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Imperfect Information in Contracts between Farm Contractor and Farm : Interpretation by Extensive Form Game

农场承包商与农场之间合同中的不完全信息：广义博弈的解释

基本信息

批准号：
07806029
负责人：
OSANAMI Fumio
金额：
$ 1.34万
依托单位：
HOKKAIDO UNIVERSITY
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1995
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1995 至 1996
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-07806029/
关键词：
Organization of Farm Contract Contract Game Theory Imperfect Information Enforceability of Contracts Farm Contractor Quality of Service Difficulty with the Work 農作業受委託高度な作業易しい作業ゲーム論情報の非対称性農業機械利用組合農協営

项目摘要

Although Japanese agriculture is highly mechanized, the cost of farm machinery is much higher in Japan than in other developed countries, largely owing to the lower utilization of machine-capacity under conditions of small-scale farming on small and widely-scattered plots. It is hoped that the farm contractor will present a possible alternative to over-investment in costly farm machinery.This paper introduces the effects of imperfect information on farm contracts. The extensive form game model was used to analyze this introduction of imperfect or asymmetrical information, and to discuss the conditions for ideal type of farm contractor. We proceed from the assumption that farmers do not perceive the quality of a farm contractor's services, and that they lack the objective criterion to judge the quality of services in advance. Typically, farmers receive only information about the contractor's fee. In terms of the game theoretical analysis, the preceding situation is common knowledge among playrs. The extensive-form game interpretation of farmer/contractor contracts revealed that the most plausible solution to the theoretical model was the combination of low charge and low-quality service. In fact, the combination of high charge and high-quality service is even more profitable for both parties, but does not represent a realistic solution due to a state of imperfect information, and the so-called prisoner's dilemma to which this ignorance gives rise.

虽然日本农业高度机械化，但日本的农业机械成本比其他发达国家高得多，这主要是由于在小而分散的小块土地上进行小规模耕作的条件下，机器能力的利用率较低。本文介绍了不完全信息对农业承包合同的影响。本文运用可拓形式博弈模型分析了这种不完全或不对称信息的引入，并讨论了理想的农业承包商类型的条件。我们的假设是，农民没有感知到承包商的服务质量，他们缺乏客观的标准来判断服务质量的提前。通常，农民只收到关于承包商费用的信息。从博弈论的角度分析，上述情况是博弈者的常识。对农户承包合同的外延式博弈解释表明，理论模型最合理的解决方案是低收费和低质量服务的结合。事实上，高收费和高质量服务的结合对双方来说甚至更有利可图，但由于信息不完善的状态以及这种无知所产生的所谓囚徒困境，这并不是一个现实的解决方案。