A STUDY ON INTERNALISTIC CHARACTER OF MORALS ; A VIEW POINT FOR FOUNDATION PROBLEM
道德内在特征研究;
基本信息
- 批准号:13610035
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 0.64万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:日本
- 项目类别:Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
- 财政年份:2001
- 资助国家:日本
- 起止时间:2001 至 2003
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
Previous attempts to conceive of a "foundation of morals" have differed in their results because of the scholars' different definitions of morality. However these projects all included the reference to "Internalistic character of morals". That means, it would be difficult to justify morality with reasons extrinsic to morality and also those justifications end in circulation within the morality. And that also means that morals can only bind the people who accept the moral system itself.This 'Internalistic character of morals", however, is not so obvious in the history of ethics. Ancient and medieval ethics in particular has such conditions as "man's true end" or "The law of God", and under these conditions, "why should man be moral?", was not serious problem. The reason for this was, under the aforementioned conditions it was proper for man to be moral. But in the modern period, a new type of theology (Protestant or Jansenist) asserted that reason can supply no genuine comprehension of … More man's true end, and in fact the modern ethics could not postulate such premises as "man's true end". So for modern ethics it has become necessary to justify the morals and explain why man should be moral. Nevertheless many modern ethical theories, such as Contract theory or Utilitarianism, considered morals to be means to some ends, for example "to happiness", hence the justification of morality was externalistic and therefore incomplete.In these circumstances, Kant tried and failed to deduce a moral law and later asserted, in his "Critique of practical Reason", that moral law was "The fact of reason". This was a precise enunciation of Internalism. But his Internalism was criticized for its dogmatic thought and for the exclusive and rigoristic character of its morality. On the other hand, Kant's unsuccessful argument, which had tried to deduce the necessity of moral law, contains some hints to overcome the problems of Internalism. One of these hints, referred to in chapter 3 of "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals", is the "Natural tendency of reason". It will be argued that this hint can supply clues to release reason from the self-righteousness of Internalism. Less
由于学者们对道德的不同定义,前人对“道德基础”的设想的结果也不同。然而,这些项目都提到了“道德的内在性”。这意味着,很难用道德之外的原因来为道德辩护,而且这些理由最终会在道德内部循环。这也意味着,道德只能约束接受道德制度本身的人。然而,这种“道德的内在性”在伦理学史上并不那么明显。古代和中世纪的伦理学特别具有“人的真实目的”或“上帝的法则”等条件,在这些条件下,“人为什么要有道德?”,并不是一个严重的问题。这样做的原因是,在上述条件下,人是有道德的。但在现代,一种新的神学(新教徒或詹森派)断言,理性不能提供对…的真正理解更多的人的真实目的,而事实上,现代伦理学并不能假设“人的真实目的”这样的前提。因此,对于现代伦理学来说,有必要为道德辩护,并解释为什么人应该是道德的。然而,许多现代伦理学理论,如契约论或功利主义,都认为道德是达到某种目的的手段,例如“为了幸福”,因此道德的辩护是外在的,因此是不完整的。在这种情况下,康德试图推导出一条道德法则,但失败了,后来在他的《实践理性批判》中断言,道德法则是“理性的事实”。这是对国际主义的准确表述。但他的国际主义因其教条思想和道德的排他性和严格性而受到批评。另一方面,康德试图演绎道德法则的必然性的不成功论证,包含了克服内在论问题的一些线索。在《道德形而上学基础》第三章中提到的这些提示之一就是“理性的自然倾向”。有人会争辩说,这一暗示可以提供线索,将理性从内在主义的自以为是中释放出来。较少
项目成果
期刊论文数量(8)
专著数量(0)
科研奖励数量(0)
会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
宇佐美 公生: "道徳の正当化-「理性の自然的性向」との関係で-"岩手大学文化論叢. 6輯. 75-94 (2004)
宇佐见公生:“道德的正当化——与‘理性的自然倾向’的关系——”岩手大学文化理论系列第6版(2004年)。
- DOI:
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- 影响因子:0
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宇佐美 公生: "道徳的実在論とカント倫理学"フィロソフィア・イワテ. 35号. 25-37 (2003)
宇佐美公生:《道德现实主义与康德伦理学》《岩手哲学》第 35 期。25-37 (2003)。
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- 影响因子:0
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Kosei USAMI: "The Meaning of Ethics naturalized"The Annual Report of The Faculty of Education, Iwate University. Vol.62. 45-58 (2002)
宇佐美浩成:“道德的意义自然化”岩手大学教育学部年度报告。
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- 影响因子:0
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宇佐美 公生: "道徳の内在主義における「外的なもの」"岩手大学文化論叢. 第五輯(近刊). (2002)
Kousei Usami:“道德内在主义中的‘外部事物’”岩手大学文化理论系列第5卷(即将出版)。
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- 影响因子:0
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宇佐美 公生: "道徳の内在主義的性格について"岩手大学教育学部研究年報. 61巻1号. 1-12 (2001)
宇佐见公生:《论道德的内在特征》岩手大学教育学部年度报告,第 61 卷,第 1. 1-12 期(2001 年)。
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USAMI Kosei其他文献
USAMI Kosei的其他文献
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{{ truncateString('USAMI Kosei', 18)}}的其他基金
Reconstruction of the Metaphysics of Morals using Dialectics as a Clue : Beyond Moral Naturalism
以辩证法为线索重建道德形而上学:超越道德自然主义
- 批准号:
19520005 - 财政年份:2007
- 资助金额:
$ 0.64万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
Comparative Philosophical Considerations on Justice and Human Rights
关于正义与人权的比较哲学思考
- 批准号:
16320013 - 财政年份:2004
- 资助金额:
$ 0.64万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
A STUDY ON MORAL THEORY AS INTERNAL REALISM AND THE REALITY OF FREEDOM
作为内在现实主义和自由现实的道德理论研究
- 批准号:
10610030 - 财政年份:1998
- 资助金额:
$ 0.64万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
CONFIDENCE AND CRITIQUE ; MORAL OBJECTIVITY AND RELATIVITY OF IN VIRTUE ETHICS
信心与批评;
- 批准号:
07610033 - 财政年份:1995
- 资助金额:
$ 0.64万 - 项目类别:
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)