Model of false-name-proof negotiation protocol for networked resources and its evaluation

网络资源防伪协商协议模型及其评估

基本信息

批准号：
17500102
负责人：
SUGAWARA Toshiharu
金额：
$ 2.18万
依托单位：
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, NTT Communication Science Laboratories
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2005
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2005 至 2006
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-17500102/
关键词：
Auction Multi-Agent Systems Load-Balancing Fairness Resource allocation Resource selection Routing Network 負荷分散

项目摘要

This research aims to evaluate the market-based fair and efficient protocol, in order to apply it to the allocations of networked resources for its future applications to this domain. In ad hoc networks used in P2P and the decentralized sensor network, for example, individual nodes are owned by different persons and designed based different specifications. In this case, it is necessary to consider the incentives, that is, reward, to transmit data to each node appropriately. The auction protocol is often used for the decision of this reward. However, by using the fake (false-name) node or by conspiring with other nodes, a certain node can acquire the reward illegally in conventional protocols. We theoretically showed that this type of illegal behaviors cannot be prevented even in Vickrey-Clarke-Groves protocol (VCG) in the research period by this grant.We then proposed Reserve-Cost protocol (RC), which is the extension of VCG by introducing the penalty proportional to the number of agen … More ts (nodes) who manage the network route. We also clarified that the RC is false-name proof, that is, the fairness of RC protocol is not influenced by the false-name bids. In addition, we also showed that RC is more efficient than VCG about 60-80% by small-scale network simulation.Moreover, it is necessary for agents to decide, by using some protocols such as auctions, where to receive/send data based on locally available information in an actual network. This corresponds to the selection of an awarder to some degree when multiple bidding agents (this corresponds to servers in this case) are identified as the appropriate for awarders.In this research, we investigated and analyzed the phenomenon occurring when such a resource allocation protocol was used in a large-scale multi-agent system such as network.In this type of systems, many demands like the resource allocation on the network occurs simultaneously from many different agents independently, thus the entire efficiency falls down. We also identified that a little bit of fluctuation can significantly improved the entire performance by avoiding concentration. Less

这项研究旨在评估基于市场的公平和高效协议，以便将其应用于网络资源的分配，以将其未来应用程序应用于该领域。例如，在P2P和分散的传感器网络中使用的临时网络中，单个节点归不同的人所有，并且设计了基于不同的规格。在这种情况下，有必要考虑激励措施，即奖励，以适当地将数据传输到每个节点。拍卖协议通常用于该奖励的决定。但是，通过使用假（错误名称）节点或与其他节点密谋，某个节点可以在常规协议中非法获取奖励。从理论上讲，即使在该授予的研究期间，即使在Vickrey-Clarke-Groves协议（VCG）中也无法预防这种非法行为。然后，我们提出了拟议的储备金协议（RC），这是VCG的扩展，这是通过对Agen More Ts（Nodes）进行惩罚的惩罚来延长VCG。我们还澄清说，RC是错误的名称证明，即RC协议的公平性不受错误名称的影响。此外，我们还表明，通过小规模网络模拟，RC比VCG更有效，大约60-80％。此外，必须通过使用某些协议（例如拍卖）来决定代理商在实际网络中基于本地可用信息接收/发送数据。当多个投标代理（在这种情况下与服务器相对应）是适合奖励者的情况时，这与一定程度上的选择相对应。在这项研究中，我们调查并分析了发生这种资源分配方案时发生的现象，当时在大型多阶段系统中使用了类型的网络，例如这种类型的网络，以下各种各样的网络，这些范围都与此类型的分配相似，在这种类型的范围内，各种各样的范围都在此类型的范围内分配，这些范围与此相似，在此类型的范围内相似，这些范围内的范围是在这种情况下的各种范围。跌倒。我们还确定，通过避免浓度，一些波动可以显着改善整个性能。较少的

项目成果

期刊论文数量（61）

专著数量（0）

科研奖励数量（0）

会议论文数量（0）

专利数量（0）

Generalized Vickrey Auction and Suppression of Active Adversary Using Incentive-Compatible

使用激励兼容的广义维克里拍卖和抑制主动对手

DOI：
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
IEICE Transactions 88-A・ 1
影响因子：
0
作者：
Makoto Yokoo;Koutarou Suzuki
通讯作者：
Koutarou Suzuki

Efficiency and Fairness of Load Distribution on Scale-Free Property

无标度特性荷载分配的效率和公平性

DOI：
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
AAAI-2005 Workshop on Link Analysis
影响因子：
0
作者：
Kensuke Fukuda;Shin-ya Sato;Osamu Akashi;Kazuhiro Kazama;Toshio Hirotsu;Satoshi Kurihara;Toshiharu Sugawara
通讯作者：
Toshiharu Sugawara

A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments

开放匿名环境中联盟博弈的紧凑表示方案

DOI：
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
Twenty-first National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2006)
影响因子：
0
作者：
Naoki Ohta;Atsushi Iwasaki;Makoto Yokoo;Kohki Maruono;Vincent Conitzer;Tuomas Sandholm
通讯作者：
Tuomas Sandholm

多様な興味を持つ専門家と素人が存在する場合の組合せオークション

当有不同兴趣的专家和业余爱好者时进行组合拍卖