The ethics of future persons, contractualism and directed duties

未来人的道德、契约主义和定向责任

• 批准号: 459736377
• 负责人: Professorin Dr. Kirsten Meyer
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Institut für Philosophie
• 依托单位国家: 德国
• 项目类别: Research Grants
• 资助国家: 德国
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/projekt/459736377?language=en
• 关键词: ethics; future; persons; contractualism; directed

This project inquires whether we have directed duties towards future persons and whether moral contractualism can provide a satisfactory theoretical foundation of such duties. Moral contractualism understands morality as a hypothetical agreement between reasoning agents in a relation of mutual recognition. Acts are morally wrong if the principles allowing the act can be reasonably rejected as a basis for general agreement. Is moral contractualism well suited to account for the claims of future people? Does it provide a solution to the non-identity problem? Is it necessary to search for an alternative justification of directed duties, or even to drop the assumption that we have directed duties towards future persons? What implications does this entail for the content of our moral obligations towards future persons?

本课题探讨的是，我们是否将义务指向未来人，道德契约主义能否为这种义务提供一个令人满意的理论基础。道德契约主义将道德理解为相互承认关系中推理主体之间的假设协议。如果允许行为的原则可以被合理地拒绝作为普遍同意的基础，那么行为在道德上是错误的。道德契约主义是否适合解释未来人的主张？它是否为非同一性问题提供了解决方案？是否有必要为定向义务寻找另一种正当性，或者甚至放弃我们将义务指向未来人的假设？这对我们对未来人的道德义务的内容有什么影响？