Metacognition viewed through the judgment lens

从判断的角度来看元认知

• 批准号: 404409389
• 负责人: Professor Dr. Arndt Bröder
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Lehrstuhl für Allgemeine Psychologie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 财政年份: 2018
• 资助国家: 德国
• 起止时间: 2017-12-31 至 2022-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/404409389?language=en
• 关键词: Metacognition; viewed; through; judgment; lens

Metacognition, the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitive processes, guides effective regulation of behavior. To assess this ability, researchers often obtain metacognitive judgments. Although it is established that metacognitive judgments are inferences based on cues and heuristics, a comprehensive analysis with tools and methods of judgment and decision making (JDM) research has not yet been performed. Viewing metacognition through a judgment lens reveals that metacognition research has paid little attention to three key issues in the JDM literature. First, a largely neglected question is whether, when making metacognitive judgments, people integrate multiple cues or use simplified judgment strategies that focus on particular cues. The first part of this project systematically addresses this question, building on promising pilot work. Second, according to the enormously fruitful lens model framework from JDM research, several factors may limit the accuracy of metacognitive judgments in terms of resolution (i.e., correlations between metacognitive judgments and actual performance across items) – namely, inconsistent judgments, a mismatch between valid and utilized cues, and limited predictability of the judgment criterion. The second part of this project uses the lens model to determine the particular source of mediocre resolution of metacognitive judgments and to investigate the processes that underlie cue learning in metacognitive judgments. This might also reveal that established measures of resolution seriously underestimate true metacognitive ability. Finally, in JDM research and experimental economics, incentivizing optimal behavior is considered crucial to avoid biases, demand effects, and loss of motivation. In contrast, the accuracy of metacognitive judgments has hardly been incentivized. Consequently, the third part of this project investigates the effects of contingent incentives on the accuracy of metacognitive judgments. In particular, we evaluate whether metacognitive illusions in the literature are demand effects that can be eliminated by proper incentives. Overall, viewing metacognition through a judgment lens will extend our understanding of the basis of metacognition, will provide better measures of metacognitive accuracy, and will equip us with guidelines for improving the accuracy of metacognition.

元认知，监测和控制自己的认知过程的能力，指导行为的有效调节。为了评估这种能力，研究人员经常获得元认知判断。虽然元认知判断是基于线索和推理的推理，但尚未对判断和决策（JDM）研究的工具和方法进行全面分析。通过判断透镜观察元认知，可以发现元认知研究对JDM文献中的三个关键问题关注较少。首先，一个很大程度上被忽视的问题是，在进行元认知判断时，人们是否会整合多种线索，或者使用专注于特定线索的简化判断策略。该项目的第一部分在有希望的试点工作的基础上，系统地探讨了这一问题。第二，根据JDM研究中卓有成效的透镜模型框架，有几个因素可能会限制元认知判断在分辨率方面的准确性（即，元认知判断与项目实际表现之间的相关性）-即不一致的判断，有效和利用的线索之间的不匹配，以及判断标准的有限可预测性。第二部分利用透镜模型来确定元认知判断的平庸分辨率的具体来源，并探讨元认知判断中线索学习的过程。这也可能表明，已建立的解决措施严重低估了真正的元认知能力。最后，在JDM研究和实验经济学中，激励最佳行为被认为是避免偏见、需求效应和动机丧失的关键。相比之下，元认知判断的准确性几乎没有受到激励。因此，本研究的第三部分探讨了权变激励对元认知判断准确性的影响。特别是，我们评估是否在文献中的元认知错觉的需求效应，可以消除适当的激励。总的来说，通过判断透镜来观察元认知将扩展我们对元认知基础的理解，将提供更好的元认知准确性的测量方法，并将为我们提供提高元认知准确性的指导方针。