Metacognition viewed through the judgment lens

元认知是一种监视和控制自己认知过程的能力，它指导着对行为的有效调节。为了评估这种能力，研究人员经常获得元认知判断。虽然元认知判断是基于线索和启发式的推断，但尚未有基于判断与决策（JDM）研究的工具和方法进行全面分析。从判断的角度审视元认知，可以发现JDM文献中元认知研究对三个关键问题关注较少。首先，一个很大程度上被忽视的问题是，在做出元认知判断时，人们是整合多个线索，还是使用专注于特定线索的简化判断策略。这个项目的第一部分在有希望的试点工作的基础上系统地解决了这个问题。其次，根据JDM研究成果丰富的透镜模型框架，有几个因素可能会限制元认知判断在分辨率方面的准确性（即元认知判断与跨项目实际表现之间的相关性），即不一致的判断，有效线索和使用线索之间的不匹配，以及判断标准的有限可预测性。本项目的第二部分使用透镜模型来确定元认知判断平庸分辨率的特定来源，并研究元认知判断中线索学习的基础过程。这也可能表明，既定的解决措施严重低估了真正的元认知能力。最后，在JDM研究和实验经济学中，激励最优行为被认为是避免偏见、需求效应和动机丧失的关键。相比之下，元认知判断的准确性几乎没有得到激励。因此，本项目的第三部分研究了偶然激励对元认知判断准确性的影响。特别是，我们评估了文献中的元认知错觉是否是可以通过适当的激励消除的需求效应。总的来说，通过判断的视角来看待元认知将扩展我们对元认知基础的理解，将提供更好的元认知准确性的衡量标准，并为我们提高元认知的准确性提供指导。

Metacognition, the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitive processes, guides effective regulation of behavior. To assess this ability, researchers often obtain metacognitive judgments. Although it is established that metacognitive judgments are inferences based on cues and heuristics, a comprehensive analysis with tools and methods of judgment and decision making (JDM) research has not yet been performed. Viewing metacognition through a judgment lens reveals that metacognition research has paid little attention to three key issues in the JDM literature. First, a largely neglected question is whether, when making metacognitive judgments, people integrate multiple cues or use simplified judgment strategies that focus on particular cues. The first part of this project systematically addresses this question, building on promising pilot work. Second, according to the enormously fruitful lens model framework from JDM research, several factors may limit the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in terms of resolution (i.e., correlations between metacognitive judgments and actual performance across items) – namely, inconsistent judgments, a mismatch between valid and utilized cues, and limited predictability of the judgment criterion. The second part of this project uses the lens model to determine the particular source of mediocre resolution of metacognitive judgments and to investigate the processes that underlie cue learning in metacognitive judgments. This might also reveal that established measures of resolution seriously underestimate true metacognitive ability. Finally, in JDM research and experimental economics, incentivizing optimal behavior is considered crucial to avoid biases, demand effects, and loss of motivation. In contrast, the accuracy of metacognitive judgments has hardly been incentivized. Consequently, the third part of this project investigates the effects of contingent incentives on the accuracy of metacognitive judgments. In particular, we evaluate whether metacognitive illusions in the literature are demand effects that can be eliminated by proper incentives. Overall, viewing metacognition through a judgment lens will extend our understanding of the basis of metacognition, will provide better measures of metacognitive accuracy, and will equip us with guidelines for improving the accuracy of metacognition.