Structure of the inference in Buddhist logic -on the dufinition of the inference for others-

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Through the Japanese translation of the section "difinition of the inference for others" in the third chapter of Dharmakirti's Pramanaviniscaya (=PVin III) it is found that his prasanga which is used in the inference has a positive function to be an establishing factor for the formulation of contrapositive form (prasangaviparyaya). Because of his simple description of the prasanga-argument, his followers, Dharmottara and Prajnakaragupta, advocate different interpretations. The main point of differnece is whether the proponent can formulate an autonomous prasangaviparyaya from prasanga or not with respect to the subject which can not be existent for the proponent. According to the study of their commentaries, it is made clear that Prajnakaragupta, advocating that no prasangaviparyaya can be formulated with respect to the nonexistent subject, criticizes Dharmottara's view.Dharmakirti's prasanga-theory exerts a great influence on the Tibetan Buddhist logic. On the basis of Dharmakirit's theory gTsan nag pa (12th c.), one of the earliest Tibetan commentators of the PVin, expounds his own prasanga-theory. I have showed that gTan nag pa's theory on the subject of prasanga-viparyaya bears a close parallel to Prajnakaragupta's view. Bu ston (1290-1364) also alludes to the difference of interpretation on the prasanga-argument between Dharmottara and Prajnakaragupta. From the philological study of their commentaries it follows that Bu ston's allusion can in reality be traced back to their theories. These studies contribute to the elucidation of the development of the Tibetan Buddhist logic from the Indian Buddhist logic from the viewpoint of the interpretation of prasanga.