy costs over time and thus allows us to identify the causal rent-sharing effect. Second, most rent-sharing papers miss information on working hours, though rent sharing may not only run through monthly or daily wages but also through working hours. Merging the AFiD data to the German Structure of Earnings Survey (“Verdienststrukturerhebung”) allows us to gauge the bias in previous studies that did not use firm performance and wage indicators on an hourly basis. These rich data further enable us to study differences in rent sharing among firms covered by collective bargaining agreements and uncovered firms. Third, the existing rent-sharing literature employs firm performance and wage measures that lack theoretical justification. Using the linked employer-employee data of the Institute for Employment Research (LIAB) allows us to construct such adequate measures. In particular, the data permit us to adequately calculate firm wage premia based on an approach that decomposes wages into worker-specific and employer-specific components (Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis 1999). We are further able to study whether rent sharing depends on the presence of unions or works councils, and to shed light on the likely causes of the widening of firm wage premia since the 1990s. Fourth, the LIAB data also permits us to undertake the first investigation into the determinants of firms’ monopsony power and whether firm wage premia vary with firms’ market power and their industrial relations regime.

大量研究发现，生产力相同的工人，不同的雇主支付不同的工资。显然，这种持续的公司工资差异与竞争性劳动力市场不一致，在竞争性劳动力市场中，公司将市场工资视为既定，并作为工资接受者行事。相反，他们指出了一个不完善的劳动力市场，在这个市场上，雇主和工人都获得了大量的就业租金，双方都在工资形成过程中拥有一定的市场力量。在此背景下，本提案的主要目的是更好地理解在不完善的劳动力市场中，劳动租金如何在工人和雇主之间分配，以及工会和劳资委员会等劳动力市场机构如何影响租金的分配。因为它不仅承诺对工资形成过程和重要劳动力市场趋势的可能后果（如工会化和工人共同决策的下降）提供新的见解，而且还承诺为重要的公共政策辩论提供信息，例如应该赋予有组织的劳工哪些权利。具体而言，该项目将做出四项贡献。首先，现有的研究，调查租金共享，即企业绩效对工人工资的影响，缺乏可信的企业绩效的外生变量，以确定因果租金共享效果。我们将使用德国的官方企业数据（“Amtliche Firmendaten für Deutschland”; AFiD），其中包含企业随时间推移的能源成本信息，从而使我们能够识别因果租金分享效应。其次，大多数租金分摊文件都没有工作时间的信息，尽管租金分摊可能不仅贯穿于月工资或日工资，而且贯穿于工作时间。将AFiD数据与德国收入结构调查（“Verdienststrukturerhebung”）合并，使我们能够衡量以前研究中没有使用公司绩效和工资指标的偏差。这些丰富的数据进一步使我们能够研究集体谈判协议覆盖的公司和未覆盖的公司之间的租金分摊差异。第三，现有的租金分享文献采用企业绩效和工资的措施，缺乏理论依据。使用就业研究所（LIAB）的关联雇主-雇员数据使我们能够构建这样的适当措施。特别是，这些数据使我们能够充分计算公司工资溢价的基础上，分解成工人的具体和雇主的具体组成部分的工资（Abowd，Kramarz，马戈利斯1999）。我们还可以进一步研究租金分摊是否取决于工会或劳资委员会的存在，并阐明自20世纪90年代以来企业工资溢价扩大的可能原因。第四，LIAB的数据也使我们能够进行第一次调查的决定因素，企业的垄断力量和企业的工资溢价是否会随着企业的市场力量和他们的劳资关系制度。