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Model of false-name-proof negotiation protocol for networked resources and its evaluation

网络资源防伪协商协议模型及其评估

基本信息

批准号：
17500102
负责人：
SUGAWARA Toshiharu
金额：
$ 2.18万
依托单位：
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation, NTT Communication Science Laboratories
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2005
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2005 至 2006
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/en/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-17500102/
关键词：
Auction Multi-Agent Systems Load-Balancing Fairness Resource allocation Resource selection Routing Network 負荷分散

项目摘要

This research aims to evaluate the market-based fair and efficient protocol, in order to apply it to the allocations of networked resources for its future applications to this domain. In ad hoc networks used in P2P and the decentralized sensor network, for example, individual nodes are owned by different persons and designed based different specifications. In this case, it is necessary to consider the incentives, that is, reward, to transmit data to each node appropriately. The auction protocol is often used for the decision of this reward. However, by using the fake (false-name) node or by conspiring with other nodes, a certain node can acquire the reward illegally in conventional protocols. We theoretically showed that this type of illegal behaviors cannot be prevented even in Vickrey-Clarke-Groves protocol (VCG) in the research period by this grant.We then proposed Reserve-Cost protocol (RC), which is the extension of VCG by introducing the penalty proportional to the number of agen … More ts (nodes) who manage the network route. We also clarified that the RC is false-name proof, that is, the fairness of RC protocol is not influenced by the false-name bids. In addition, we also showed that RC is more efficient than VCG about 60-80% by small-scale network simulation.Moreover, it is necessary for agents to decide, by using some protocols such as auctions, where to receive/send data based on locally available information in an actual network. This corresponds to the selection of an awarder to some degree when multiple bidding agents (this corresponds to servers in this case) are identified as the appropriate for awarders.In this research, we investigated and analyzed the phenomenon occurring when such a resource allocation protocol was used in a large-scale multi-agent system such as network.In this type of systems, many demands like the resource allocation on the network occurs simultaneously from many different agents independently, thus the entire efficiency falls down. We also identified that a little bit of fluctuation can significantly improved the entire performance by avoiding concentration. Less

本研究旨在评估基于市场的公平和高效协议，以便将其应用于网络资源的分配，以实现其在该领域的未来应用。例如，在P2P和分布式传感器网络中使用的自组织网络中，单个节点由不同的人拥有，并根据不同的规范进行设计。在这种情况下，有必要考虑激励，即奖励，以适当地将数据传输到每个节点。拍卖协议通常用于决定这种奖励。然而，在传统协议中，通过使用假（假名）节点或与其他节点合谋，某个节点可以非法获得奖励。我们从理论上证明，即使在研究期间的Vickrey-Clarke-Groves协议（VCG）中也无法阻止这种非法行为。然后提出了Reserve-Cost协议（RC），该协议是VCG的扩展，通过引入与管理网络路由的节点数量成比例的惩罚。我们还澄清了RC是假名证明，即RC协议的公平性不受假名投标的影响。此外，我们还通过小规模网络仿真表明，RC比VCG效率高60-80%。此外，代理有必要根据实际网络中的本地可用信息，通过使用一些协议（如拍卖）来决定在哪里接收/发送数据。当多个投标代理（在本例中对应于服务器）被确定为适合中标者时，这在一定程度上对应于中标者的选择。在本研究中，我们调查和分析了这种资源分配协议在网络等大规模多智能体系统中使用时出现的现象。在这种类型的系统中，许多需求（如网络上的资源分配）同时独立地来自许多不同的代理，从而导致整体效率下降。我们还发现，少量的波动可以通过避免集中而显著提高整体性能。少

项目成果

期刊论文数量（61）

专著数量（0）

科研奖励数量（0）

会议论文数量（0）

专利数量（0）

Generalized Vickrey Auction and Suppression of Active Adversary Using Incentive-Compatible

使用激励兼容的广义维克里拍卖和抑制主动对手

DOI：
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
IEICE Transactions 88-A・ 1
影响因子：
0
作者：
Makoto Yokoo;Koutarou Suzuki
通讯作者：
Koutarou Suzuki

Efficiency and Fairness of Load Distribution on Scale-Free Property

无标度特性荷载分配的效率和公平性

DOI：
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
AAAI-2005 Workshop on Link Analysis
影响因子：
0
作者：
Kensuke Fukuda;Shin-ya Sato;Osamu Akashi;Kazuhiro Kazama;Toshio Hirotsu;Satoshi Kurihara;Toshiharu Sugawara
通讯作者：
Toshiharu Sugawara

A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments

开放匿名环境中联盟博弈的紧凑表示方案

DOI：
发表时间：
2006
期刊：
Twenty-first National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2006)
影响因子：
0
作者：
Naoki Ohta;Atsushi Iwasaki;Makoto Yokoo;Kohki Maruono;Vincent Conitzer;Tuomas Sandholm
通讯作者：
Tuomas Sandholm

多様な興味を持つ専門家と素人が存在する場合の組合せオークション

当有不同兴趣的专家和业余爱好者时进行组合拍卖