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Model of false-name-proof negotiation protocol for networked resources and its evaluation

网络资源防伪协商协议模型及其评估

基本信息

批准号：
17500102
负责人：
SUGAWARA Toshiharu
金额：
$ 2.18万
依托单位：
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, NTT Communication Science Laboratories
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2005
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2005 至 2006
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-17500102/
关键词：
Auction Multi-Agent Systems Load-Balancing Fairness Resource allocation Resource selection Routing Network 負荷分散

项目摘要

This research aims to evaluate the market-based fair and efficient protocol, in order to apply it to the allocations of networked resources for its future applications to this domain. In ad hoc networks used in P2P and the decentralized sensor network, for example, individual nodes are owned by different persons and designed based different specifications. In this case, it is necessary to consider the incentives, that is, reward, to transmit data to each node appropriately. The auction protocol is often used for the decision of this reward. However, by using the fake (false-name) node or by conspiring with other nodes, a certain node can acquire the reward illegally in conventional protocols. We theoretically showed that this type of illegal behaviors cannot be prevented even in Vickrey-Clarke-Groves protocol (VCG) in the research period by this grant.We then proposed Reserve-Cost protocol (RC), which is the extension of VCG by introducing the penalty proportional to the number of agen … More ts (nodes) who manage the network route. We also clarified that the RC is false-name proof, that is, the fairness of RC protocol is not influenced by the false-name bids. In addition, we also showed that RC is more efficient than VCG about 60-80% by small-scale network simulation.Moreover, it is necessary for agents to decide, by using some protocols such as auctions, where to receive/send data based on locally available information in an actual network. This corresponds to the selection of an awarder to some degree when multiple bidding agents (this corresponds to servers in this case) are identified as the appropriate for awarders.In this research, we investigated and analyzed the phenomenon occurring when such a resource allocation protocol was used in a large-scale multi-agent system such as network.In this type of systems, many demands like the resource allocation on the network occurs simultaneously from many different agents independently, thus the entire efficiency falls down. We also identified that a little bit of fluctuation can significantly improved the entire performance by avoiding concentration. Less

本研究的目的是评估市场为基础的公平和有效的协议，以便将其应用到网络资源的分配，其未来的应用到这一领域。例如，在P2P和分散式传感器网络中使用的自组织网络中，各个节点由不同的人拥有，并且基于不同的规范设计。在这种情况下，有必要考虑激励，即奖励，以适当地向每个节点发送数据。拍卖协议通常用于决定这种奖励。然而，通过使用假（假名）节点或通过与其他节点合谋，某个节点可以在传统协议中非法获得奖励。在此基础上，我们从理论上证明了Vickrey-Clarke-格罗夫斯协议（VCG）在研究期间也不能防止这类非法行为，并提出了保留代价协议（RC），它是VCG的扩展，引入了与阿根数目成比例的惩罚 ...更多信息管理网络路由的节点。我们还澄清了RC是假名证明，即RC协议的公平性不受假名出价的影响。此外，通过小规模的网络仿真，我们还发现RC比VCG的效率高出60-80%.此外，在实际网络中，Agent需要根据本地可用的信息，通过使用拍卖等协议来决定在哪里接收/发送数据.这在一定程度上对应于当多个投标代理人在本研究中，我们调查和分析了当这种资源分配协议用于大规模多代理系统（如网络）时发生的现象。在这种类型的系统中，网络上的资源分配等许多需求同时从许多不同的代理独立地出现，从而整体效率福尔斯下降。我们还发现，一点点的波动可以显着提高整体性能，避免集中。少

项目成果

期刊论文数量（61）

专著数量（0）

科研奖励数量（0）

会议论文数量（0）

专利数量（0）

Generalized Vickrey Auction and Suppression of Active Adversary Using Incentive-Compatible

使用激励兼容的广义维克里拍卖和抑制主动对手

DOI：
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
IEICE Transactions 88-A・ 1
影响因子：
0
作者：
Makoto Yokoo;Koutarou Suzuki
通讯作者：
Koutarou Suzuki

Efficiency and Fairness of Load Distribution on Scale-Free Property

无标度特性荷载分配的效率和公平性

DOI：
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
AAAI-2005 Workshop on Link Analysis
影响因子：
0
作者：
Kensuke Fukuda;Shin-ya Sato;Osamu Akashi;Kazuhiro Kazama;Toshio Hirotsu;Satoshi Kurihara;Toshiharu Sugawara
通讯作者：
Toshiharu Sugawara

A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments

开放匿名环境中联盟博弈的紧凑表示方案

DOI：
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
Twenty-first National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2006)
影响因子：
0
作者：
Naoki Ohta;Atsushi Iwasaki;Makoto Yokoo;Kohki Maruono;Vincent Conitzer;Tuomas Sandholm
通讯作者：
Tuomas Sandholm

多様な興味を持つ専門家と素人が存在する場合の組合せオークション

当有不同兴趣的专家和业余爱好者时进行组合拍卖