Imperfect Information in Contracts between Farm Contractor and Farm : Interpretation by Extensive Form Game

虽然日本农业高度机械化，但日本农业机械的成本比其他发达国家高得多，这主要是由于在小而分散的小规模耕作条件下，机械能力的利用率较低。希望农场承包商能提出一种可能的替代方案，以避免对昂贵的农业机械进行过度投资。本文介绍了不完全信息对农业合同的影响。利用广义博弈模型分析了不完全信息或不对称信息的引入，并讨论了理想类型农场承包者的条件。我们的出发点是假设农民无法感知农场承包商的服务质量，并且他们缺乏提前判断服务质量的客观标准。通常情况下，农民只能获得有关承包商费用的信息。在博弈论分析中，上述情况是参与者的常识。对农民/承包者契约的广义博弈解释表明，低收费和低质量服务的结合是理论模型最合理的解决方案。事实上，高收费和高质量服务的结合对双方都更有利，但由于信息不完全，这并不是一个现实的解决方案，这种无知导致了所谓的囚徒困境。

Although Japanese agriculture is highly mechanized, the cost of farm machinery is much higher in Japan than in other developed countries, largely owing to the lower utilization of machine-capacity under conditions of small-scale farming on small and widely-scattered plots. It is hoped that the farm contractor will present a possible alternative to over-investment in costly farm machinery.This paper introduces the effects of imperfect information on farm contracts. The extensive form game model was used to analyze this introduction of imperfect or asymmetrical information, and to discuss the conditions for ideal type of farm contractor. We proceed from the assumption that farmers do not perceive the quality of a farm contractor's services, and that they lack the objective criterion to judge the quality of services in advance. Typically, farmers receive only information about the contractor's fee. In terms of the game theoretical analysis, the preceding situation is common knowledge among playrs. The extensive-form game interpretation of farmer/contractor contracts revealed that the most plausible solution to the theoretical model was the combination of low charge and low-quality service. In fact, the combination of high charge and high-quality service is even more profitable for both parties, but does not represent a realistic solution due to a state of imperfect information, and the so-called prisoner's dilemma to which this ignorance gives rise.