Economic Benefit of Transportation Reservation System

交通预订系统的经济效益

• 批准号: 12650530
• 负责人: KOBAYASHI Kiyoshi
• 金额: $ 2.3万
• 依托单位: KYOTO UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
• 财政年份: 2000
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2000 至 2001
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-12650530/
• 关键词: reservation; uncertainty; self-selection; social benefit; rational expectation equilibrium

In this research, we consider a single market of transportation services whose supply and consumption are simultaneously made at a point in time. The limited number of tickets is supplied by a monopolistic firm with the fixed price. A customer who is willing to consume a service is faced with two options at reserving timing : 1) to purchase a ticket now, or 2) to defer his/her decision by consuming timing. In choosing an option, the customer should take into account two different types of risks : 1) demand-side risks and 2) supply-side risks. Once the customer has purchased a ticket in advance, he/she is inevitably faced with demand-side risks that he/she should pay for fees if the reservation should be cancelled. The customer can avoid these types of risks by deferring decisions at reserving timing. However, by reserving decisions, the customers will be faced with supply-side risks that the services will be sold out at consuming timing. Thus, the customer is forced to resolve trade-offs between demand- and supply-side risks.This research has formulated an individual reservation behavior model and a rational equilibrium model to forecast the number of reservation in the service market where service supply is rationed. The reservation system functions as a self-selection mechanism, through which those who have relatively large utility toward the service are automatically selected through individual reservation behavior. Eventually, the priorities in allocation are attached to those who have relatively large utility and the efficiency in allocation of the service can be improved. This research also analyzed economic benefit of reservation system. It shows that reservation system does not always improve social welfare because of cancellation fee.

在这项研究中，我们考虑了一个单一的市场的运输服务的供应和消费同时在一个时间点。有限数量的门票由垄断公司以固定价格提供。愿意消费服务的客户在预订时间时面临两个选择：1）现在购买机票，或者2）通过消费时间来推迟他/她的决定。在选择期权时，客户应考虑两种不同类型的风险：1）需求方风险和2）供应方风险。一旦客户提前购买了机票，他/她就不可避免地面临着需求方风险，即如果取消预订，他/她应该支付费用。客户可以通过推迟保留时间的决定来避免这些类型的风险。然而，通过保留决策，客户将面临服务将在消费时间售罄的供应方风险。本研究建立个人预约行为模型与理性均衡模型，预测服务供给受限的服务市场中的预约次数。预约系统起到自选择机制的作用，通过该机制，通过个人预约行为自动选择对服务具有相对较大效用的那些人。最后，优先分配给那些具有较大效用的服务，从而提高服务的分配效率。本研究还分析了预订系统的经济效益。这表明，预约制并不总是因为取消费用而改善社会福利。

项目成果

Kiyosi Kobayasi,Morimitsu Kurino: "The optimal reparing rules under demand uncertainty"2000 IEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics. 655-666 (2000)

Kiyosi Kobayasi，Morimitsu Kurino：“需求不确定性下的最优修复规则”2000 IEE 国际系统、人与控制论会议。

Kakuya Matsushima, Kiyoshi Kobayashi, Takeshi Oro: "Reservation of Transportation Services under Uncertainty"Proc. of the 9th WCTR. (CD-ROM). (2001)

Kakuya Matsushima、Kiyoshi Kobayashi、Takeshi Oro：“不确定性下的交通服务预订”Proc。

松島格也, 小林潔司, 小路剛志: "不確実性下における家計のサービス予約行動"土木計画研究・論文集. 17. 655-666 (2000)

Kakuya Matsushima、Kiyoshi Kobayashi、Tsuyoshi Koji：“不确定性下的家庭服务预订行为”土木工程规划研究与论文。17. 655-666 (2000)。

松島格也, 小林潔司: "交通サービスの予約システムの経済便益"土木計画学研究・講演集. 24,No.92(CD-Rom). (2001)

Kakuya Matsushima、Kiyoshi Kobayashi：“交通服务预订系统的经济效益”土木工程规划研究和讲座集 24，第 92 期（CD-Rom）。

小林潔司,横松宗太: "不確実性下での意思決定行動モデル-期待効用理論を越えて"国際交通安全学会誌. Vol.26 No.1. 40-47 (2000)

Kiyoshi Kobayashi，Sota Yokomatsu：“不确定性下的决策行为模型 - 超越预期效用理论”国际交通安全学会杂志第 26 卷第 1 期（2000 年）。